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It is possible to read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without 
realizing that they are not about human beings at all. When one 
encounters the name of the creature—monkey, dog, mole—one 
looks up in fright and realizes that one is already far away from the 
continent of man. 
—Walter Benjamin,“Franz Kafka: 
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Kafka and Other Animals 
Nonhuman protagonists are ubiquitous in Franz Kafka’s oeuvre, from his 
early stories down to the very last one. Among them we fnd dogs, jackals, 
leopards, a tiger, a panther, a vulture, a cat, and a mouse; a few unspecifed 
animals, such as a mole-like and a marten-like; mythological creatures, 
including sirens and a dragon; a kitten-lamb crossbreed; and several hum-
animal protagonists: a human transformed into vermin, a man who used 
to be a horse, and an ape turned into a human being. Nonhuman animals1 
abound also in Kafka’s personal writings. In a letter to his fancée, Felice 
Bauer, Kafka formulated his ultimate aim: “I strive to know the entire hu-
man and animal community, to recognize their fundamental preferences, 
desires, and moral ideals, to reduce them to simple rules, and as quickly 
as possible to adopt these rules” (LF, 545). His diaries and letters also re-
veal unique and enduring identifcations with nonhuman animals. “I am 
thriving among all the animals” (LFFE, 150), he declares in a letter to his 
friends Max and Elsa Brod, while visiting his sister on a farm in the village 
of Zürau. “But I truly sufered to the full the anguish of all animal nature” 
(LFFE, 216), he writes to another friend; and in a letter to Milena Jesenská, 
his Czech translator and intimate friend, Kafka states: “Fundamentally I 
was still only the animal, belonged still only in the forest” (LM, 159). In 
his biography of Kafka, Pietro Citati notes: 
He sensed an animal within him. Again and again, composing with 
the fgures of his unconscious a bestiary just as immense as a medi-






eval one. He felt within him a beetle or a hibernating cockchafer; 
a mole that dug tunnels through the ground; a mouse that fed the 
moment man arrives; a slithering snake; a worm squashed by a hu-
man foot; a futtering bat; a parasite insect that fed on our blood; a 
sylvan beast that lay desperate in a flthy ditch or in its den; a crow 
gray like ashes with atrophied wings; a dog that snarled and bared 
its teeth at anyone who disturbed him, or barked nervously running 
around a statue; a twofold animal with the body of a lamb, the head 
and claws of a cat.2 
Kafka’s fascination with animality, within and beyond humanity, did 
not escape his attentive early readers. In his essay on the tenth anniver-
sary of Kafka’s death, Walter Benjamin maintains that “the world of his 
ancestors was as unfathomable as the world of realities was important for 
him, and we may be sure that, like the totem poles of primitive peoples, 
the world of ancestors took him down to the animals.”3 In a similar vein, 
Teodor Adorno notes that “the fight through man and beyond into the 
non-human—that is Kafka’s epic course.”4 Joachim Seyppel’s 1956 study, 
arguably the frst full-length essay on Kafka’s nonhuman animals, under-
scores their central role in his writings: 
Tere is in particular one theme which has so far escaped accurate 
and detailed analysis: the animal theme. Tere are in his writings 
countless references to animals, human-animal comparisons, allu-
sions to animal life, fables, and animal motifs; there are important 
works in which the human person has been transformed into an 
animal, or vice versa. Tere are hardly any stories in which Kafka 
did not include at least one signifcant reference to creatures of the 
animal kingdom.5 
In their 1975 book on Kafka, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari defne his 
writing as “essentially animalistic.”6 In some contemporary scholarship, 
Kafka’s work has been celebrated as unveiling a “creaturely realm” that is 
“marked by a sustained engagement with animality,” and Kafka himself 
hailed as a harbinger of animal studies critiques of anthropomorphism 
and as “the most thoroughgoing bestiarist of the modern period.”7 In fact, 
the neologism “zoopoetics” was coined by Jacques Derrida in reference to 














Despite the prominence of nonhuman animals throughout Kafka’s writ-
ing, their representation has been predominantly regarded as a mere alle-
gory of intrahuman matters, such as Judaism and Zionism, modern alien-
ation, metaphysical concepts, and psychoanalytic ideas. In Die Funktion 
der Tierfguren im Werke Franz Kafkas (1969), the frst book dedicated to 
animal representation in Kafka’s work, Karl-Heinz Fingerhut concludes 
that Kafka’s animal fgures are depictions of human attributes and ciphers 
of human thoughts.9 Te allegorization of Kafka’s animal stories is abun-
dant in contemporary criticism as well, deriving from a widespread ten-
dency to allegorize both animal stories and Kafka’s stories. 
Nonhuman animal fgures in literature have been interpreted frst and 
foremost allegorically, that is, as representing something else. “Animals 
have served literature well. Tey have stood as allegorical fgures to repre-
sent human nature and as a rich body of metaphors for the inanimate as 
well as the animate,”10 maintains Mary Allen in the opening of her pio-
neering 1983 study Animals in American Literature. Yet reading nonhu-
man animals as standing for something else replaces a reading of them as 
standing for themselves. Allegorization is therefore an act of exclusion, as 
another pathbreaker in the feld of literary animal studies, Margot Norris, 
states in her 1985 Beasts of the Modern Imagination: “Nowhere in literature 
were animals allowed to be themselves, to refer to Nature and to their own 
animality without being pressed into symbolic service as metaphors, or as 
fgures in fable or allegory.”11 More recently, Susan McHugh, in her criti-
cal study of animal stories, points out that “although animals abound in 
literature across all ages and cultures, only in rarifed ways have they been 
the focal point of systematic literary study,”12 while Mario Ortiz-Robles 
notes that “from the earliest epics, fables, parables, and plays, animals have 
donned a great variety of guises to become the privileged presences that 
show us how to be human.”13 
Te systematic exclusion of nonhuman animals from literary discourse
despite their ubiquitous presence throughout the literary canon may be
explained by a famous psychological experiment called “Te Invisible Go-
rilla.” In this experiment, subjects were shown a short video of two groups
passing basketballs around and asked to count how many times the players
in one of the groups pass the ball. Halfway through the video, someone in a
gorilla suit strolls into the middle of the screen, pounds his chest, and then

























walks out of the frame. Focusing entirely on the given assignment, about
half of the subjects missed the gorilla. When asked if they had noticed any-
thing unusual, whether they had spotted anything walk through the scene,
even more specifcally—if they had seen a gorilla, the answer was no. Tis
experiment demonstrates selective attention, also known as inattentional
blindness, such that we fail to see things we are not prepared to see.14 
“Te Invisible Gorilla” frst came to my mind while teaching a course 
on animal stories. When I mentioned Moby Dick, several students were 
surprised, for they could not recall any nonhuman fgure in the book. Like 
the preoccupied viewers who had not seen the gorilla in the video, the 
students—preoccupied with the allegorical and symbolic functions of the 
whale—failed to notice the tremendous whale Moby Dick in Moby Dick. 
Literary critics are no diferent: they tend to read through nonhuman pro-
tagonists in literature, and thus these literary animals become invisible. 
Yet, unlike the invisible gorilla experiment, animal stories are read without 
any specifc instructions. So why is the reader’s attention so selective? What 
distracts the reader from the nonhuman fgures? In a single word, the an-
swer to these questions is anthropocentrism. 
Te term “anthropocentrism” was coined in the 1860s, amid the initial
controversy over Darwin’s theory of evolution, to represent the view that
humans are at the center of the universe.15 In animal studies and posthu-
manist theory, anthropocentrism is regarded as an ideology of human excep-
tionalism, which operates to “maintain the centrality and priority of human
existence through marginalizing and subordinating nonhuman perspectives,
interests and beings.”16 An overarching anthropocentric ideology directs our
attention to specifc things (humans) and away from others (nonhumans).
Asking “What do they represent?” and “What do they stand for?” When
dealing with nonhuman animals in literature, we often ask “What do they
represent?” and “What do they stand for?” assuming that they cannot simply
represent and stand for themselves, as they are neither important nor inter-
esting in themselves. As numerous scholars have pointed out, nonhuman
animals are typically invisible in the literary discourse, which projects upon
them categories and values derived from human society.17 Te anthropocen-
tric tendency to view nonhuman animals—neither the same as humans nor
totally dissimilar—fguratively goes far beyond literary practices. “We polish
an animal mirror to look for ourselves,”18 Donna Haraway observes, echoing
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s famous saying, “Animals are good to think with.”19 


















has expanded considerably over the past few decades in various academic
disciplines. In what is known as “the animal turn,”20 nonhuman animals
have moved beyond the confnes of the natural sciences, spreading to the
humanities and social sciences, and have been brought within the scope of
cultural, political, and ethical considerations. Engaging with various theo-
retical and critical approaches, the cross- and interdisciplinary feld of ani-
mal studies (also known as human-animal studies or critical animal studies)
has been energized since the 1990s by poststructuralist and posthumanist
theorists. Te subfeld of literary animal studies, which emerged from the
interplay between literary studies and animal studies, explores the represen-
tation of nonhuman animals in literary texts, as well as the cultural origins
and impacts of fctional animal representations.21 In this way, the allegori-
cal conception of nonhuman animals in fction has been replaced in recent
scholarship by a zoopoetic approach, which “revisits, examines, perplexes,
provokes, and explores the agency of the nonhuman animal.”22 
Resistance to the allegorical reading of Kafka’s animals, however, is not 
limited to animal studies and posthumanist critique. Alongside the overall 
tendency to allegorize animal stories, there is also a pronounced inclina-
tion to allegorize the work of Kafka. It seems that the enigmatic nature of 
his fction has led many of Kafka’s commentators in this direction. Max 
Brod, Kafka’s lifelong friend and posthumous editor and publisher, canon-
ized the Jewish interpretations in the 1920s and 1930s, and gradually, as 
James Rolleston says, “It became evident that whatever worldview came 
to dominate the Western intellectual scene—existentialist, structuralist, 
postmodern—Kafka’s writing seemed to respond eagerly, as if pioneering 
the new trend.”23 A similar observation can be found in Susan Sontag’s 
renowned essay “Against Interpretation”: 
Te work of Kafka  .  .  . has been subjected to a mass ravishment 
by no less than three armies of interpreters. Tose who read Kafka 
as a social allegory see case studies of the frustrations and insanity 
of modern bureaucracy and its ultimate issuance in the totalitarian 
state. Tose who read Kafka as a psychoanalytic allegory see desper-
ate revelations of Kafka’s fear of his father, his castration anxieties, 
his sense of his own impotence, his thralldom to his dreams. Tose 
who read Kafka as a religious allegory explain that K. in Te Castle
is trying to gain access to heaven, that Joseph K. in Te Trial is being 
judged by the inexorable and mysterious justice of God.24 









Te allegorical approach to Kafka’s stories has been widely criticized 
in recent Kafka scholarship, which rejects allegorization as a barrier—
rather than an aid—to understanding, pointing out that Kafka’s narratives 
have no simple allegorical key and therefore are not allegories at all.25 As 
early as 1934, Walter Benjamin claims in his infuential essay on Kafka, 
that “his parables are never exhausted by what is explainable; on the con-
trary, he took all conceivable precautions against the interpretation of his 
writings. . . . Both the psychoanalytic and the theological interpretations 
equally miss the essential points.”26 While Adorno also recruited Kafka 
to his ideological agenda, arguing that his work deals with the material-
ist mechanism of modern society, the main contribution of his landmark 
essay on Kafka was the rejection of Brod’s approach, according to which 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between Kafka’s fctional universe 
and extradiegetic ideas. As Adorno notes, in Kafka’s texts “Each sentence 
says ‘interpret me,’ and none will permit it.”27 In fact, even Max Brod, who 
is identifed with the allegorical approach to Kafka’s work—and the Jewish 
allegories in particular—argues in his biography of Kafka that “Kafka never 
is allegorical, but he is symbolical in the highest sense.”28 Likewise, Albert 
Camus claims in “Hope and the Absurd in the Work of Franz Kafka,” the 
appendix to Te Myth of Sisyphus: 
Te whole art of Kafka consists in forcing the reader to reread. His 
endings, or his absence of endings, suggest explanations which, 
however, are not revealed in clear language but, before they seem 
justifed, require that the story be reread from another point of 
view.29 
Heinz Politzer has famously coined the term “open parable” to describe 
Kafka’s poetics, asserting that his stories indeed have meaning that exceeds 
the literal text, but that this meaning is evasive, and that the stories are 
therefore paradoxical: an unsolvable riddle.30 Tis approach has had a 
profound impact on Kafka studies. Relatedly, Gerhard Neumann labels 
Kafka’s prose a “sliding paradox” (gleitendes Paradox) to refer to the way 
his writing confronts us with paradoxes; through devices like semantic dis-
placements or alienating metaphors and the countering of reader’s expecta-
tion, Kafka leads his reader into a space where all rigid concepts begin to 







   
 
7 Introduction
Kafka’s truth is not Kafka’s world (no more Kafka-ism), but the signs
of that world. Tus the work is never an answer to the world’s mys-
tery; literature is never dogmatic. By imitating the world and its 
legends, the writer can show only the sign without the signifed: the 
world is a place endlessly open to signifcation but endlessly dis-
satisfed by it.  .  .  . Kafka’s narrative authorizes a thousand equally 
plausible keys—which is to say, it validates none.32 
More recently, Paul Haacke notes in his essay on Kafka’s political animals: 
Kafka’s stories do not communicate an explanatory message in the 
voice of a didactic authority, and they are not presented in the form 
of teleological narratives that lead to a resolute moral, maxim or 
conclusion. Instead of providing examples for the purpose of in-
struction or guidance, they remain ambiguous, paradoxical, and 
open to multiple or conficting interpretations.33 
Paradoxically, this resistance to interpretation has become the most use-
ful key for interpreting the work of Kafka.34 In the conclusion of his Idea of 
Prose, entitled “Kafka Defended against His Interpreters,” Giorgio Agam-
ben states that “the only content of the inexplicable—and in this lies the 
subtlety of the doctrine—consists in the command—truly inexplicable—
‘Explain!’”35 Agamben’s words echo Kafka’s short piece “Prometheus,” 
which tells four diferent legends seeking to explain the myth, but eventu-
ally concludes: “Tere remained the inexplicable mass of rock. Te legend 
tried to explain the inexplicable. As it came out of a substratum of truth it 
had in turn to end in the inexplicable” (CS, 432). Tis metatextual theme 
can be traced in many of Kafka’s writings; for example, “On Parables” 
(“Von den Gleichnissen”) dramatizes the situation of those trying to fnd 
meaning in texts, stating, “In efect, all these parables merely attempt to say 
that the inconceivable is inconceivable, and we know that already” (KSS, 
161). Likewise, the closing sentence of Kafka’s story “Te Test” (“Die Prü-
fung”) is “He who does not answer the questions has passed the test” (CS, 
442). Te priest’s words to Josef K. in Kafka’s novel Te Trial (Der Prozess), 
“What is written is unchanging, and opinions are often just an expression 
of despair at that” (T, 157), can also be read as refecting Kafka’s skeptical 
approach to interpretation. 




Moreover, the inability of Kafka’s protagonists to reach the destination 
of their journey has been often read as equivalent to readers’ inability to 
reach their own destination in the journey of reading, which is supposed 
to culminate in fnding the meaning of the story. Tis is, of course, central 
in Kafka’s novel Te Castle (Das Schloss), as well as in numerous short sto-
ries and fragments. Te reaction of the policeman to the narrator’s request 
for directions in the short story “A Comment” (“Ein Kommentar”) may 
refect Kafka’s reply to his commentators: 
He smiled and said, “you want me to tell you the way?” “Yes,” I said, 
“since I can’t fnd it myself.” “Forget about it! Forget about it!” he 
said, and with a broad swing of his body he turned away, like people 
who want to be alone with their laughter. (KSS, 161) 
In the same vein, Kafka’s brief story “Advocates” (“Fürsprecher”) concludes: 
So if you have started out on a walk, continue it whatever happens; 
you can only gain, you run no risk, in the end you may fall over a 
precipice perhaps, but had you turned back after the frst steps and 
run downstairs you would have fallen at once—and not perhaps, 
but for certain. So if you fnd nothing in the corridors open the 
doors, and if you fnd nothing behind these doors there are more 
foors, and if you fnd nothing up there, don’t worry, just leap up 
another fight of stairs. As long as you don’t stop climbing, the stairs 
won’t end, under your climbing feet they will go on growing up-
wards. (CS, 451) 
Te antiallegorical approach to the work of Kafka has also infuenced 
the way his animal stories are read, and the critique that allegorization is 
counterpoetic has also brought about a growing interest in Kafka’s nonhu-
man animals per se. Drawing attention to Kafka’s statement in his diary, 
“Metaphors are one among many things which make me despair of writ-
ing” (D, 398), Deleuze and Guattari apply this antimetaphorical approach 
to the nonhuman animals in Kafka’s oeuvre: 
Kafka deliberately kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all signifca-
tion, no less than all designation. Metamorphosis is the contrary of 







but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. 
Te thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities 
overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following their 
line of escape. It is no longer a question of a resemblance between the 
comportment of an animal and that of a man; it is even less a ques-
tion of a simple wordplay.36 
Even within the allegorical framework, many literary scholars have long 
rejected the reduction of the text to the allegorical level. In his classic Seven 
Types of Ambiguity (1930), William Empson states: 
Part of the function of an allegory is to make you feel that two levels 
of being correspond to each other in detail and indeed that there is 
some underlying reality, something in the nature of things, which 
makes this happen. . . . But the efect of allegory is to keep the two 
levels of being very distinct in your mind though they interpen-
etrate each other in so many details.37 
Similarly, Angus Fletcher, in his extensive study of allegory, asserts that the 
literal level of many allegories is free of the usual allegorical intention, so 
that the work is no longer felt to be strongly iconographic. In such cases, 
the diegetic level of the narrative is to be taken in a completely literal 
way, becoming sufcient unto itself.38 Northrop Frye also problematizes 
the very notion of allegory, arguing that every literary analysis is allegorical 
to some degree, as it exceeds the diegesis and refers to the actual universe; 
hence, he distinguishes a limit case of naive allegory, namely a work that is 
“so anxious to make its own allegorical points that it has no real literary or 
hypothetical center.”39 
Animal fable, in which the literal level is by defnition subjected to the 
thematic level, seems to be such a limit case; but even the reduction of 
this limit case has been challenged. Refecting on the role of nonhuman 
animals in animal fables, Emmanuel Levinas states that “men are seen as
these animals and not only through these animals; the animals stops and 
fll up thought. An allegory is not . . . a poor man’s symbol.”40 If even in 
animal fables the nonhuman animals should be taken into consideration, 
this must be even more so in complex texts such as Kafka’s animal stories. 
Te poetic critique of allegorization thereby intensifes the animal studies 
critique, inasmuch as the reduction of literary nonhuman animals to in-





trahuman concepts fails to notice the complexity of both the literary text 
and the nonhuman animals. 
Embracing Humanimality 
Te innovative zoopoetic approach to literary animals seeks to critically ex-
amine human-animal dynamics and explore the experience of nonhuman 
animals. Te outlying position taken against the exploration of nonhuman 
experience presumes that such experience does not exist. Te Cartesian 
doctrine, according to which nonhuman animals have no mental experi-
ence, not even the simplest experiences of pain and pleasure, as they are 
nothing but “machines made by the hands of God,”41 has long been aban-
doned and scientifcally refuted.42 Te common contemporary argument 
against representing nonhuman experience is now epistemological rather 
than ontological; it is concerned with denying, not the existence of nonhu-
man consciousness, but our ability to access it. 
Indeed, the representation of nonhuman experience in fction poses a 
unique challenge. In contrast to other artistic forms, the literary represen-
tation is restricted to a verbal account, and as such encounters stumbling 
blocks when depicting nonhuman focalization, which is inherently non-
verbal.43 Unlike most other societal minorities, nonhuman animals cannot 
tell their own story; hence their representation is inevitably performed by 
humans.44 “How is it possible to be true to animal experience, even if that 
were the wish,” Gillian Beer asks, “if your medium of description is written 
human language?”45 Te fundamental challenge of nonhuman representa-
tion in literature was addressed already in 1927, in E. M. Forster’s famous 
treatise on the novel: 
Since the actors in a story are usually human, it seems convenient 
to entitle this aspect People. Other animals have been introduced, 
but with limited success, for we know too little so far about their 
psychology. Tere may be, probably will be, an alteration here in 
the future . . . and we shall have animals who are neither symbolic, 
nor little men disguised, nor as four-legged tables moving, nor as 
painted scraps of paper that fy. It is one of the ways where science 
may enlarge the novel, by giving it fresh subject-matter. But the 
help has not been given yet, and until it comes we may say that the 












Since Forster wrote these words we have witnessed signifcant develop-
ments in cognitive ethnology that substantially contributed to the scien-
tifc knowledge of nonhuman animals. Tis knowledge, as Cary Wolfe 
notes, can be transferred from scientifc to literary accounts: 
Given what we have learned in recent decades about many non-
human animals—the richness of their mental and emotional lives, 
the complexity of their forms of communication and interactions—
many scholars now think that we are forced to make the same kind 
of shift in the ethics of reading and interpretation that attended 
taking sexual diference seriously in the 1990s (in the form of queer 
theory) or race and gender seriously in the 1970s and 1980s.47 
In fact, animal literature should have not waited for a scientifc break-
through. First, as Konrad Lorenz shows, realistic animal fction at the turn 
of the twentieth century—achieved by careful empathic observation and 
not by scientifc knowledge—has largely infuenced animal science, and 
not vice versa.48 
More importantly, realistic writing of nonhuman animals is merely one
possibility—among other options—for creating nonhuman fgures who are
more than merely “little men disguised,” in Forster’s terms, or “absent refer-
ents,” in Carol Adams’s formulation.49 Literary accounts are not restricted to
realistic representation, and mimesis is neither the exclusive nor necessarily
the preeminent manner of depiction in literature. As Tom Regan and An-
drew Linzey assert in their study of nonhuman animals in literature: 
What literature can do—as can probably no other discipline—is to 
reconnect us with the world of animals. No matter how much we 
may learn about animals from disciplines such as psychology and 
biology (for they have much to teach us), that knowledge cannot 
replace the insights that can come from the disciplined exercise of 
our imagination.50 
Te fact that the protagonist of Virginia Woolf ’s novel Orlando, for exam-
ple, abruptly transforms from male to female with no explanation certainly 
does not mark gender issues as irrelevant to the novel. In like manner, 
species issues are essential when discussing Gregor Samsa’s overnight trans-
formation from human to nonhuman in Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis,” 
regardless of the nonrealistic nature of this transformative event. 












Literary nonhuman animals, including anthropomorphized ones, 
should raise questions about human/nonhuman dynamics and illuminate 
the nonhuman condition. Anthropomorphism, in other words, is not 
equivalent to anthropocentrism. Narratives that use anthropomorphism 
and do not represent nonhuman animals faithfully may have—beside an-
thropomorphic elements—other elements that deal with the nonhuman 
experience, as well as human-nonhuman relations and dynamics. “Tere 
are degrees of personifcation,” I. A. Richards argues in his epochal Prac-
tical Criticism (1929); “it can range from a mere momentary loan of a 
single human attribute or impulse to the projection of a complete spiritual 
being.”51 Various contemporary scholars have recognized the literary spec-
trum of anthropomorphism, falling between the pure mimetic and the 
completely anthropomorphized representation.52 As Erica Fudge observes: 
Anthropomorphism might actually serve an ethical function: if we
don’t believe that in some way we can communicate with and under-
stand animals, what is to make us stop and think as we experiment
upon them, eat them, put them in cages? By gaining access to the
world of animals, these books ofer a way of thinking about human-
animal relations more generally, and potentially more positively.53 
Consider, for example, the Aesopian fable “Te Man and the Lion 
Traveling Together”: 
A man and a lion were traveling along together one day when they 
began to argue about which of them was stronger. Just then they 
passed a stone statue representing a man strangling a lion. “Tere, 
you see, we are stronger than you,” said the man, pointing it out to 
the lion. But the lion smiled and replied: “If lions could make stat-
ues, you would see plenty of men under the paws of lions.”54 
Tis fable, which on the literal level deals with human-animal power rela-
tions, has been largely read as a fable about power relations within hu-
manity. Te abolitionist Wendell Phillips, for example, famously referred 
to it in his 1845 preface to Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an 
American Slave: “You remember the old fable of ‘Te Man and the Lion,’ 
where the lion complained that he should not be so misrepresented when 







history.’”55 Nevertheless, such reading, which sees the lion as standing for 
subordinate groups, deprived of self-representation, should not exclude 
nonhuman animals, who inherently cannot represent themselves. Te an-
thropomorphized lion, who anticipates here the contemporary critique of 
the canon, radically exposes cultural representations as anthropocentric 
practice that merely refects the perspective and interests of the dominat-
ing humans. 
Like Aesop’s lion, as well as many other anthropomorphized animals, 
Kafka’s anthropomorphized fgures can also be read in a nonanthropocen-
tric way. Following the Kantian account of imagination as “another nature 
out of the material that actual nature gives it,”56 Hannah Arendt contends 
that it is a misunderstanding to class Kafka with the surrealists. Arendt 
describes Kafka’s storytelling as the construction of models, comparing 
them to blueprints, “which sometimes in a page, or even in a single phrase, 
expose the naked structure of events,” and can be understood only “by 
those who are willing and able to realize by their own imagination the in-
tentions of architects and the future appearances of buildings.”57 Paradoxi-
cally, Kafka’s nonrealistic depiction of social reality is regarded as peculiarly 
truthful; hence Georg Lukács holds that “Kafka belongs with the great 
realist writers.”58 Correspondingly, Kafka’s nonrealistic portrayal of nonhu-
man animals, who intertwine both human and nonhuman traits, should 
be viewed as a truthful alternative to the anthropocentric human-animal 
contradistinction. Like Woolf ’s case of gender fuidity, Kafka’s species fu-
idity implies the radical suspension of the human/animal binary. Stand-
ing on the threshold between humanity and animality, Kafka’s fctional 
creatures undermine the species barrier, creating a liminal human-animal 
space, which can be described as “humanimal.” 
Species fuidity in literature at the turn of the twentieth century, which 
is part of the larger phenomenon of animal abundance in the literature of 
this period, has been broadly recognized in literary animal studies as post-
Darwinian.59 Inspired by Darwin’s theory of the mutability of species and 
intensifed by Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical anthropocentrism, as 
well as Freud’s mapping of the unconscious, the notion of the animalized 
human struck at the normative thinking and imaginary at the turn of the 
twentieth century.60 In his memoir Conversations with Kafka, Kafka’s friend 
Gustav Janouch tells an anecdote indicating that Kafka himself viewed his 
humanimal writing as a product of the zeitgeist. Janouch had presented 
to Kafka David Garnett’s Lady into Fox, a British metamorphosis novella 











published in 1922, suggesting that Garnett had imitated Kafka’s “Te 
Metamorphosis.” Rejecting the idea of plagiarism, Kafka’s reply was: “But 
no! He didn’t get that from me. It’s a matter of the age. We both copied 
from that. Animals are closer to us than human beings. Tat’s where our 
prison bars lie. We fnd relations with animals easier than with men.”61 
Alongside the post-Darwinian zeitgeist, Kafkalogists have also related 
the poetics of Kafka to his sociopolitical condition as a German Jew liv-
ing in Prague. Examining Kafka’s writing through a sociohistorical prism, 
Pavel Eisner, in his 1948 Franz Kafka and Prague, depicts Kafka as living 
in a “triple ghetto”: 
In the eyes of the Czechs, the German Jew was a stranger in three 
senses: as a Jew, either owing to creed or to unmixed blood; as a 
generally comfortable, prosperous and, often enough, rich citizen, 
in the midst of a crowd of proletarians and small bourgeois; and 
thirdly, as a German.62 
In his 1951 study, Franz Kafka, Günther Anders suggests further contexts 
for Kafka’s ultimate otherness: 
For where indeed did he belong? As a Jew not quite to the Chris-
tian world; and as a non-practicing Jew—as he originally was—
not quite among the Jews. As a German-speaking Czech, not quite 
among the Czechs; and as a German-speaking Jew, not quite among 
the Bohemian Germans. As a Bohemian, not quite to Austria. As 
an ofcial of a workers’ insurance company, not quite to the middle 
class. Yet as a son of a middle-class family, not quite to the working 
class. He cannot feel at home among his ofce colleagues, for he 
knows himself to be a writer. But he is unable to live entirely as a 
writer either, for he sacrifces his energies to the welfare of his family. 
But “in my family I am more estranged than a stranger.”63 
Stranded between identities, Kafka has been regarded as apolitical,64 
a notion that is often illustrated by his remarkable diary entry of August 
2, 1914: “Germany has declared war on Russia—swimming in the after-
noon” (D, 301). Nevertheless, portraying Kafka as apolitical due to his 
lack of interest in war afairs refects a narrow conception of politics, fo-









a capital P.65 Whereas Kafka’s fctional and nonfctional writings do not 
deal with Politics, they certainly focus on politics, exploring questions of 
inclusion and exclusion, social and familial power relations, as well as the 
very notion of boundaries. Deleuze and Guattari see Kafka’s subversive 
relationship to the dominant German culture in fn de siècle Prague as 
the key to understanding his work. For them, Kafka’s work is an exemplar 
of minor literature, which leads an attack on the majority by using its 
language outside the relative territory of that majority, and essentially has 
political themes and collective value.66 
Kafka’s attack on the majority, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, is refected 
also in his approach—in life and fction alike—to nonhuman animals. In 
striking contrast to his indiference to the outbreak of the First World War, 
Kafka shows genuine concern and compassion for nonhuman animals, as 
illustrated, for example, by an entry in his diary three months later: “Yes-
terday a fallen horse with a bloody knee on Niklasstrasse. I looked away 
and uncontrollably grimaced in the broad daylight” (D, 350). In a letter to 
Felice, he maintains: “Had you not been lying on the ground among the 
animals, you wouldn’t have been able to see the sky and the stars wouldn’t 
have been set free. Perhaps you wouldn’t have survived the terror of stand-
ing upright” (LF, 447). Elias Canetti, who stated that “Kafka’s work is 
dipped in the color of powerlessness,”67 interprets this passage as follows: 
One must lie down with the beasts in order to be set free, or re-
deemed. Standing upright signifes the power of man over beasts; 
but precisely in the most obvious attitude man is exposed, visible, 
vulnerable. For this power is also guilt, and only on the ground, ly-
ing among the animals, can one see the stars, which frees one from 
this terrifying power of man.68 
His social alienation, on the one hand, and his empathy with the power-
less, on the other, lead Kafka to feel detached from human beings and to 
identify with nonhuman animals, the most powerless of beings. “Often—
and in my inmost self perhaps all the time—I doubt whether I am a hu-
man being,” he writes to Felice, and shortly after he confdently asserts, 
“I am not a human being” (LF, 287–88). Kafka’s sincere commitment to 
nonhuman animals, in both life and writing, is encapsulated in his remark-
able words to a fsh, while looking into his eyes in the Berlin aquarium: 
“Now at last I can look at you in peace, I don’t eat you anymore.”69 Grant-











ing animality a preeminent status, Kafka directs his reader towards inter-
species ethics and politics. 
Additionally, animal representations in Kafka’s canon are always hu-
manimal, seeking to explore not only the nonhuman experience, but also 
the very animal-human divide, and as such they are highly political. As 
Adorno notes, “Instead of human dignity, the supreme bourgeois con-
cept, there emerges in him the salutary recollection of the similarity be-
tween man and animal, an idea upon which a whole group of his narra-
tives thrives.”70 Kafka’s vast zoopoetics refects, then, his radical zoopolitics, 
embodying the posthumanist agenda constituted decades after his death, 
as Agamben has expressed it: 
What is man, if he is always the place—and, at the same time, the 
result—of ceaseless divisions and caesurae? It is more urgent to work 
on these divisions, to ask in what way—within man—has man been 
separated from non-man, and the animal from the human, than it 
is to take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights 
and values.71 
It is in this vein that Eric Santner identifes a series of German Jewish 
writers, among them Kafka, who have placed the notion of the creaturely 
at the center of their literary and philosophical elaborations of human life 
in modern times: 
For these writers, however, creaturely life—the peculiar proximity 
of the human to the animal at the very point of their radical difer-
ence—is a product not simply of man’s thrownness into the (enig-
matic) “openness of Being” but of his exposure to a traumatic di-
mension of political power and social bonds whose structures have 
undergone radical transformations in modernity. Te “essential dis-
ruption” that renders man “creaturely” for these writers has, that is, 
a distinctly political—or better, biopolitical—aspect; it names the 
threshold where life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes 
to inform the very matter and materiality of life.72 
Jay Geller’s Bestiarium Judaicum thoroughly explores the extensive engage-
ment of German Jewish authors with questions of animality. Geller re-









nineteenth century to Felix Salten (the author of Bambi) on the eve of the 
Second World War, and yet he encapsulates his exploration in one single 
word—“Kafka.” 73 
In recent years, Kafka’s zoopoetics has been tellingly recognized by 
his commentators, as well as by posthumanist and literary animal studies 
scholars, who have yet, however, aspired to provide neither an overarch-
ing nor interdiscursive account thereof. Tis book aims to fll this lacuna. 
Positing Kafka’s animal stories as a distinct and signifcant corpus within 
his entire poetics, and closely examining them in dialogue with both Kafka 
studies and posthumanist theories, this book seeks to critically revisit ani-
mality, humanimal dynamics, and the very human-animal contradistinc-
tion in the writing of Franz Kafka. 
I choose to focus on six of Kafka’s animal stories, those that are the 
most elaborate and that are also characterized by animalistic points of 
view: “Te Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”), “A Report to an Acad-
emy” (“Ein Bericht für eine Akademie”), “Jackals and Arabs” (“Schakale 
und Araber”), “Researches of a Dog” (“Forschungen eines Hundes”), “Te 
Burrow” (“Der Bau”), and “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” (“Jo-
sefne, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse”). In order to trace Kafka’s 
zoopoetic trajectory, the chapters are chronologically arranged, from his 
frst to his very last animal story. Other animal stories by Kafka—among 
them “A Crossbreed” (“Eine Kreuzung”) and “Te Animal in the Syna-
gogue” (“Das Tier in der Synagoge”)—will be referred to over the course 
of my discussion of the selected works. 
Lastly, it is important to note that animality in Kafka’s oeuvre is not 
restricted to nonhuman characters but can be found in human fgures 
as well. Te animalization of humans complements the humanization of 
nonhuman fgures in destabilizing the boundaries between humans and 
other animals. Terefore, Kafka’s animalized humans—found in “A Coun-
try Doctor” (“Ein Landarzt”), “A Page from an Old Document” (“Ein altes 
Blatt”), “Building the Great Wall of China” (“Beim Bau der Chinesischen 
Mauer”), and “A Hunger Artist” (“Ein Hungerkünstler”)—will be also ex-
amined in dialogue with his animal stories. 
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The Metamorphosis of the  
Human/Animal Binary 
“Te Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”), written in 1912 and frst pub-
lished in 1915, is among the most distinguished masterpieces of twentieth-
century fction. Te novella opens with the overnight transformation of 
the traveling salesman Gregor Samsa into a monstrous vermin (ungeheures 
Ungeziefer) and follows life at the Samsas’ house after the transformation. 
Kafka’s frst and most extended animal story has not been considered as 
such, but has rather been read allegorically. It would be impossible to en-
compass the enormous variety of allegorical readings of this story, which 
include, among many others, a satire on petit bourgeois mores, a Marxist 
critique of capitalist hierarchies, a psychological analysis of alienation or 
the Oedipus complex, a case for the futility of Jewish assimilation into 
European society, a parable about the frailty of human empathy and soli-
darity, an account of a homosexual coming out of the closet, and a tale of a 
family struggling with an aficted family member.1 “Te Metamorphosis” 
thus seems an inexhaustible resource for allegorical interpretation. 
Nonetheless, the very multiplicity of allegorical readings indicates that 
the story is in fact not an allegory, as Tzvetan Todorov argues in his exten-
sive work on the fantastic: 
Te plethora of allegorical interpretations point to the fact that “Te 
Metamorphosis” is not an allegory, since the text does not invite a 
specifc allegorical interpretation. Several allegorical interpretations 
are perhaps suggested, but they are all vague and the text does not 
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favor any one in particular. Te fact that the story does not ofer a 
defnitive allegorical message clearly indicates that “Te Metamor-
phosis” should not be defned as an allegory.2 
Ironically, the animalized protagonist at the center of the story, who is
excluded from the domestic arena by his family, is also excluded from
the interpretive arena by the literary commentators, who see him as a
mere vehicle for various interhuman themes. However, “the plethora
of allegorical interpretations,” the huge bundle of hermeneutic keys (of
which Kafka’s narratives paradigmatically do not favor any particular one)
keeps the door open, allowing the animalized fgure to break through the
threshold. Trough this open door between the nonhuman and the hu-
man sphere, I would like to read Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis” as a story
about this very threshold separating humans from other animals; a story
that exposes the construction of the human/animal binary, and also de-
constructs this binary. 
The Construction of the Human/Animal Binary 
“Te Metamorphosis” commences with one of the most memorable open-
ing sentences in world literature: “When Gregor Samsa woke up one 
morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed in his bed 
into a monstrous vermin” (M, 3). Te vermin, the animal that Gregor 
Samsa transforms into, is named in the original German text Ungeziefer. 
While the denotation of Ungeziefer in German is indeed equivalent to “ver-
min” in English, its etymological meaning, which harks back to Middle 
High German, is “an unclean animal, unft for sacrifce.”3 Inevitably lost 
in translation, this etymological meaning is crucial to the text and serves 
as a point of departure for my zoopoetic reading of “Te Metamorphosis.” 
The Modern Alienation from Nonhuman Animals 
In his groundbreaking work Homo Sacer (1995), Giorgio Agamben raises 
fundamental questions about the nature of political power through an 
analysis of an obscure fgure of archaic Roman law. Te term homo sacer, 
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is excluded from society and its law. In consequence, this person could be 
killed by anyone, but not sacrifced in religious rites. Agamben refers to 
the life of the homo sacer as “bare life.” Such life is distinguished from both 
animal life (zoé), which can be sacrifced, and human life (bíos), which 
cannot be taken with impunity.4 Agamben’s political theory had largely fo-
cused on how human life has become bare life throughout Western history, 
suspending the question of animal life and politics, but in his later work, 
Te Open: Man and Animal (2002), he puts the notion of bare life to work 
in his discussion of nonhuman animals, primarily through a rereading of 
Heidegger’s conception of nonhuman animals as being “poor in world” 
(weltarm).5 
Te idea that nonhuman life became bare life in modern times can 
be traced to Jean Baudrillard’s insightful essay “Te Animals: Territory 
and Metamorphoses” in his 1981 Simulacra and Simulation. Te fact 
that in modern society nonhuman animals are no longer sacrifced and 
prosecuted6 seems to suggest an improvement in their status, yet actually 
indicates, according to Baudrillard, their total exclusion from social and 
political life: 
Animals were only demoted to the status of inhumanity as reason 
and humanism progressed. . . . Tose who used to sacrifce animals 
did not take them for beasts. And even the Middle Ages, which 
condemned and punished them in due form, was in this way much 
closer to them than we are, we who are flled with horror at this 
practice. Tey held them to be guilty: which was a way of honor-
ing them. We take them for nothing, and it is on this basis that we 
are “human” with them. We no longer sacrifce them, we no longer 
punish them, and we are proud of it, but it is simply that we have 
domesticated them, worse: that we have made of them a racially 
inferior world, no longer even worthy of our justice, but only of our 
afection and social charity, no longer worthy of punishment and 
of death, but only of experimentation and extermination like meat 
from the butchery.7 
Both Ungeziefer and homo sacer refer to those who are unft for sacrifce, 
and hence can be viewed equivalently. Te transformation of Gregor 
Samsa into Ungeziefer will thus be contextualized with Agamben’s char-
acterization of the homo sacer and Baudrillard’s critique. Correspondingly, 





the morning in which Gregor woke up and found himself changed into 
vermin (Ungeziefer or homo sacer) is the dawn of modern humanism. 
And indeed, Gregor is twice violently pushed to his room, beyond the 
threshold of humanity, by the implements of reason and humanism. On 
the frst time, his father “picked up in his right hand a heavy newspaper 
from the table, and stamping his feet, started brandishing the cane and the 
newspaper to drive Gregor back into his room” (M, 14). Te newspaper in 
this scene recalls Heidegger’s reformulation of zoon echon logon, the Greek 
defnition of man as a speaking living being: “A human being is a living 
thing that reads the newspaper.”8 In this context, the newspaper functions 
metonymically, standing for human reason, which is used to suppress and 
exclude other animals. Moreover, the German word for “newspaper,” the 
weapon used here to suppress animality, is Zeitung, derived from the word 
Zeit, which means time. Te newspaper, the Zeitung, is the embodiment 
of the zeitgeist, the zeitgeist of modernism. In her essay “Franz Kafka: 
A Revolution,” written on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of 
Kafka’s death, Hannah Arendt points out that Kafka’s critics, though 
strongly disagreeing about the inherent meaning of his work, oddly agree 
on one essential point: all are struck by a quality of modernity that appears 
nowhere else with the same intensity and unequivocalness.9 Focusing on 
human-animal dynamics in modern times, my analysis of Kafka’s “Te 
Metamorphosis” is also “struck by a quality of modernity.” 
Te second time Gregor’s father pushes his transformed son beyond the 
confnes of humanity, he is armed with a biological weapon: 
It was an apple; a second one came fying right after it; Gregor 
stopped dead with fear; further running was useless, for his father 
was determined to bombard him. He had flled his pockets from 
the fruit bowl on the bufet and was now pitching one apple after 
another. (M, 28–29) 
Tough the fruit of the tree of knowledge in the book of Genesis is not 
identifed, in Christian iconography and symbolism it is often portrayed 
as an apple, which consequently became the symbol of knowledge and 
reason. Terefore, the modern sin against animality here harks back to 
the original sin. Te intertextual link to the biblical story sheds light on 
the relations between the original sin of humanity and the modern sin of 
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Yet, whereas in the biblical myth the separation of humanity from the 
paradisiac harmony with nature in the Garden of Eden was a punishment 
by God for its sin of disobedience, in the modern case the detachment of 
humans from the rest of nature is itself the sin committed by humanity. 
Moreover, unlike Adam, who was led to sin by Eve, Gregor’s father is 
the active sinner, while his mother “forced herself onto his father, and em-
bracing him . . . her hands clasping his father’s neck, begged for Gregor’s 
life” (M, 29). Te reversal of the gender roles indicates that, unlike the 
original sin, the humanist sin, the sin of humanism against animality, is 
frst and foremost patriarchal.10 According to legend, the forbidden fruit 
of knowledge became lodged in Adam’s throat, and since then men have 
this laryngeal prominence—also known as an Adam’s apple—as an eternal 
reminder of the original sin. Likewise, one of the apples thrown at Gregor 
“literally forced his way to his back  .  .  . the apple remained imbedded 
in his fesh as a visible souvenir” (M, 29). Kafka’s apple, echoing Adam’s 
apple, stays in Gregor’s body till his very last breath, as a reminder of the 
humanist sin. 
Tis scene, in which the father bombards his son with apples, is also 
intertextually linked to the myth of Wilhelm Tell, a folk hero of Swit-
zerland, which was canonized in Friedrich Schiller’s eponymous play. In 
Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell (1804), a powerful manifesto for political freedom, 
tyrant Gessler, governor of the Swiss cantons, forces Wilhelm Tell to shoot 
an apple of his son’s head. Unlike Tell, who saves his beloved son by hit-
ting the apple, Mr. Samsa hits his hated son with an apple, which causes 
him injury and eventually kills him. Viewing this scene in the light of the 
iconic Apfelschuss scene in Wilhelm Tell reveals Mr. Samsa not only as op-
positional to the heroic Tell but also as analogous to the initiator of the 
horrifc act—Gessler, the sovereign power. 
It is worthwhile comparing the sovereign powers in the two Apfelschuss
scenes through the Foucauldian lens of biopolitics, which has shaped much 
contemporary theorizing of politics. In Te History of Sexuality (1976), 
Foucault analyzes an historical shift in the operation of sovereignty: “Te 
old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully 
supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated manage-
ment of life.”11 Whilst in the premodern era the power of the sovereign 
was either to take life or to let live, in modern times the sovereign right is 
transformed into the new right to make live and to let die. Foucault sees 
the moment when violence begins to proliferate beyond the recognizable 
26 Kafka’s Zoopoetics 
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historical framework of sovereign power into this innovative operation of 
power, which he defnes as biopower or biopolitics, as the inception of 
modernity. 
In Foucauldian terms, whereas tyrant Gessler is the old sovereign power 
who can take life—“You shoot, or die—together with the boy”12—Mr. 
Samsa stands for the modern sovereign power, which does not take Gregor’s 
life but rather shapes and controls it thoroughly. While Foucault did not 
apply the notion of biopolitics to nonhuman animals, posthumanist theo-
rists have variously suggested that the dominion over nonhuman animals 
in modern times exemplifes his notion of biopolitical control.13 Terefore, 
a zoopoetic reading of Mr. Samsa’s biopower over Gregor does not reduce 
biopower over nonhuman animals to an intrahuman context, but rather 
expands the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics beyond the boundaries of 
humanity. 
The Middle-Class Alienation from Nonhuman Animals 
A considerable diference emerges between the attitude of his family to-
ward Gregor and that of the cleaner. While the family members evince 
ambivalence and revulsion, the cleaner displays only equanimity and curi-
osity. She is also not afraid of him, nor is she threatened by him: 
For now the cleaning woman was there. Tis old widow, who thanks 
to her strong bony frame had probably survived the worst in a long 
life, was not really repelled by Gregor. Without being in the least 
inquisitive, she had once accidentally opened the door of Gregor’s 
room, and at the sight of Gregor . .  . she had remained standing, 
with her hands folded on her stomach, marveling. From that time 
on she never failed to open the door a crack every morning and 
every evening and peek in hurriedly at Gregor. In the beginning she 
also used to call him over to her with words she probably considered 
friendly, like “Come over here for a minute, you old dung beetle!” 
or “Look at that old dung beetle!” (M, 32–33) 
Te nonchalance of the cleaner when face to face with the transformed 
Gregor is particularly contrasted with the reaction of his mother, who 
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and composure vis-à-vis Gregor, the cleaner’s function in the story seems 
to serve as foil to the other characters. 
Addressing the uncharacteristic reaction of the cleaner to Gregor, sev-
eral commentators have pointed that she lacks any familial afnity with 
Gregor; unlike Gregor’s parents and sister, she has no emotional attach-
ment to premetamorphosed Gregor.14 Tis explanation is nevertheless in-
conclusive, inasmuch as a gigantic vermin,15 who is part of the household, 
is bound to evoke horror, or at least some degree of revulsion, regardless 
of one’s acquaintance with the human past of this being. Te boarders, for 
example, who know nothing of his previous history, are utterly shocked 
and disgusted to see Gregor, unwilling to continue living under the same 
roof with him. An alternative explanation for the cleaner’s nonchalant at-
titude toward Gregor is class based. Te Samsa family, the chief clerk, and 
the boarders all belong to the same social class; they are bourgeois. Te 
cleaner, on the other hand, is a working-class woman. 
Several historical studies have pointed to increasing sensitivity toward 
nonhuman animals among the Western middle class from the Renaissance 
onward.16 At the same time, a more signifcant trend can be discerned in 
the transition from conscious intent (either cruel or compassionate) to an 
attitude of alienation, indiference, and ignorance.17 Te social division of 
labor, technological developments and the process of urbanization brought 
about increasing physical separation between humans and most other ani-
mals. Following the Middle Ages, human habitation was separated from 
the locale where “working animals” and “food animals” were kept, and di-
rect contact with other animals was drastically decreased. Later, slaughter-
houses were moved from cities to the periphery, principally for economic 
reasons, but also because of the horror these repugnant facilities evoked.18 
In his 1937 masterwork, Te Civilizing Process, the sociologist Norbert 
Elias examines the eating habits of nobles and bourgeois. He depicts a 
gradual progression, from piling up whole animals on the table, through 
serving them without palpable signs of life (such as the head), to camou-
faging the living animal by cutting, processing, and preparing it before-
hand in the kitchen. Concealing the traces of violence done to the animals 
served for human consumption is, according to Elias, part of a broader 
paradigm characterizing the progress of civilization: rejection of all mani-
festations of cruelty by the upper and middle classes.19 Tis new sensitivity 
toward nonhuman animals appeared in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, fnding expression in intellectual tracts, the establishment of ani-
















mal welfare organizations, a growing trend of adopting companion ani-
mals, and so on. All this, however, did not improve the condition of most 
nonhuman animals, as the “dirty job” of exploiting and killing them had 
not stopped, but was only better concealed from the higher classes and 
carried out solely by the working class. In Elias’s words, “Te distasteful is 
removed behind the scenes of social life.”20 
Interestingly, the dynamics of the division of labor regarding Gregor’s 
care, as well as the diferent approaches toward him, faithfully refect the 
dynamics of the division of labor between the working class and the higher 
classes with respect to the treatment of nonhuman animals in Western so-
ciety as described by Elias. Whereas the cleaner (who represents the work-
ing class) treats Gregor with a mixture of cruelty and empathy, the family 
(standing for the middle class) exhibits estrangement, revulsion, and re-
pression toward him. 
In the frst phase of estrangement, according to the aforementioned 
historical progression, there is a physical separation; a tacit agreement dic-
tates that the members of the family should refrain from seeing Gregor: 
One time—it must have been a month since Gregor’s metamorpho-
sis, and there was certainly no particular reason any more for his
sister to be astonished at Gregor’s appearance—she came a little ear-
lier than usual and caught Gregor still looking out the window, im-
mobile and so in an excellent position to be terrifying. It would not
have surprised Gregor if she had not come in, because his position
prevented her from immediately opening the window, but not only
did she not come in, she even sprang back and locked the door . . . he
had to wait until noon before his sister came again, and she seemed
much more uneasy than usual. He realized from this that the sight
of him was still repulsive to her and was bound to remain repulsive
to her in the future, and that she probably had to overcome a lot of
resistance not to run away at the sight of even the small part of his
body that jutted out from under the couch. (M, 22) 
In contrast to this estrangement and repression exhibited by the family, the 
cleaner is not threatened by Gregor, nor does she try to avoid or exclude 
him. She treats him rather fondly, albeit with a touch of contempt and 
condescension, even going so far as to confront him. Gradually, the mem-
bers of the household, the middle-class folk, distance themselves from 
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him, shun him, and lose interest in his condition. And after Gregor’s sister 
relinquishes her duty and no longer takes care of her animalized brother, 
the cleaner is the only one entrusted with his care. 
Te diference between the family members and the cleaner is most 
pronounced after Gregor’s death; upon noticing that he is lying motion-
less, the cleaner tickles Gregor with the broom, and then, after realizing 
that he is dead, she calls out, “Come and have a look, it’s croaked; it’s lying 
there, dead as a doornail!” (M, 40). Later, she disposes of Gregor’s corpse, 
as she realizes that the family is reluctant to deal with it. But the Samsas 
not only avoid handling the mortal remains, they do not even wish to be 
informed of how this was done: 
“Look, you don’t have to worry about getting rid of the stuf next 
door. It’s already been taken care of.” Mrs. Samsa and Grete bent 
down over their letter, as if to continue writing. Mr. Samsa, who 
noticed that the cleaning woman was now about to start describing 
everything in detail, stopped her with a frmly outstretched hand. 
(M, 42) 
Te family’s reaction is a demonstration of Elias’s claim that “the distasteful 
is removed behind the scenes of social life.” It is, however, interesting to 
note that the family experiences relief for the frst time, not at the removal 
of Gregor’s dead body, but when seeing the butcher’s boy: 
When a butcher’s boy, with a carrier on his head came climbing 
up the stairs with a proud bearing, towards them and then up past 
them, Mr. Samsa and the women quickly left the banister and all 
went back, into their apartment. (M, 41) 
Gregor’s disturbing presence is not only vanished, but the distasteful dead 
body is substituted with another dead body, yet in a “civilized,” modern 
form of chopped meat. 
The Alienation from the Nonhuman through Adolescence 
Alongside the cleaner’s approach to Gregor in contrast to that of his family, 
we can also examine the attitude of Grete, Gregor’s sister, in comparison 









to his parents’ stance. Of the three family members, Grete is the lowest 
in status due to her gender and age. Signifcantly, she is the only family 
member who treats Gregor with care and attentiveness, at least up to a 
certain point. Her relations with Gregor are distant and cold (she enters 
Gregor’s room only when he is concealed and cannot be seen) yet are still 
better than the parents’ relation to their son, whose dismissive rejection of 
Gregor is virtually absolute. Grete is the sole person who genuinely tries 
to address his needs. Tus, when she realizes that Gregor does not eat his 
regular food, she performs an experiment: 
To fnd out his likes and dislikes, she brought him a wide assort-
ment of things, all spread out on an old newspaper: old, half-rotten, 
vegetables; bones left over from the evening meal, caked with con-
gealed white sauce; some raisins and almonds; a piece of cheese, 
which two days before Gregor had declared inedible; a plain slice of 
bread, a slice of bread and butter, and one with butter and salt. In 
addition to all this, she put down some water in the bowl apparently 
permanently earmarked for Gregor’s use. (M, 17–18) 
Te biologist Marian Stamp Dawkins, who has carried out numerous ex-
periments based on giving choices to nonhuman animals in order to fnd 
out their preferences, ofers a similar method as a means of understanding 
other animals and overcoming the language barrier.21 It seems that Grete, 
many decades before Dawkins, intuitively utilizes this methodology, al-
lowing humans to answer the question—paraphrasing Freud’s (in)famous 
query, “What does a woman want”—“What does a nonhuman animal 
want?” 
Parallel to studies of diferent attitudes toward nonhuman animals in 
terms of social class, there are also age-based theories. In Totem and Taboo
(1913) Freud states: 
Children show no trace of the arrogance, which urges adult civilized 
men to draw a hard-and-fast line between their own nature and 
that of all other animals. Children have no scruples over allowing 
animals to rank as their full equals. Uninhibited as they are in the 
avowal of their bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more 
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Tis diference between children and adults in approach to nonhuman
animals is also refected in literature. In her book on the cultural represen-
tation of nonhuman animals, Erica Fudge observes that in many literary
works children connect to other animals better than they do to grownups.
Fudge examines E. B. White’s classic 1952 children’s book Charlotte’s Web
as a paradigmatic narrative in which Fern, the young heroine, shows em-
pathy for other animals, while the adults are estranged from the nonhu-
man world. 
Nevertheless, unlike other social positions (such as gender, ethnicity, or 
class), age status is inherently labile. And indeed, when Fern grows up, she 
fnds herself estranged from nonhuman animals.23 In the same vein, Car-
men Dell’Aversano points out that transgressive feelings of empathy and 
afection for nonhuman animals are initially repressed: 
From earliest infancy we are taught to discount both our own feel-
ings for animals and the feelings of animals themselves. Innumer-
able children have been served their pet lamb or duck for dinner, or 
have been forced to abandon their puppy or kitten at the beginning 
of the holiday season. A few have reacted with permanent shock and 
horror; most have yielded to societal pressure, and have learned to 
regard their most authentic and deepest emotions as nothing more 
than childish “squeamishness.” In all its horror, this is, in the experi-
ence of many of us, the moment in which our identity is founded 
and constructed as “human” in contrast to the “non-human.” And 
the “non-human,” embodied in the corpse, maimed beyond recog-
nition, of the being we loved the most.24 
Dell’Aversano demonstrates the initiation ritual into the primacy of the 
bond between humans in Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’s 1938 novel Te 
Yearling, a story of a Florida boy who is forced to shoot his beloved fawn 
when the fawn grows up and threatens the family’s crop. Trough the kill-
ing of his nonhuman friend, the protagonist makes the transition from a 
“yearling” to a full member of society, defned—among other things—by 
a willingness and ability to kill beings of other species as a proof of his 
loyalty to his own.25 
Unlike in Te Yearling, in “Te Metamorphosis” it is not the parents 
who convince their child to get rid of the nonhuman; conversely, it is 
Grete who persuades her parents that the verminous Gregor should be got 






rid of. Like Fern, Grete also loses interest in the nonhuman animal. Un-
like the child in Te Yearling, Grete does not physically kill the nonhuman 
animal; but the fact that Gregor dies right after hearing his sister decisively 
say, “It has to go” (M, 38), indicates that her words at least symbolically 
caused his death. In their book on young adult literature, Kenneth Donel-
son and Alleen Nilsen show that in many cases animal sacrifce is a symbol 
of the young person’s loss of innocence.26 In Kafka’s metamorphosis story, 
Grete, the young adult, also sacrifces the nonhuman animal, who until 
that point was unsacrifcable (literally, as he is Ungeziefer—an animal un-
suitable for sacrifce). 
Grete is older than White’s Fern; she is not a child, but adolescent. Yet, 
similarly, there is a clear correlation between the increasing alienation she 
feels toward her animalized brother and the process of maturation that she 
undergoes. After fnding Gregor’s dead body, the parents promptly notice 
how Grete has matured: 
As they were talking in this vein, it occurred almost simultaneously 
to Mr. and Mrs. Samsa, as they watched their daughter getting live-
lier and livelier, that lately, in spite of all the troubles which had 
turned her cheeks pale, she had blossomed into a good-looking, 
shapely girl. Growing quieter and communicating almost uncon-
sciously through glances, they thought that it would soon be time, 
too, to fnd her a good husband. And it was like a confrmation of 
their new dreams and good intentions, when at the end of the ride 
their daughter got up frst and stretched her young body. (M, 42) 
Tese words referring to Grete’s maturation conclude the story, un-
derlying the centrality of this theme. Te process of Grete growing up, 
blossoming into a lovely young woman, is also often described in terms of 
metamorphosis.27 Clayton Koelb even claims that the story is in fact about 
Grete’s—and not Gregor’s—metamorphosis: 
An attentive reader will notice right away that the action of Kafka’s 
story actually has almost nothing to do with the process of Gregor’s 
bodily alteration . . . , which is already complete before the story be-
gins. It has everything to do with the consequences of that transfor-
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the radical and miraculous change in Gregor’s family, especially his 
sister Grete.28 
Nevertheless, Grete’s transformation does not only stand in contrast 
to Gregor’s transformation—he turns into a monstrous vermin and she 
becomes a vivacious and beautiful woman. Te two transformative events, 
at the very beginning and at the very end of the story, are also analo-
gous. Grete’s transformation is not merely physical but frst and foremost 
mental, and this change—just like Gregor’s change—can be described in 
terms of monstrosity. Whereas Gregor became nonhuman, Grete becomes 
inhumane. Grete has completed the process of coming of age with the full 
rejection of animality. Complying with “humanormativity,”29 her social-
ization is completed, and she has become a normative bourgeois, ready to 
start a bourgeois family of her own. 
Deconstructing the Human/Animal Binary 
Already from its opening sentence, it is established that Kafka’s “Te Meta-
morphosis” is a metamorphosis narrative.30 Tere are, in fact, two major
distinct metamorphosis models in Western literature, which difer from one
another narratologically and ideologically. Te frst model comprises etio-
logical metamorphosis narratives, which ofer a mythological explanation
for the origin of something, typically (though not exclusively) a natural
phenomenon. Te metamorphic event in such tales is thus, in narratologi-
cal terms, the resolution of the narrative. Te Ovidian metamorphosis nar-
ratives, with very few exceptions, belong here.31 In the other metamorpho-
sis model, the metamorphic event functions as the confict of the narrative,
taking place in an early stage in the story. Such narratives follow the charac-
ters’ lives after the metamorphosis has occurred and typically conclude with
a countermetamorphosis, when the human form is regained. Apuleius’s Te
Golden Ass, as well as numerous popular tales, such as “Beauty and the
Beast,” “Swan Lake,” and “Te Princess and the Frog,” ft this type of meta-
morphosis narrative. Kafka makes use of aspects of both models, but also
departs from them in signifcant ways. Te human/animal binary in Kafka’s
“Te Metamorphosis” is thus subverted through selective obedience and
violation of the conventions of both metamorphosis models. 





Transgressing the Species Boundary 
It seems that by presenting fgures undergoing a species transition meta-
morphosis narratives in which humans are transformed into nonhuman 
animals32 inherently subvert the human/animal binary, replacing it with a 
model of species fuidity. In the last chapter of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the 
character of Pythagoras concludes with the ethico-political lesson learned 
from this subversion, which is that we should not harm other animals: 
All things change, nothing dies. Te spirit wanders and 
comes from there to here, from here to there and occupies whatever 
body 
it likes, and from wild beasts transfers into human bodies, 
and into wild beasts when in ours, and does not perish at any time. 
And just as wax is easily stamped with new images, 
and does not remain as it was nor keep the same shapes, 
but is, even so, itself the same, so, I teach, is the soul always 
the same, but it passes into a variety of shapes. 
And so, in case piety is conquered by the belly’s desires, 
refrain, I do declare, from expelling kindred soul 
by unspeakable slaughter, and let not blood be fed by blood.33 
However, in nonetiological metamorphosis narratives this subversive 
implication does not exist, not even implicitly. On the contrary, these tales 
typically reinforce the human/animal binary, as well as the anthropocentric 
paradigm, by presenting a psychophysical split. While the human body is 
transformed into a nonhuman body, the mind remains human throughout 
the plot, allowing the human and the nonhuman to oppose and defne 
each other.34 Tis dichotomous model presented in metamorphosis tales is 
rooted in the tradition of dualism in philosophy of mind, which sees body 
and mind as two ontologically separate categories.35 Te human identity 
of the transformed person is not challenged, and the transformation is 
presented as a discrepancy to be corrected. Te psychophysical split in 
nonetiological metamorphosis tales is either explicitly stated or implied. It 
is explicitly stated, for example, in the metamorphosis scene in Te Odys-
sey, in which Circe turns Odysseus’s friends into pigs: “For they grew the 
heads and shapes and bristles of swine, with swine-voice too. Only their 
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Ass, in which Lucius reports his mental condition directly after he was 
transformed into an ass: “Tough I was now a perfect ass, a Lucius-turned-
beast, I still preserved my human faculties.”37 
Already the very frst sentence of Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis” places 
the story within the nonetiological tradition of metamorphosis narratives, 
as the metamorphic event is clearly the confict—and not the resolu-
tion—of the story. Gregor Samsa’s frst reaction to the transformation also 
fts the nonetiological metamorphic model, as there is a complete discrep-
ancy between Gregor’s animal body and his human mind: 
He was lying on his back as hard as armor plate, and when he lifted 
his head a little, he saw his vaulted brown belly, sectioned by arch-
shaped ribs, to whose dome the cover, about to slide completely, 
could barely cling. His many legs, pitifully thin compared with the 
size of the rest of him, were waving helplessly before his eyes. . . . 
“Oh God,” he thought, “what a grueling job I’ve picked! Day in, 
day out—on the road.” (M, 3–4) 
Surprisingly, what troubles Gregor’s mind at this juncture is his work, and 
not the horrifc change that his body has undergone; his human thoughts 
are sharply contrasted with his animal body. Tis juxtaposition underlines 
the chasm between Gregor’s body and his mind, showing how alienated 
Gregor is from his new body. At this early stage, Gregor Samsa is confned 
in the verminous body, as Josef K., the protagonist of Kafka’s Te Trial, is 
imprisoned in his apartment. 
But unlike earlier nonetiological metamorphosis stories, the psycho-
physical split is not maintained throughout the narrative, and instead of 
confrming dualistic assumptions the progression of the plot denies them. 
Soon there is a gradual change, and the dichotomous split between the 
nonhuman body and the human mind is undermined. Already on the very 
frst morning of his transformation, Gregor gains dexterity in operating his 
new body; he manages to get out of bed, walk to the door, and open it. 
His new body is no longer a mere source of pain and sufering but also of 
certain pleasure: “For the frst time that morning he had a feeling of physi-
cal well-being; his little legs were on frm ground; they obeyed him com-
pletely, as he noted to his joy” (M, 14). As Gregor Samsa becomes more 
united with his nonhuman body he simultaneously feels more detached 
from his humanity, and the incompatibility between nonhuman body and 





human soul diminishes, becoming more congruous; Gregor learns to live 
with his body and gradually accepts his animalistic being. In fact, the cor-
poral transformation, which at frst was described as happening overnight, 
is later seen as a continuous process. Tus, for instance, his sight is deterio-
rating, as he noticed when looking through the window: “From day to day 
he saw things even a short distance away less and less distinctly” (M, 21). 
Gradually, the change takes on an epistemic dimension as well. Gregor’s 
thoughts no longer center on his premetamorphosis human life, but on his 
present existence as a rejected vermin. He even starts to enjoy activities ap-
propriate to his current nonhuman existence: 
He adopted the habit of crawling crisscross over the walls and the 
ceiling. He especially liked hanging from the ceiling; it was com-
pletely diferent from lying on the foor; one could breathe more 
freely; a faint swinging sensation went through the body. (M, 23) 
Gregor himself has become aware of this mental change: 
Gregor realized that the monotony of family life, combined with 
the fact that not a soul had addressed a word directly to him, must 
have addled his brain in the course of the past two months, for he 
could not explain to himself in any other way how in all seriousness 
he could have been anxious to have his room cleared out. Had he 
really wanted to have his warm room, comfortably ftted with fur-
niture that had always been in the family, changed into a cave, in 
which, of course, he would be able to crawl around unhampered in 
all directions but at the cost of simultaneously, rapidly, and totally 
forgetting his human past? Even now he had been on the verge of 
forgetting and only his mother’s voice, which he had not heard for 
so long, had shaken him up. (M, 24–25) 
As the story progresses, it becomes harder to distinguish Gregor Sam-
sa’s nonhuman aspects from his human ones as the two intermingle. Tis 
is not a simplistic dichotomy between the human mind and the vermin 
body; the mind itself contains the contradictory elements of the two states 
of being. In accordance with Marx’s dictum that “it is not the conscious-
ness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
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his verminous body—gradually determines, or at least afects, his con-
sciousness. His human psyche has adjusted to the corporeal being and is 
undergoing its own, albeit imperfect, transformation. We witness here a 
dynamic fusion of human mentality, equipped as it is with cognitive tools 
for conceptual and verbal thinking, and animal mentality, which manifests 
itself chiefy in certain preferences, volitions, and desires. 
Moreover, the traditional psychophysical spit is undermined here not 
only through the dynamics of Gregor’s mind, which gradually becomes 
less human and more animalistic, but also by his physicality, which sub-
verts traditional metamorphosis conventions. In cross-species tales, the 
physical turnover is typically complete, and the original human form has 
no somatic traces. Terefore—even in fantastic stories, in which metamor-
phosis is viewed as a possible occurrence—characters who were not witness 
to the moment of the transformation do not recognize the person behind 
the nonhuman body. Te fantastic opening event in “Te Metamorphosis” 
is usually read as an exceptional aberration from the realistic line of the 
story. As such, it is regarded as either a direct precursor or a straightfor-
ward instance of magic realism, a literary genre most associated with Latin 
American literature, portraying fantastical events in an otherwise realistic 
tone.39 Gregor Samsa’s transformation is given to the reader in the very 
frst sentence of the story, but not to the other characters, and yet none of 
the other characters has any doubt that the monstrous vermin is indeed 
Gregor. 
Te fact that the vermin is in Gregor’s room while Gregor is absent is 
insufcient to frmly conclude that Gregor has turned into the vermin. 
Te frst realistic thought at the sight of a monstrous vermin coming out 
of Gregor’s room would probably be that the vermin has somehow entered 
the house and either devoured Gregor or scared him away. But the Samsa 
family entertains no doubt as to the origin of the monstrous vermin—it 
is clear to them that Gregor has turned into vermin. If Kafka’s “Te Meta-
morphosis,” apart from Gregor’s transformation, is indeed a realistic story, 
why is the metamorphic event taken for granted? Te fact that the Samsas 
instantly recognize the vermin as their beloved son and brother indicates 
that the transformed Gregor Samsa is actually still recognizable—that is, 
the metamorphosis is not complete, and Gregor still maintains some of his 
anatomical human features. Some signifcant anomalies in the entomo-
logical paradigm have been long noted; the transformed Gregor has some 
human somatic features and characteristics that the insectile body does 











not have, including a neck and ability to turn his head, to close his eyes, 
to tear up, and even to breathe (for insects have a very diferent respiratory 
system).40 
Gregor’s becoming-vermin actually epitomizes Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s theorization of “becoming-animal.” To become-animal, for them, is 
to stake out an ongoing and never-ending path of escape, which undoes 
the strict renderings of animal and human identity as defned by social 
forces. Tis process is a result of ever-moving and changing drives and 
desires, which allow the subject to reach a continuum of intensities.41 In
contrast with earlier nonetiological metamorphosis narratives, Kafka’s no-
vella breaks down the species boundaries between the human and the non-
human as it does not present a human trapped in a nonhuman body but 
rather a humanimal hybrid, whose physical and mental existences both 
contain, side by side, human and nonhuman features. Instead of the hu-
man/animal and body/mind oppositions, Kafka ofers a wide and dynamic 
spectrum between the human and the nonhuman, physically and mentally 
alike. Gregor Samsa does not cross the barrier between the human and 
the nonhuman from one side to the other; he is situated rather on the 
threshold of the two domains. In his very in-betweenness, foating in the 
liminal space between the human and the nonhuman, humanimal Gregor 
transgresses the human-animal barrier. 
Transgressing the Species Hierarchies 
Te outline of most nonetiological metamorphosis stories can be depicted 
in the tripartite structure of sin-punishment-redemption, in which the 
metamorphic event is a punishment for a sin and redemption takes place 
with the regaining of the human body. Max Horkheimer and Teodor 
Adorno describe the anthropocentric premise of this paradigm in their 
1944 magnum opus, Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
In popular fairy tales the metamorphosis of humans into animals 
is a recurring punishment. To be imprisoned in an animal body is 
regarded as damnation. To children . . . the idea of such transforma-
tions is immediately comprehensible and familiar. Believers in the 
transmigration of souls in the earliest cultures saw the animal form 
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bears witness to the horror which is feared by humans in such meta-
morphoses. Every animal recalls to them an immense misfortune 
which took place in primeval times. Fairy tales express this dim hu-
man intuition.42 
Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis” radically violates this anthropocentric pat-
tern. As several studies have shown, Kafka dramatically breaks from the 
metamorphosis tradition on which his story relies, as the expectation that 
Gregor Samsa will eventually regain his human body is not materialized.43 
Nevertheless, the triangular matrix of sin-punishment-redemption is 
not realized in Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis,” not only due to the lack of 
redemption. Te two other components are also absent. Punishment is de-
fned as an (1) intentional infiction by someone in authority (2) of some-
thing negative (3) on someone who has committed a breach of rules.44 
Gregor’s metamorphosis meets none of these three criteria. In most cases, 
the literary metamorphosis is indeed intentionally inficted by someone in 
authority. Te castigator in most metamorphosis narratives is a witch or 
a sorcerer, or—in mythological narratives—a god or a goddess. In Kafka’s 
“Te Metamorphosis” neither sorcery nor divine power has transformed 
Gregor Samsa into vermin. Nobody did. Tere is no alternative castigator; 
it just spontaneously happened. Te metamorphosis takes place, as Fried-
mann Harzer puts it, in a “hermeneutical vacuum.”45 
Te identity of the castigator in Kafka’s oeuvre is typically an author-
ity whom the character is subordinated to; and even when the nature of 
the crime is unknown, as in Te Trial, the identity of the castigator is 
well known. In Kafka’s story “Te Judgment” (“Das Urteil”), Georg Ben-
demann’s father has no legal authority, yet clearly has the power to in-
fict on his son a horrifc punishment. In “Te Metamorphosis,” on the 
other hand, the reader cannot fnd the castigator, while the protagonists—
Gregor Samsa and his family—do not even look for one. Gregor’s meta-
morphosis is presented and perceived by all as a spontaneous occurrence. 
As no one has deliberately transformed Gregor, it cannot be considered as 
a punishment; no one is punishing Gregor. 
In fact, even in the broader sense of “poetic justice,” Gregor Samsa’s 
metamorphosis cannot be viewed as a punishment, as he has not commit-
ted any breach of rules. Before the metamorphosis Gregor was a salesman 
working very hard to support his family, and did not harm anyone. An 
excessively severe punishment, disproportionate to a minor sin, is indeed 







a common motif in Kafka’s oeuvre. For example, in “Te Knock at the 
Courtyard Gate” (“Der Schlag ans Hoftor”) the narrator’s sister beats her 
fst absent-mindedly on the farm door, or perhaps only shakes it, an action 
that leads to her brothers’ imprisonment. “In the Penal Colony” (“In der 
Strafkolonie”) deals with a prisoner condemned to be tortured to death 
for sleeping on duty. Likewise, Georg’s punishment in “Te Judgment”—
death by drowning—is certainly not commensurate with his transgres-
sion, namely encroaching on the patriarchal authority. As horrifc as these 
punishments are, however, they are at least somewhat explained in terms 
of cause and efect. Such explanation is not provided in “Te Metamor-
phosis.” 
Te metamorphosis of Gregor Samsa cannot be regarded as a punish-
ment for a sin, as there is neither a punisher nor a sinner. But even more 
interesting, the third criterion—the infiction of “something negative”—is 
not fulflled, as the transformation on the whole is not presented as a 
negative event. Various critics have suggested that the metamorphosis is 
Gregor’s way out of life as a traveling salesman, burdened with the task of 
providing for his family; once transformed, Gregor is no longer required 
to be the breadwinner of the family. Te metamorphosis thus frees him 
from all his social obligations as a human being, and thus can be viewed 
as a covert salvation from the fate of losing oneself for the sake of others. 
After his transformation, Gregor is free to climb the walls of his room to 
his heart’s content, enjoying a liberty he has not known before.46 
In “Report to an Academy” (“Ein Bericht für eine Akademie”), as will 
be discussed in the next chapter, Red Peter’s transformation from ape to 
human is expressly presented as a conscious choice, as a way out of his 
unfortunate life. Gregor Samsa’s transformation in “Te Metamorphosis” 
is not by choice, but can also be described as a “way out” of a life of mis-
ery. Gregor’s metamorphosis is, in Heinz Politzer’s words, the wish fulfll-
ment of an escapist.47 Gradually it becomes clear that being vermin is not 
such a bad thing after all, especially when the alternative is the human life 
Gregor Samsa had before the metamorphosis. As Deleuze and Guattari 
note, “Gregor becomes [vermin]  .  .  . to fnd an escape where his father 
didn’t know to fnd one, in order to fee the director, the business, and the 
bureaucrats, to reach that region where the voice no longer does anything 
but hum.”48 
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not only ontologically, but also in terms of value, as “Te Metamorphosis” 
dismisses the anthropocentric dogma that human existence is a priori su-
perior to nonhuman existence. Tis dogma is encapsulated in John Stuart 
Mill’s Utilitarianism (1863), in which it is claimed: “It is better to be a 
human being dissatisfed than a pig satisfed . . . and if the fool, or the pig, 
are of a diferent opinion, it is because they only know their own side of 
the question.”49 Te presupposition that human existence is superior to 
animal existence, and that metamorphosed fgures would therefore neces-
sarily prefer their human existence, had been challenged already in antiq-
uity, through Plutarch’s Moralia. Under the title “Beasts Are Rational,” this 
frst-century text reworks the metamorphosis scene in Homer’s Odyssey. 
In Plutarch’s version, Circe instructs Odysseus, who wishes to restore his 
friends their human form, to ask them frst if they are interested in being 
so restored, and, surprisingly, Gryllus, one of Odysseus’s former friends, 
says: “I shall quickly make you see that we are right to prefer our present 
life in place of the former one, now that we have tried both.”50 In Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses the transformation into a nonhuman body is not neces-
sarily a punishment, and in many cases it is even redemptive. In “Te 
Metamorphosis” Kafka revives this classical tradition, wherein becoming 
an animal is not automatically perceived as punishment, but at least to 
some extent is a salvation. 
Moreover, human superiority over other animals is undermined in the 
story from an ethical standpoint as well, inasmuch as the identifcation of 
humans with humaneness and nonhuman animals with brutality breaks 
down. As several studies has pointed out, Kafka makes it clear that the 
nonhuman Gregor Samsa is much more humane than his inhumane, hu-
man family. Te vermin is clearly the most sensitive, gentle, and moral of 
all the characters in the story.51 Tis is refected, among other things, in 
Gregor’s strong emotional reaction when his sister plays the violin, while 
the others show no interest. Gregor’s behavior stands in contrast to the 
parasitic and ungrateful behavior of his family, who sponged on Gregor 
before his metamorphosis and alienate him afterward. As Wayne Booth 
notes in his widely acclaimed Te Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), although the 
transmogrifed Gregor is far from a creature that arouses empathy, the 
reader is empathetic toward him.52 Similarly, Walter Sokel writes that the 
character of Gregor Samsa has afected his personal attitude toward vermin 
in the real world: 




Kafka text’s had the efect upon me of extending sympathy and 
solidarity in sufering to life beyond the human species. A human 
being had been changed into a specimen of vermin. Might not the 
huge cockroach I chanced upon in an upper Manhattan bathroom 
be a creature with some feeling, some sensibility, might it not by 
some inexplicable fuke be sheltering another traveling salesman or 
former clerk, another Gregor Samsa? Or at least a being not totally 
unlike myself?53 
Te story thus undercuts the human-animal contradistinction that human 
culture fosters, with its dogmatic insistence on ascribing certain moral val-
ues to biological qualities. 
Transgressing Species Essentialism 
Numerous critics have granted the vermin of Kafka’s story a biological 
identity. Some have seen him as a cockroach, others as a beetle, and more 
specifcally a dung beetle.54 Nabokov, approaching the story armed with 
vast knowledge and interest in entomology, disproves the presumption 
that the creature in question is a cockroach—for cockroaches are fat in 
shape and have large legs, while Gregor Samsa is curved and has small 
legs. He suggests that Gregor is a beetle, though not a dung beetle.55 But 
even Nabokov’s detailed and careful entomological analysis, with its charts 
and graphs of Gregor Samsa’s body, is doomed to fail, for it is in principle 
that the nature of the vermin cannot be biologically identifed. Had Kafka 
wanted Gregor Samsa’s species to be identifed, he would have referred 
to him not merely as a monstrous vermin. Presumably, the story would 
then open with Gregor waking up in bed realizing he had turned into a 
(monstrous) beetle, cockroach, or even a broader biological category, such 
as insect or bug.56 
It is not simply that the nature of the vermin is undefned, it is also a 
priori indefnable. Beyond the biological inconsistency in the description 
of the vermin, which does not allow for biological identifcation, reductive 
attempts to biologically classify the vermin are infeasible also for purely 
literary reasons, namely for fear of losing the particular rhetoric efect of 
the Ungeziefer. Te observation that the vermin cannot be reduced to any 
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minability. When Kurt Wolf, the publisher of “Te Metamorphosis,” in-
formed him that an artist for the frontispiece of the story’s frst edition 
has been commissioned, Kafka strongly requested the publisher not to 
illustrate the vermin: 
Dear Sir, 
You recently mentioned that Ottomar Starke is going to do a drawing 
for the title page of Metamorphosis. . . . Tis prospect has given me a 
minor and perhaps unnecessary fright. It struck me that Starke, as an 
illustrator, might want to draw the [vermin] itself. Not that, please 
not that! I do not want to restrict him, but only to make this plea out 
of my deeper knowledge of the story. Te [vermin] itself cannot be 
depicted. It cannot even be shown from a distance. (LFFE, 114–15) 
Te vermin cannot be depicted, as Kafka frmly determined; one can draw 
a cockroach or a beetle, but there is no schematic drawing of vermin since 
this is a broad category encompassing diverse creatures. While there are 
thousands of species of cockroaches and dung beetles, they all belong to 
the same order within the taxonomical rank, and as such, they share many 
of their characteristics. Te category of vermin is actually not a biologi-
cal category at all, as it crosses all the taxonomic ranks within the animal 
kingdom; it includes animals from diferent families, orders, and even divi-
sions, such as Arthropods (e.g. cockroaches), Chordates (such as rats) and 
Annelids (like various worms).57 Te designation Ungeziefer, then, does 
not refer to any biological attributes, but merely to the negative connota-
tions it has in human culture; it denotes something particularly objection-
able, outside the ordinary classifcation of life forms. 
Te chaotic, yet commonly used category of Ungeziefer, as well as its Eng-
lish equivalent “vermin,” brings to mind the famous Borgesian alternate 
taxonomy. In his 1942 “Te Analytical Language of John Wilkins” (“El 
idioma analítico de John Wilkins”), Jorge Luis Borges describes a fctitious 
taxonomy of animals in which nonhuman animals are divided into four-
teen unusual groups: “(a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed 
ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f ) fabu-
lous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classifcation, 
(i) those that tremble as if they are mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those 
drawn with a very fne camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have 









just broken a fower vase, (n) those that resemble fies from a distance.”58 
Foucault’s Te Order of Tings (1966), which traces the invention of 
man in modern times, opens with this Borgesian taxonomy: 
Tis book frst arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter 
that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my 
thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age 
and our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the 
planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion 
of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and 
threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same 
and the Other.59 
Te exclusion of humans from the natural world plays central role in the 
invention of man in modern times, as Foucault later notes in Te History of 
Sexuality: “For millennia, man remained what he was to Aristotle: a living 
animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man 
is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into ques-
tion.”60 Terefore, Borges’s taxonomy, which is often used to illustrate the 
arbitrariness and cultural specifcity of any attempt to categorize the world, 
should also draw our critical attention specifcally to the way we categorize 
other animals in respect to ourselves. 
In Te Animal Tat Terefore I Am (2002), Derrida critically refects on 
the overarching category of “the Animal”: 
Confned within this catch-all concept, within this vast encamp-
ment of the animal, . . . are all the living things that man does not 
recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And that is 
so in spite of the infnite space that separates the lizard from the 
dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the 
parrot from the chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel 
from the tiger, the elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm, 
or the hedgehog from the echidna.61 
Unlike Borges’s fctitious classifcation of the animal world, which excites 
laughter in Foucault and probably in other readers as well, the very cat-
egory of animal, does not seem comic to Derrida, but rather sinful: “Te 
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category of the animal,” he notes, “is not simply a sin against rigorous 
thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority, it is also a crime.”62 
Derrida’s critique of the category “animal” is applicable also to the subcat-
egory of vermin. 
Nonetheless, not only does the word Ungeziefer, as the lowest of the 
lowest, possess evident negative connotations, it is also modifed in “Te 
Metamorphosis” as ungeheuren Ungeziefer, a monstrous vermin.63 Like 
vermin, “monster” is also not a biological term; both words convey only 
society’s horror at the sight of certain beings. Te combination of these 
two German words—ungeheuren Ungeziefer—both start with the prefx 
un, which indicates negativity, further strengthens the negative content 
embodied in each one of the words. Additionally, the evocative use of the 
negative prefx un diverts the reader’s attention from entomology to ety-
mology, as it also brings into consideration the etymology of both words: 
Ungeziefer, an unclean animal unft for sacrifce, and ungeheuer, a person 
without ties to any family.64 
In his account of the abnormal, Foucault discusses the construction 
of the monster, whose existence and form violate the laws of both society 
and nature. “When the monster violates the law by its very existence,” he 
contends, “it triggers the response of something quite diferent from the 
law itself. It provokes either violence, the will of our simple repression, or 
medical care or pity.”65 It is interesting to note that Foucault’s account of 
reactions to the monster perfectly matches the reactions of the Samsas to 
the monstrous vermin. Teir frst response, when only Gregor’s voice from 
behind a closed door indicates his condition, is to fetch medical care: “‘My 
God,’ cried his mother, already in tears, ‘maybe he’s seriously ill, and here 
we are, torturing him. Grete! Grete! .  .  . Go to the doctor immediately. 
Gregor is sick. Hurry, get the doctor. Did you just hear Gregor talking?’” 
(M, 10). But as soon as the door is opened, and the family not only hears 
but also sees the monstrous vermin, it all changes and medical care is no 
longer an option. At this point, responses to the monstrous being are split 
and each one of the three family members responds diferently to Gregor, 
in accordance to the other three reactions to monstrosity as described by 
Foucault: pity (the sister), repression (the mother), and violence (the fa-
ther). As the plot advances, the sister’s response to Gregor changes from 
pity to repression, and eventually the entire family falls in with the harshest 
treatment. Te change in the sister’s attitude even takes on a grammatical 
signal: one of the turning points in the story is when Grete strips the last 





vestige of humanity from her brother by referring to him as “it” (es) rather 
than “he” (er).66 
Te depersonifcation of Gregor Samsa has been completed; it is the 
attitude of his family that ultimately brings about a change in his status: 
from someone into something. Having heard his sister expressing a wish 
that he disappear from their life, Gregor expires, becoming a carcass, a 
physical object without any mental dimension. Gregor’s corporal turn-
over has indeed taken place spontaneously, but his becoming “monstrous 
vermin,” that is—based on the etymology of ungeheuren Ungeziefer—an 
unclean animal, with no family ties, is certainly a function of the societal 
attitude towards him. As Stanley Corngold and Benno Wagner state, “Ver-
min is an entirely hybrid, non-self-identical, historically transient, socially 
constructed entity about which there exists no certain information: there 
is no science of the vermin, unless it is political science.”67 
Te source of Gregor’s anguish and the most horrifc aspect of his trans-
formation is not in fact the physical transformation but rather his family’s 
attitude toward him. Gregor is indeed confned in a nonhuman body, but 
he is also confned in his room, and the societal confnement seems to be 
even worse than the anatomical one. Had his family not excluded him, 
presumably Gregor might have been less wretched, perhaps even content 
in his verminous existence. It is the alienating family that strictly desig-
nates Gregor as vermin, as Elias Canetti observes: 
Instead of a son, who feeds and supports the family, all of a sudden 
there is an insect. Tis transformation exposes him, inescapably, to 
humiliation; an entire family feels provoked to infict it actively. 
Hesitantly, the humiliation begins. Time is allowed for its expansion 
and intensifcation. Gradually all the characters, almost helplessly 
and against their will, participate in it. Tey recapitulate the act that 
is given at the outset: it is the family itself that transforms Gregor 
Samsa, irretrievably, into an insect. What was an insect becomes, in 
the social context, vermin.68 
Te opening sentence of “Te Metamorphosis” indicates that Gregor 
Samsa’s transformation is a matter of biological determinism. Yet over the 
course of the novella it becomes clear that his verminous existence is not 
forced on Gregor from outside, by nature, but from his immediate human 







Te Metamorphosis of the Human/Animal Binary 47 
this change through its attitude towards Gregor. Animal existence is not 
presented here as purely a biological state, but as a fusion of biological and 
social existence. It is important here to note that the original German title 
of the novella, Die Verwandlung, is not entirely equivalent to its English 
title, “Te Metamorphosis.” While metamorphosis refers, both literally 
and in literary convention, to a change in form, Verwandlung is more ac-
curately translated as “Te Transition,” as it is not necessarily restricted to 
physical change.69 And indeed, the story only briefy deals with Gregor’s 
physical transition. Te drama is clearly centered around the noncorporeal 
aspects of becoming vermin, suggesting that Gregor’s humanimal transi-
tion is largely socially constructed. 
Following the well-established distinction between sex and gender, 
Carmen Dell’Aversano suggests an analogous variance between “biological 
species” and “species identity.”70 In similarity to the distinction between 
sex and gender, one can discern in the category of species both biologi-
cal and social components. In fact, we can paraphrase Simone de Beau-
voir’s epigrammatic formulation, “One is not born, but rather becomes, 
a woman,”71 stating that Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis” demonstrates that 
“one is not born (or physically transformed into), but rather becomes, an 
animal.” Like womanhood, animality is presented in “Te Metamorpho-
sis” as a refection not of essential diferences between human and nonhu-
man animals but of diferences in their social situation. 
To understand how one becomes an animal, we can literally use Jean-
Paul Sartre’s words in his preface to Frantz Fanon’s Te Wretched of the 
Earth: “I am not saying it is impossible to change a man into an animal. I 
am saying they can’t do it without weakening him considerably. Beating is 
never enough, pressure has to be brought by undernourishing him.”72 Te 
set of corporeal biopower practices against Gregor includes both beating 
and undernourishing. Facing the body of her beaten and starved brother, 
Grete’s initial reaction is “Just see how thin he was. It’s such a long time 
since he’s eaten anything. . . . Indeed, Gregor’s body was completely fat 
and dry” (CS, 136–37). Gregor Samsa, intertwining the famous words of 
de Beauvoir and Sartre, was not born an animal, but rather became one 
through beating and undernourishment. 
“Te Metamorphosis” is considered a radically innovative work of liter-
ature, since it defes various narratological norms, not least of all in its star-
tling, in medias res opening. Kafka’s decision to situate the ultradramatic 
metamorphic event in the very frst sentence of the story, without any 




expositional account, thereby throwing the reader of the literary norm, 
has made this sentence one of the most remarkable opening sentences in 
world literature. Yet if the novella indeed focuses on the process of Gregor 
Samsa’s becoming animal through social construction, Gregor’s corporal 
transformation is in fact merely the exposition of the central drama. Under 
this reading, “Te Metamorphosis” might be less poetically radical than it 
seems at frst glance, yet more politically radical. By presenting the physi-
cal turnover as secondary to the social construction in Gregor’s animaliza-
tion process, the adversarial binarism of human/animal is de-essentialized. 
Alternatively, Kafka ofers a counterintuitive antithesis of species identity 
as a socially constructed category, generated through biopolitical practices 
of segregation, exclusion, confnement, undernourishment, and violence. 
2RPP
 
chapter   
A Transspecies’ Report to an Academy 
Kafka’s 1917 short story “A Report to an Academy” (“Ein Bericht für eine 
Akademie”) centers on Red Peter (Rotpeter), an ape captured in Africa and 
transported to Europe. To escape the grim fate awaiting him, Red Peter 
resolved to become human, at frst by imitating the people around him, 
and later through a systematic study of humans. Te entire story is Red 
Peter’s monologue delivered to the members of the academy, who invited 
him to report on his former life as an ape. Like all of Kafka’s animal stories, 
this one, too, has been largely read allegorically. Te nonhuman experience 
and the human-animal dynamics, which are at the heart of the story, have 
been typically reduced to intrahuman themes. “A Report to an Academy” 
was frst published in the Jewish periodical Der Jude, hence Red Peter’s 
transformation has been perceived, frst and foremost, as an allegory for 
attempts at assimilation by European Jews.1 Other common allegorical 
readings of the story deal with European colonialism in Africa, the human 
condition, as well the question of mimesis in art.2 
Tzvetan Todorov’s argument, presented in the previous chapter, accord-
ing to which the plethora of allegorical interpretations to “Te Metamor-
phosis” points out that it is actually not an allegory (since the text does 
not invite any specifc allegorical reading), is applicable here as well. Fur-
thermore, when Martin Buber, the editor of Der Jude, in which both “A 
Report to an Academy” and “Jackals and Arabs” were published, suggested 
calling these stories parables, Kafka responded: “May I ask you not to call 
the pieces parables; they are not really parables. If they are to have any 
overall title at all, the best might be: ‘Two Animal Stories’” (LFFE, 132). 
Following Kafka’s own lead, I propose to read “A Report to an Academy” 
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as an animal story, focusing on the nonhuman condition as well as human-
nonhuman dynamics. 
Contextualizing Nonhuman Oppression 
The Historical Context of Nonhuman Oppression 
Red Peter’s story is largely based on historical facts. References to reality, 
such as names of real places or people, are quite rare in Kafka’s poetics. Te 
absence of such indications reinforces the universal scope of Kafka’s work. 
Tus, for example, we are not told when the plot of “In the Penal Colony” 
takes place, or where Gregor Samsa lives.3 As Marthe Robert points out, 
Kafka uses anonymity in order to bring out a transcendent quality.4 “A 
Report to an Academy” is, however, exceptional in this context. Red Peter, 
we are told, was captured on the Gold Coast, a colonized territory in the 
Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, and taken to Hamburg. Te company that 
seized him—Hagenbeck—was an actual business that traded in wild ani-
mals, owned by Carl Hagenbeck, who established the famous Hagenbeck’s 
Animal Park (Tierpark Hagenbeck) in Hamburg.5 In his critical work on 
the modern zoo, Nigel Rothfels dedicates much of his research to Carl 
Hagenbeck, the father of the modern zoo. Rothfels argues that by intro-
ducing the innovative idea of the zoo as a safe sanctuary for nonhuman 
animals, Hagenbeck revolutionized the entire concept of the zoo: 
Hagenbeck’s revolution was precisely the narratives of freedom and 
happiness he developed at his zoos to go along with the newer ex-
hibits. Before Hagenbeck, zoological gardens often struggled to con-
vince the public that it was not so bad to be an animal at the zoo. 
Beginning with Hagenbeck, the gardens began fnally, and more or 
less successfully, to renarrate the captive lives of animals. Ever since 
Hagenbeck, animals have not been collected merely for reasons of 
science or education, or even really for recreation—animals have 
been put in zoos increasingly because they are nice, healthy, safe 
places to be and because the animals, we are told, might be better 
of there than in a real “wild.”6 
Hagenbeck made sure to promulgate this impression in his 1908 auto-
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observed, the change introduced by Hagenbeck was not so much in the 
conditions of captivity, as in eradicating the traces of imprisonment; visi-
tors to the enormous zoo that Hagenbeck built in Hamburg in 1907 saw 
no cages or bars: the nonhuman animals were behind invisible barriers or 
natural-looking fences.7 For Adorno, the concealment itself was even more 
oppressive than the previous overt confnement: 
Nor can any good come of Hagenbeck’s layout, with trenches in-
stead of cages, betraying the Ark by simulating the rescue that only 
Ararat can promise. Tey deny the animals’ freedom only the more 
completely by keeping the boundaries invisible, the sight of which 
would infame the longing for open space.  .  .  . Te more purely 
nature is preserved and transplanted by civilization, the more im-
placably it is dominated.8 
Ironically, Red Peter is not impressed by Hagenbeck’s narrative of freedom: 
When I was handed over to my frst trainer, in Hamburg I quickly 
realized the two choices available to me: the zoo or vaudeville. I did 
not hesitate. I said to myself: try with all your might to get into 
vaudeville variety; that is the way out; the zoo is only a new cage 
with bars; once you get into it, you’re lost. (KSS, 83) 
Human visitors to modern zoos may not notice the imprisonment, but 
the nonhuman animals certainly do; even the most advanced zoo is, in 
Red Peter’s words, “only a new cage.” Te zoo, as Randy Malamud aptly 
points out, “fundamentally inscribes the looked-at animals inside their 
cages—or their ‘cageless enclosures,’ that is, cages that don’t look like cages 
(to us)—as subaltern.”9 
Red Peter’s alternative, after rejecting the option of the zoo—the variety
show—is also anchored in historical facts and taken from the records of
the Hagenbeck company. In 1887, Carl Hagenbeck established a traveling
animal circus that performed all over Europe and the United States. Just as
Red Peter’s capture by Hagenbeck’s hunting expedition is based on historical
facts, so, too, are his training in human behavior and his public appear-
ances. Rothfels cites many examples of apes captured in Africa and brought
to Europe by the Hagenbeck company at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Tose apes were trained to behave like humans and, similarly to
Red Peter, imitated drinking alcohol, smoking, shaking hands, and making






























other human gestures. In fact, the only diference between those performing
apes and Red Peter is that the latter also learned to speak.10 In his book on
the ethics of zoos, Stephen Bostock mentions that Hagenbeck used to select
“natural performers”—exceptional individuals from among the many wild
animals he traded in—”11 which is consistent with the plot of “A Report to
an Academy.” 
Carl Hagenbeck has also been considered an innovator in the feld of
animal circuses, as he championed an alleged humane method of training,
using rewards and positive reinforcement instead of whips and intimida-
tion.12 However, this humane treatment could not be implemented, inas-
much as training animals solely with positive reinforcement is impractical.
Te alleged humane training accorded with the public sentiment at the time,
which objected to the cruelty of whipping animals during performances, but
it is evident that wild animals were trained by harsh means in Hagenbeck’s
facilities.13 In other words, both in zoos and circuses, Hagenbeck’s innova-
tion was restricted to the concealment of the violence involved in capturing
and training nonhumans. Te traces of violence against animals used for
food in modern times have been erased, as discussed in the previous chapter,
to perpetuate its continuation. In a parallel manner, the treatment of nonhu-
man animals in modern zoos and circuses also demonstrates how concealing
the violence, and not refraining from it, has been the response to the grow-
ing sensitivity to the condition of these animals in modern times. In both
cases, “the distasteful is removed behind the scenes of social life,” as Norbert
Elias put it;14 the violence merely disappeared from the public eye. 
We can thus reevaluate the societal reservations at the sight of Red 
Peter’s naked body: 
Recently, I read an article by one of the ten thousand windbags who
vent their views about me in the newspapers: they say that my ape
nature has not yet been entirely repressed; the proof is supposed to
be that whenever I have company, I am inclined to lower my pants to
show the bullet’s path of entry. Every tiny fnger of that guy’s writing
hand ought to be blown of, one by one. I, I have the right to lower
my pants in front of anyone I like; there is nothing to see there other
than a well-groomed pelt and the scar left by—let us choose a spe-
cifc word for a specifc purpose, a word, however, that should not be
misunderstood—the scar left by a profigate shot. Everything is open
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Te societal malaise at Red Peter’s outrageous act of lowering his pants 
in public can be historically contextualized. Hagenbeck’s animal business 
enjoyed enormous success precisely because it responded to the public’s 
sensitivity to animal cruelty by hiding the traces of brutality from the spec-
tators. As long as Red Peter wears his pants, the scar—the mark of malice 
perpetrated during his capture—is hidden from human eyes. Exposing the 
scar troubles the public, inasmuch as it shatters the mirage that “no ani-
mals were harmed in the making of this show,” an illusion that the animal 
traders wished to maintain. 
“Te captivity of animals is predicated upon the (false) presupposition 
that they don’t mind captivity,” Randy Malamud argues. “If audiences re-
sisted this presumption, the cognitive dissonance would be too great.”15 
And, indeed, when Red Peter invalidates this presumption by exposing his 
scars, the audience—represented here by the journalist—resists Red Peter, 
and not the presumption. Red Peter’s nudity exposes his “bare life” (or 
naked life, following Agamben’s original Italian term, nuda vita), stripped 
of any rights. Amused by a humanlike ape, the audience feels ill at ease 
when exposed to the nonentertaining side of the entertainment industry, 
a reality it would rather be spared. Ironically, Red Peter is condemned as 
uncivilized, because he exposes the scar that so-called civilized society in-
ficted upon him when capturing him. 
Nudity is considered animalistic, hence shameful and socially unac-
ceptable. Te human being, who has been famously designated as “the 
naked ape,”16 is also the clothed animal. Te conception of man as the 
clothed animal harks back to the biblical story of the Garden of Eden, 
where the immediate efect of eating the forbidden fruit on Adam and Eve 
is a feeling of moral compulsion to clothe themselves: 
And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that 
it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to 
make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she 
gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes 
of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; 
and they sewed fg-leaves together, and made themselves girdles. 
(Genesis 3:6–7) 
Te Bible posits here an inextricable link between becoming wise and
becoming uncomfortable with nudity, and both are also correlated with










becoming human. By eating the fruit of knowledge, Adam and Eve be-
come aware of their creaturely nature and rush to conceal it by cover-
ing themselves. Additionally, in the prior verse, the fruit from the tree
of knowledge is also linked with moral knowledge: “In the day ye eat
thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing
good and evil” (Genesis 3:5). By clothing themselves, following eating
the fruit, Adam and Eve have gained not only wisdom, but also moral
consciousness. 
Nietzsche, in Te Gay Science (1882), dismisses the linkage between 
clothing and morality, stressing that covering the naked body is not a 
moral behavior, but rather a moral disguise: 
Te naked human being is generally a disgraceful sight . . . It seems 
we Europeans are utterly unable to dispense with that masquerade 
called clothing. But why should there not be equally good reasons 
for the disguise of “moral men,” for their veil of moral formulas and 
notions of decency, for the whole benevolent concealment of our 
actions behind the concepts of duty, virtue, public spirit, respect-
ability, self-denial? . . . Te European disguises himself with morality
because he has become a sick, sickly, maimed animal which has 
good reasons for being “tame”; because he is almost a monstrosity, 
something half, weak, awkward.  .  .  . It is not the ferocity of the 
beast of prey that needs a moral disguise, but the herd animal with 
its deep mediocrity, fear, and boredom with itself. Morality dresses 
up the European—let’s admit it!—into something nobler, grander, 
goodlier, something “divine.”17 
Red Peter’s resentment at the requirement to cover his body seems to echo 
this Nietzschean critique. Nietzsche’s portrayal of clothes as a moral dis-
guise is concretized in “A Report to an Academy,” as covering Red Peter’s 
body also covers the mark of immortality, the scarred mark of violence 
etched into his body. 
In fact, Derrida’s sustained engagement with the human-animal ques-
tion commences with the notion of humans’ distinctive discomfort with 
nudity. He opens Te Animal Tat Terefore I Am, originally a seminar 
delivered in 1997, with a description of a situation, where he felt ashamed 
(as well as embarrassed for being ashamed) of having his naked body gazed 




A Transspecies’ Report to an Academy 55 
what and before whom?” His answer to the second part of the question 
(“before whom?”) becomes the point of departure for his exploration of 
animal agency, as one can only be ashamed before someone, and not be-
fore something. Whereas the title of his seminar, Te Animal Tat Tere-
fore I Am, is a close variation on the Cartesian cogito, this query can also 
be viewed as a paraphrase of Descartes’s formulation: “I am ashamed be-
fore the animal, therefore the animal is.” Derrida’s answer to the frst part 
(“ashamed of what?”) is “ashamed of being as naked as a beast.”18 He re-
verses here the commonly accepted notion, that humans difer from other 
animals since they are ashamed of their nudity, stressing that humans are 
disgraced by their naked body because it exposes that they are not diferent 
from other animals. Te clothed animal, which in the biblical paradigm is 
metonymic to the moral and wise animal, in Derrida’s analysis is merely 
the animal that is ashamed of being animal.19 In light of the Derridean 
reversal, Red Peter’s act of exposing his naked and scarred body is viewed as 
inhuman, as unlike human beings he is not ashamed to expose his animal-
ity, his creaturely condition. 
An additional historical source to “A Report to an Academy” is sug-
gested in J. M. Coetzee’s 1999 metafctional novella Te Lives of Animals. 
Tis text revolves around a celebrated aging Australian author named 
Elizabeth Costello, who has been invited to give a lecture at an American 
university. But instead of talking about her own books or about literature 
in general, she chooses—in her own report to an academy—to discuss 
the horrifc treatment of nonhuman animals by human society, focusing 
extensively on Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy.”20 Costello reports that 
the Prussian Academy of Science built a research facility in Tenerife, oper-
ated from 1912 to 1920, to study the mental abilities of apes. In 1917, 
the psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, one of the scientists working on the 
project, published an elaborate report on the mentality of apes, describing 
his experiments and fndings. Kafka published “A Report to an Academy” 
a few months after Köhler’s report came out. Costello points out that Red 
Peter, like Köhler’s apes, was captured in Africa by hunters specializing in 
primates; the animals were then transported by sea to a scientifc institute 
where they were trained to behave like humans. Costello talks at length 
about a particular ape, Sultan, who was Köhler’s star student, and appar-
ently served as the prototype for Red Peter.21 In the conclusion to his re-
port, which describes research from 1913 to 1917 (a period of fve years, 
which is identical to Red Peter’s period of training) Köhler writes: 





Te chimpanzees manifest intelligent behaviour of the general kind 
familiar in human beings. . . . Chimpanzees do not only stand out 
against the rest of the animal world by several morphological and, in 
the narrower sense, physiological, characteristics, but they also show 
a type of behaviour which counts as specifcally human.22 
“A Report to an Academy” includes a few nonrealistic elements; chief 
among them is Red Peter’s ability to use human language. However, the 
story of an African ape, who was shot, captured, and imprisoned by Hagen-
beck’s hunting expedition, then shipped by sea to Hamburg, where he 
entertained audiences by imitating human behavior, faithfully chronicles 
the lives of many apes at the time. Te clear historical context encourages 
further reading of the story as an animal story, whereby the human-animal 
relations within the diegesis refect such relations in the extradiegetic real-
ity. 
The Political Context of Nonhuman Oppression 
In Tomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), one of the foundational texts of 
modern political theory, people formed a social contract, transferring their 
self-sovereignty to the authority of a ruler, whose monopoly on the use of 
power would guarantee justice. Tey do so to escape life in the state of na-
ture, which was “continuall feare and danger of violent death; And the life 
of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”23 By entering the social 
contract individuals exchange freedom for protection. Te rejection of the 
Hobbesian formulation of the social contract is central in posthumanist 
critique,24 and it also stands at the core of Kafka’s poetics. Te Kafkaesque 
version of the social contract, in which the absolute power of the sovereign 
provides nothing but insecurity and terror, is antithetical to Hobbes’s. It 
is evident in Kafka’s punishment narratives, such as Te Trial, “Te Judg-
ment,” and “In the Penal Colony,” and it is also explicitly articulated in 
“On the Question of the Laws” (“Zur Frage der Gesetze”): 
Unfortunately, our laws are not generally known, they are the secret 
of the small group of nobles who rules us.  .  .  . if, following these 
conclusions, which have been most carefully sorted and fled, we 
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or the future—then all this is extremely uncertain and may be no 
more than an intellectual game, for the laws that we are trying to 
fgure out may not even exist. (KSS, 130) 
Hobbes’s theory of the social contract is largely grounded upon the 
human/animal and nature/civilization dualism, identifying the state of na-
ture with violence, a state where homo homini lupus—people are wolves to 
each other. Te presumed identifcation between the state of nature and 
violence justifes for Hobbes the loss of freedom and the sovereign’s abso-
lute power. Whilst Kafka’s stories typically resist the Hobbesian paradigm 
by undermining the alleged identifcation between civil society and secu-
rity, in “A Report to an Academy” Kafka also undercuts the other part of 
Hobbes’s equation, which is the presumed identifcation between the state 
of nature and violence: 
I am afraid that what I mean by “a way out” will not be clearly 
understood. I was using it in the most common and also the full-
est sense of the word. I deliberately do not say “freedom.” I do not 
mean that great feeling of freedom on all sides. Perhaps I knew it 
as an ape and I have known human beings who long for it. But as 
far as I am concerned, I did not ask for freedom either then or now. 
By the way: human beings all too often deceive themselves about 
freedom. And just as freedom counts among the most sublime feel-
ings, so too the corresponding delusion counts among the most 
sublime. . . . You mockery of holy Nature! No building could stand 
up to apedom’s laughter at such sight. (KSS, 79–80) 
Te state of nature in Red Peter’s report is not violence, but freedom. 
It is not in the state of nature that homo homini lupus; it is not in the state 
of nature that individuals (both human and nonhuman) are cruel to each 
other. Alternatively, as Red Peter exposes in his report and in his scarred 
body, it is in the so-called civilized society that humans are cruel to non-
humans. Like Gregor Samsa, who one day wakes up to realize that he has 
turned into a monstrous vermin, and Josef K., who discovers one morning 
that he is under arrest, Red Peter, who has led a peaceful life in nature, 
having no inkling of what is in store for him, is suddenly captured, and his 
life changes irrevocably. 
While the initiating event in “Te Metamorphosis” is fantastic, and in 








Te Trial is at least peculiar, what happens to Red Peter in “A Report to 
an Academy” (apart, of course, from the fact that he can speak in human 
language and tell his story) is thoroughly probable. Te realism is fore-
grounded by the references to the actual world, foremost among them to 
Hagenbeck’s company, which—as noted before—are rare in Kafka’s oeu-
vre. Apes in Africa, like nonhuman animals all over the world, are not 
subject to an equitable legal system; they are constantly at risk of being 
suddenly deprived of freedom through no fault of their own.25 Te very 
last words that Josef K. utters before his execution, “like a dog” (T, 165), 
identify senseless killing, carried out openly without any attempt to con-
ceal it, with the killing of a nonhuman animal. In “A Report to an Acad-
emy” Kafka also identifes the lack of rights with nonhuman lives. 
In Minima Moralia (1951) Adorno sees the othering of humans as a 
result of dehumanization, which is rooted in the othering of nonhuman 
animals: 
Perhaps the social schematization of perception in Anti-Semites 
is such that they don’t see Jews as human beings at all. Te con-
stantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like 
animals, monkeys for example, is the key to the pogrom. Te pos-
sibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a 
fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being. Te defance with 
which he repels this gaze—“after all it’s only an animal”—reappears 
irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators hav-
ing again and again to reassure themselves that it is “only an ani-
mal,” because they could never fully believe this even of animals.26 
In a similar vein, Agamben’s pivotal point in Te Open is the notion of the 
“anthropological machine,” conceptualizing the repeated act of drawing 
the line between humans and other animals, through which the two cat-
egories are produced, as a mechanical entity: 
Insofar as the production of man through the opposition man/ 
animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine necessarily 
functions by means of an exclusion (which is always already a cap-
turing) and an inclusion (which is also always already an exclusion). 
Indeed, precisely because the human is already presupposed every 
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zone of indeterminacy in which the outside nothing but the exclu-
sion of an inside and the inside is in turn only the inclusion of an 
outside.27 
Te “anthropological machine” creates, according to Agamben, “a kind 
of state of exception,” a term referring to a law-free zone, in which con-
stitutional rights are suspended. For the nonhuman animals, the “state of 
exception” is an everlasting state; for them, all zones in the civil world are 
law-free zones. 
Tis nonhuman state of exception can be actually illustrated in the
famous example given by Bertrand Russell of the problem of induction.
Russell analyzes the philosophical question at the basis of the assumption
that “there is nothing new under the sun,” arguing that, in fact, there can
be something new under the sun, and that the sun may suddenly cease
to shine: 
We are all convinced that the sun will rise tomorrow. Why? Is this 
belief a mere blind outcome of past experience, or can it be justifed 
as a reasonable belief? . . . We have a frm belief that it will rise in the 
future, because it has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why 
we believe that it will continue to rise as heretofore, we may appeal 
to the laws of motion. . . . Te interesting doubt is as to whether the 
laws of motion will remain in operation until tomorrow. . . . Te 
man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last 
wrings its neck instead, showing that more refned views as to the 
uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.28 
Te methodological doubt that Russell applies to our ability to predict
events corresponds to Kafka’s poetics, where such doubt is a key feature. As
a chicken can suddenly be taken to the slaughter one day, as per Russell’s
example, so can an ape be wrenched from his natural habitat in Africa, as
occurs in Kafka’s text. Unlike humans in the Hobbesian civil society, who
voluntarily forfeit their freedom but ostensibly gain protection as members
of the social contract, Red Peter lost his liberty when he was unwillingly
abducted from nature into civil society, without gaining anything in return. 
Red Peter is not deprived of his freedom in order to enter the social 
contract; he loses his liberty precisely because he is not—and as a nonhu-
man, he cannot be—part of the social contract. While members of society 














bound by the social contract are protected from brutality, violence against 
others is permitted. Deprived of the freedom he had in the state of nature, 
yet also denied the protection under the social contract in the civil world, 
Red Peter receives the worst of both worlds and belongs to neither of them, 
simultaneously captured inside and outside the force of law. No longer in 
the state of nature, yet without an option of becoming a member of civil 
society, Red Peter—as he himself refects on his situation on the boat—is 
stuck between the two states: 
I was stuck. If they had nailed me down, I would have had no less 
freedom of movement. Why was that? Scratch open the fesh be-
tween your toes, and you will not fnd the reason. Crush your back-
side against the bars of your cage until they almost cut you in two, 
and you still won’t fnd the reason. I had no way out but had to 
provide myself with one, for I could not live without it. Always up 
against the wall of this crate—I would inevitably have croaked. But 
at Hagenbeck, apes belong up against the wall—well, so I stopped 
being an ape. (KSS, 79) 
Red Peter recognizes that as an ape he can neither return to the state of 
nature nor enter the social contract. He also realizes he cannot exist out-
side both states, so he chooses the only way out, the only option left—to 
stop being an ape, which may allow him to enter the social contract. His 
search for “a way out” (Ausweg) is thus a search for “a way in”—a way into 
a protective order. 
Contextualizing Humanimal Transition 
“A Report to an Academy” focuses on Red Peter’s transition from an
ape to a human being, and hence it has been widely considered a meta-
morphosis story.29 However, this story systematically deviates from the
paradigm of metamorphosis narratives, including Kafka’s earlier meta-
morphosis tale, “Te Metamorphosis,” which is a radical metamorphosis
work, as shown in the previous chapter. Red Peter’s trajectory from a
nonhuman animal to a human being is in itself a remarkable deviation
from the tradition of metamorphosis literature, whereas species change
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man.30 Te story of an ape turned human clearly echoes Darwin’s theory
of evolution, and this is the frst context in which I would like to read
Red Peter’s species transition. 
Even more subversive than the direction of the species change is the 
fact that Red Peter’s process of becoming human is not expressed in his 
outward appearance at all. While it is evident to the story’s characters and 
critics that in his physique Red Peter retains his ape body, he is still per-
ceived by all—within and outside the diegesis—as a “former ape.”31 In
“Te Metamorphosis,” as stated in the previous chapter, species identity 
is not reduced to biological identity, but contains, alongside the corporal 
component, also a major element of social construction. Yet, in “A Report 
on an Academy” the biological aspect of the species transition is entirely 
eliminated. Tis nonphysical species transition stands in stark contrast not 
only to the tradition of metamorphosis literature, but also to the very term 
“metamorphosis,” which literally means change in form. I would, then, 
like to examine Red Peter’s immaterial species transition in terms of evolu-
tion, and in light of gender and postcolonial critiques. 
Red Peter’s Species Transition as Evolution 
Kafka’s story of an ape turned human through a process of adaptation 
to his environment, echoes—as have been extensively noted—Darwin’s 
theory of evolution.32 Tis theory, as expounded in Te Origin of Species
(1859) and Te Descent of Man (1871), deals with the development of all 
biological species, including plants, but its particular application to the 
evolution of the human species, and its relationship to other primates, 
garnered the most public attention for its religious, social, and ethical im-
plications. Darwinism had tremendous impact on the intellectual climate 
in the West at the turn of the twentieth century, and Kafka’s biographers 
have reported that he frst read Darwin at age sixteen, whereupon he be-
came an ardent follower.33 Darwinian motifs can be traced, as Leena Eilittä 
shows, throughout Kafka’s works,34 but the story that undoubtedly bears 
these marks more than any other work in Kafka’s oeuvre is “A Report to 
an Academy.” 
In her book on the infuence of Darwin on nineteenth-century litera-
ture, Gillian Beer draws a parallel between the concept of evolution and 
the concept of metamorphosis: 





“Omnia mutantur, nihil interit.” Everything changes, nothing dies. 
Ovid’s assertion in Metamorphoses marks one crucial distinction be-
tween the idea of metamorphosis and Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
Darwin’s theory required extinction. Death was extended from the 
individual organism to the whole species. Metamorphosis bypasses 
death. Te concept expresses continuance, survival, the essential self 
transposed but not obliterated by transformation. In some ways, 
evolutionary theory looks like the older concept of metamorphosis 
prolonged through time, transformation eked out rather than em-
blazoned. Both ideas seek to rationalize change but through diverse 
means.35 
It is easy to see that in “A Report to an Academy”—much more than in 
other narratives of metamorphosis—the transformation is presented as an 
act of survival, as a reaction to an existential threat. Red Peter describes 
how he found himself close to death and, in order to save himself, changed 
his biological species. As Walter Sokel phrases it, Red Peter opts for surviv-
ing as an individual at the expense of losing his species identity and his 
nature.36 Te apishness has been eradicated, while Red Peter survives. In 
fact, Red Peter himself draws a parallel between the process he underwent 
from ape to human and the process of human evolution: 
To speak frankly, as much as I like to employ fgurative image for 
these things, to speak frankly: your apedom, gentlemen, to the ex-
tent that you have something of the sort behind you, cannot be 
more remote from you than mine is from me. (KSS, 77) 
Apes have long been perceived as located betwixt and between human-
ity and animality.37 Due to their special location on the boundary between 
the two mythic poles of nature and culture, Donna Haraway, in her 1989 
seminal study Primate Visions, coined the term “simian orientalism,” re-
ferring to the fantasies around apes in both scientifc and sociopolitical 
writing.38 By standing at the threshold of humanity, Agamben argues, apes 
undermine the human-animal divide, dismissing the Cartesian thesis that 
conceived of nonhuman animals as if they were automata mechanica.39 
Red Peter has sexual relations with a female chimpanzee, but his own 
species is undefned in the text. However, a related passage, which Kafka 
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Peter is indeed a chimpanzee. In this passage, which is not narrated by 
Red Peter, the narrator addresses him, saying: “Listening to you talk . . . 
I really and truly forget—whether you take it as a compliment or not, it’s 
the truth—that you are a chimpanzee” (CS, 260). In contrast to most 
metamorphosis narratives, including Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis,” where 
the gap between the original fgure and the transformed one is dramatic, 
the gap in Red Peter’s case is minimal, as the human and chimpanzee ge-
nomes are 98.8% identical.40 As a humanized ape Red Peter is situated at 
the threshold of humanity, but even before his humanization, as a mere 
ape, Red Peter was literally a “human ape”—Menschenafe—which is the 
German term for the taxonomic family of great apes (Hominidae). Fur-
thermore, unlike most literary metamorphic events (Gregor Samsa’s meta-
morphosis included), but in accordance with evolutionary processes, the 
change in Red Peter is not efected overnight. It can, in fact, be seen as a 
process of adaptation, which is a key term in the Darwinian paradigm. 
In view of all this, the change wrought in Red Peter is to be regarded as 
an interim state between metamorphosis and evolution. Although Darwin-
ism, as a scientifc theory, is merely descriptive, it was co-opted—probably 
more than any other scientifc theory—in the service of various ideological 
beliefs. When discussing the place of humans within the animal kingdom, 
the basic tenets of the theory were often distorted, as the status of human 
beings was converted from “the crown of creation” to “the crown of evolu-
tion,” occupying the place at the top of the chain of beings. Conversely, by 
suggesting a model of continuation between humans and other animals, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution (which must not be confused with its popu-
list interpretations) is—in Carrie Rohman’s words—“the most radical 
philosophical blow to anthropocentrism in the modern age.”41 As Darwin 
himself clearly states in Te Descent of Man: 
Nevertheless, the diference in mind between man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind. We 
have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and 
faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, rea-
son etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even 
sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals.42 
Not only is the diference one of degree, and not of kind, but Darwin also
has not conceived of this diference in terms of value or importance. Tere








is no “more evolved” or “less evolved” in his evolutionary theory, as natural
selection moves in no particular direction. Tere are only the diferent paths
taken by diferent species, which are not directed to any particular end.43 
Red Peter is among the few Kafka protagonists, if not the only one, 
who has succeeded in overcoming the obstacles put in his way.44 However, 
his evolution into a human being is not necessarily a positive develop-
ment. Being human is presented as a mere dodge, used by the ape to avoid 
being a lifetime prisoner. Toward the end of the story, Red Peter states 
that he “reached the average cultural level of a European.” However, when 
he describes the process he has undergone, this cultural level is presented 
ironically: 
It was so easy to imitate these people. Within a few days I had 
learned to spit. We then spat in one another’s faces, the only difer-
ence being that afterward I licked my face clean and they did not. 
Before long I was smoking a pipe like an old hand. . . . It was the 
brandy bottle that gave me the greatest trouble. (KSS, 81) 
Red Peter, like the sailors on the ship, identifes smoking, spitting, and 
drinking alcohol with human behaviors that he should adopt in order to 
become human. By presenting these activities as the key events in Red Pe-
ter’s transition, “A Report to an Academy” underscores the negative aspects 
of becoming human. According to the story, humans are neither the ratio-
nal nor the political animals, as often described in Western thought, but 
merely the drinking, spitting, and smoking animals. Tese are the skills 
one should acquire to reach the average cultural level of a European. 
Becoming human does not require rational thinking, and certainly not 
moral virtues, as in his former apish life Red Peter harmed no one, while 
human beings shot, captured, caged and tortured him. Te humanization 
process is, in fact, completed when at the very end of his report Red Peter 
describes an abusive relationship he has with a female chimpanzee: 
If I return late at night from banquets, from learned societies, from 
convivial occasions, a little half-trained little chimpanzee is waiting 
for me, and I have my pleasure of her in the way of all apes. In the 
daytime I do not want to see her; she has the lunatic look of the be-
wildered trained animals; I am the only one who recognizes it, and 
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In his Aesthetic Teory, Adorno argues that “there is nothing so expressive 
as the eyes of animals—especially apes.”45 In addition to smoking, spitting, 
and drinking alcohol, rejecting the animal gaze is also presented here as a 
crucial aspect of human behavior that one should acquire when turning 
human. As in “Te Metamorphosis,” the correlation between “being hu-
man” and “being humane” is disrupted, as rendered by Clayton Koelb: 
In the course of his report Red Peter emphasizes the costs inher-
ent in the transformation; a moral descent from a life of genuine 
freedom to a human life of obligations and constraints. Te descent 
from ape to man thus recapitulates the fall from Eden.46 
“A Report to an Academy,” then, relates the story of an ape evolving 
into a human. Tis evolution, however, is not portrayed in terms of prog-
ress, but such description is actually in line with Darwin’s concept of evo-
lution, which is free of value judgment. As several critics have noted, in “A 
Report to an Academy” Kafka keenly satirizes the humanist ethos, as he 
undermines the hierarchical separation of humans from apes, suggesting 
that there is little to admire about human society and humankind.47 At
frst glance, the story—which follows the evolutionary trajectory—seems 
to go against metamorphosis norms, whereby the species change is from 
a higher form of life to a lower one. Yet in retrospect it turns out that the 
story actually does comply with this norm, as Red Peter’s change from ape 
to human is indeed presented, at least to some degree, as a regression from 
a higher to a lower form of life. 
Species Transition as Performativity 
In the previous chapter, Kafka’s “Te Metamorphosis” has been presented 
as a radical metamorphosis story, since Gregor becomes an animal as, in 
Beauvoirian terms, one becomes a woman; the corporal transformation is 
merely the point of departure for the cross-species transition, which is to a 
large extent socially constructed. In “A Report to an Academy,” the species 
transition is purely a matter of social construction, which has no corporal 
component whatsoever. Terefore, if the transformation of Gregor Samsa 
is indeed an animalistic embodiment of Simone de Beauvoir’s view of gen-
der, Red Peter’s species transition animalistically refects Judith Butler’s 







gender theory. Te idea of gender performativity is at the core of Butler’s 
work, notably in her 1990 groundbreaking study Gender Trouble. Gen-
der, Butler concludes, is not something that one is, rather it is something 
one does—a doing rather than a being, and, therefore, “Tere is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”48 
In his memoir, Gustav Janouch quotes Kafka as sharing a similar idea 
about culture, which Janouch retrospectively associated with “A Report to 
an Academy”: “Te civilized world depends for the most part on the efect 
of successful training procedures. Tat is what culture means.“49 In the 
Romantic period apes came to represent the golden age in human history, 
living a natural life, serene, healthy, happy, and free.50 Anthropoid apes can 
be found in several works of Kafka’s German Romantic forebears, such as 
E. T. A. Hofmann’s 1814 “News of an Educated Young Man” (“Nachricht 
von einem gebildeten junger Mann”) and Wilhelm Hauf’s 1827 “Te 
Young Englishman or the Ape as Human” (“Der junge Engländer oder 
Der Afe als Mensch”), both considered to be major infuences on “A Re-
port to an Academy.”51 Hauf’s story is centered on a mysterious character 
arriving at a German town, introduced as one of the inhabitants’ nephew, 
who is not versed in local customs and mores. Soon the nephew learns to 
speak German and to behave like a gentleman, charming the locals. Only 
at the end—debunking social manners and conventions—does it transpire 
that the stranger is, in fact, an ape. Te similarity between Kafka’s and 
Hauf’s humanized apes is evident. Yet it is the dissimilarity between the 
two narratives that highlights Kafka’s radical concept of species. Unlike 
Hauf’s ape, Red Peter does not need to hide his biological species in order 
to be accepted as a human. Society in “A Report to an Academy” does not 
mistakenly identify the ape as human, but sees him as a former ape, regard-
less of his biological identity. 
Reading “A Report to an Academy” through a Butlerian lens can 
sharpen this point: species identity in Kafka’s ape-man story, is—like 
gender in Butler’s thought—merely a cultural code, which relies on imi-
tation and reappearance, having no inherent essence. As such, it can be 
disrupted, undermined, turned over, resisted, and troubled. Red Peter’s 
humanization begins already on the boat, literally as a performance, inas-
much as he imitates human behavior, like spitting and smoking, and “all 
of steerage cheered” (KSS, 81). Red Peter’s human performance on the 
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potential subversion, as by ridiculing normative cultural expressions and 
performances, drag aims at destabilizing identities. “In imitating gender,” 
Butler maintains, “drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender 
itself, as well as its contingency.”52 
Yet, as Butler emphasizes in Bodies Tat Matter (1993), the perfor-
mance context is crucial; drag is not categorically subversive, as it can also 
have the opposite efect, reinforcing the binaries of dominant norms and 
reproducing cultural hegemony.53 Red Peter’s drag show on the boat has 
two diferent sets of audience: one includes the sailors, the immediate au-
dience who witnesses the show in real time, and the other is actually us, the 
readers.54 In the context of the real-time show, Red Peter’s aping human 
performance in front of the sailors on the boat is indeed a nonsubversive 
act of humanist entertainment. As Henri Bergson observes in his classic 
essay on laughter, inversion has a comic efect: 
Picture to yourself certain characters in a certain situation: if you 
reverse the situation and invert the roles, you obtain a comic 
scene. . . . .  Tus, we laugh at the prisoner at the bar lecturing the 
magistrate; at a child presuming to teach its parents. . . . In every 
case the root idea involves an inversion of roles.55 
Likewise, in his study of humor Simon Critchley remarks that when the 
animal becomes human, the efect is “pleasingly benign.”56 Te subversive 
potential of Red Peter’s humanization is realized only in the context of the 
secondary audience, the readers, as human identity is reduced—not only 
during the drag show but throughout the story—to acts like smoking, 
spitting, and drinking alcohol. Human identity is presented here as a series 
of tricks that are artifcial additives to animal nature. Ironically, some of 
these tricks that establish human identity in the story are often described 
as beastly and brutish. 
Nevertheless, in the story these crude rituals are regarded as the quint-
essential human attributes that Red Peter should gain in order to become 
human. Red Peter only briefy mentions that after mastering the art of 
drinking, he also began to speak. Within the framework of the detailed 
description of the drinking training, the succinct reference to his experi-
ence of language acquisition marks its relative marginality in the process 
of becoming human. Speech here is merely a speech act, like any other act, 
and not even the most challenging one. Troughout history, the capacity 







to speak has been a primary emblem of humans’ diacritical diference from 
other animals, harking back to the classical determination of human be-
ing as the speaking animal (zoon echon logon), as famously pronounced in 
Aristotle’s Politics: 
Man is the only animal who has the gift of speech . . . the power of 
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and 
therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic 
of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, or just and 
unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have 
this sense makes a family and a state.57 
Kafka here replaces the Aristotelian notion of humans as the speaking ani-
mals, stated in his Politics, with Aristotle’s own competitive defnition of 
humans as the imitating animals, as appears in his Poetics: “Imitation is 
co-natural with human beings from childhood, and in this they difer from 
other animals, because they are the most imitative and produce their frst 
acts of understanding by means of imitation.”58 
Moreover, when examining the function of Red Peter’s humanization, 
Butler’s distinction between performance and performativity is imperative; 
unlike performance, performativity is not a bounded act, presupposing a 
preexisting subject. Red Peter’s human performativity does not take place 
only on stage. It is not merely a parodic relief from the humanist para-
digm, for the amusement of his viewers. Te ape’s human performativity 
also continues ofstage, to a point that he is indeed perceived by all as a 
transspecies—someone, whose species identity does not correspond with 
their birth species. His species transition begins with human performance 
in the literal sense on the ship, and continues with human performativity 
in the Butlerian sense: 
My hands in my pants pockets, the wine bottle on the table, I half-
lie, half-sit in my rocking chair and look out the window. When 
company comes, I play host as is proper. My manager sits in the 
anteroom; when I ring, he comes and listens to what I have to say. 
(KSS, 83) 
Red Peter’s acquisition of human identity refects Butler’s fundamental 
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a subject, which does not “exist” prior to it. However, Red Peter’s human 
identity is not fully consistent. When a journalist claims that Red Peter’s 
predilection for taking down his pants in public proves that his “ape nature 
has not yet been entirely repressed,” he responds: “I have the right to lower 
my pants in front of anyone I like” (KSS, 78). Tis angry reaction discloses 
the transspecies’ wish to bring into being multiple modes of species perfor-
mance; Red Peter is not interested in committing himself to any stable spe-
cies identity, but his nonhuman performance coexists alongside his human 
one. Eventually, Kafka’s ape-to-man protagonist cuts not only the Gordian 
knot of biological species and species identity, but also its correlation to 
sexual preference, as the story concludes with Red Peter’s description of his 
sexual relations with a female chimpanzee. 
Red Peter actively disrupts normativity and transgresses the boundar-
ies of propriety, interfering with the status quo in a closed social system. 
In doing so, Red Peter embodies the notion of queerness. Several schol-
ars have implemented the concept of queerness not only beyond human 
sexuality, but also beyond humanity. For example, Phillip Bernhardt-
House describes the legendary werewolf as queer, and Greta Gaard defnes 
queer ecofeminism, which problematizes “the normative dualisms, value-
hierarchical thinking, and logic of domination that together characterize 
the ideological framework of Western culture.” In her study of queering 
the human-animal bond, Carmen Dell’Aversano proclaims that queer 
is about sex only incidentally—as “the real topic of its polymorphously 
transgressive refections is identity.”59 Red Peter should thus be viewed as a 
“species queer,” who “by refusing to crystallise in any specifc form, main-
tains a relation of resistance to whatever constitutes the normal.”60 
Furthermore, the ape’s humanization, on- and ofstage, occurs with a 
complementary case of animalized humans, reinforcing its transgressive 
potential. Together, these two-way transgressions, animal-to-human and 
human-to-animal, resist the power structure that regulates species identi-
ties. Te most animalistic fgures in the story are the sailors on the ship: 
Tey always had something in their mouths to spit out, and they 
didn’t care where they spit landed. Tey were always complaining 
that my feas jumped on them; yet they were never seriously angry 
with me on that score; they were aware that feas thrived in my pelt 
and that feas are jumpers; they came to terms with this fact. When 
they were of duty, a number of them would sometimes sit in a 








   
semicircle around me; hardly speaking but merely making cooing 
sounds to each other. (KSS, 80) 
Te sailors are dehumanized not only by their animalistic behavior, but 
also by depriving them of the most human activity, which is speaking. 
Tey appear to have lost the capacity for language, as Akira Lippit notes, 
“replacing it instead with meaningless laughter and a compulsion to expec-
torate. Teir mouths are not used for language but rather for the expres-
sion of afect (laughing), ingestion (smoking and drinking) and excreting 
(spitting).”61 Likewise, the trapeze artists in the circus perform apelike acts: 
Often, in the vaudeville theaters, before I go on, I have seen some 
artiste couple up at the ceiling fooling around on their trapezes. 
Tey swung, they rocked, they jumped, they foated into each oth-
er’s arms; one carried the other by the hair with his teeth. (KSS, 79) 
Species transition is bidirectional, and as Deleuze and Guattari put it: “Te 
deterritorialized animal force in turn precipitates and intensifes the de-
territorialization of the deterritorializing human force.”62 Human charac-
ters are not only animalized in the story, some actually go under a species 
transition; as Red Peters reports, “I practically made a monkey of my frst 
teacher, who was soon forced to give up training and had to be delivered 
to a sanitarium. Fortunately he was soon released” (KSS, 83). 
“A Report to an Academy” thus denaturalizes the most basic and perva-
sive binary on which our society rests: that of the “natural” divide between 
humans and other animals. Te transgression of the species barrier in “A 
Report to an Academy” is even more radical than in “Te Metamorpho-
sis,” not only because Red Peter’s species identity is changed without any 
biological—or preternatural—trigger, but also because species transition 
goes both ways, from nonhuman to human and vice versa, and it is not 
a one-time event that happens solely to one character.63 Te multiplicity 
within species identity includes Red Peter himself—the self-made human-
ized ape—as well as his dehumanized former teacher, the animalistic sail-
ors, the trapeze artists, and also the half-trained female chimpanzee. Spe-
cies identities and boundaries were never more fuid and scrambled. None 
of these characters can be defned as “cis-species,” an individual whose spe-
cies identity—in parallel to the term “cis-gender”—matches the biological 
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and replaces it with a rainbow of species identities, a broad spectrum of 
manifestations and roles. 
Species Transition as a Mask 
Red Peter’s process of becoming human, as several critics have shown, be-
gins when he is actually a prisoner on the boat, sailing from Africa to Eu-
rope, after realizing that apes belong in cages, and therefore if he wants to 
be out of the cage he should stop being an ape.64 Tis identity shift can also 
be viewed through the prism of postcolonial discourse, underscoring the 
intersections between posthumanism and postcolonialism. In his key work 
Te Wretched of the Earth (1961), Frantz Fanon argues that class and race 
gain their meaning from one another. As opposed to causally related, they 
are coconstituted—neither of them predetermines or is a consequence of 
the other, but rather each is dialectically coproduced: 
It is clear that what divides this world is frst and foremost what 
species, what race one belongs to. In the colonies the economic in-
frastructure is also a superstructure. Te cause is efect: You are rich 
because you are white, you are white because you are rich.65 
In “A Report to an Academy” Kafka presents a parallel coconstitution 
between species and class, or in other words—between being nonhuman 
and being oppressed. As Fanon denaturalizes the category of race, Kafka, 
designating here nonhuman animals as “the wretched of the earth,” denat-
uralizes the category of species. Te correlation between being oppressed 
and being nonhuman in “A Report to an Academy” is in fact more valid 
than the stability of species identity, as Red Peter cannot stop being op-
pressed as long as he is nonhuman, but he can stop being nonhuman, and 
as a result—stop being oppressed. 
In Black Skin, White Masks (1952) Fanon recounts how the process 
of becoming white takes place through mastering language and culture, 
which mask black skin: 
Te Antilles Negro who wants to be white will be the whiter as he 
gains greater mastery of the cultural tool that language is. Rather 
more than a year ago in Lyon, I remember, in a lecture I had drawn 






a parallel between Negro and European poetry, and a French ac-
quaintance told me enthusiastically, “At bottom you are a white 
man.” Te fact that I had been able to investigate so interesting a 
problem through the white man’s language gave me honorary citi-
zenship. Historically, it must be understood that the Negro wants to 
speak French because it is the key that can open doors which were 
still barred to him ffty years ago.66 
In a similar fashion, Red Peter’s report to the academy, which could be 
also entitled “Simian Skin, Human Masks,” demonstrates that becoming 
human does not require a biological change; it is gaining mastery of hu-
man codes and manners that masks his simian skin and humanizes him. 
Red Peter already realized that while being caged on the boat from Africa 
to Europe: 
I did not calculate; but I did observe matters with great calm. I 
saw these men walk back and forth, always the same faces, the 
same movements: it often seemed to me that only one man was in-
volved. So, this man or these men went unmolested. An exalted goal 
dawned on me. No one promised me that if I become like them, 
the cage door would be raised. Promises of that kind, for seemingly 
impossible fulfllment, are not given. But if fulfllment is achieved, 
the promises also appear subsequently, just where they had earlier 
been sought in vain. (KSS, 81) 
As mentioned above, “A Report to an Academy” ends with Red Peter’s 
quite disturbing description, which can be viewed as the completion of his 
species transition; he indeed fully turned from the oppressed to the op-
pressor position, as his treatment of the female chimpanzee indicates. Yet 
the alternative to becoming human, as Red Peter recognizes, is actually not 
being oppressed, but simply not being—it is “turn human or disappear,” 
in parallel to Fanon’s famous words, “Turn white or disappear,”67 describ-
ing the dilemma with which the black person is confronted. As Red Peter 
clarifes in his report to the academy: 
I had no way out but had to provide myself with one, for I could not 
live without it. Always up against the wall of this crate—I would 
inevitably have croaked. But at Hagenbeck, apes belong up against 
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Te phenomenon of apes dying shortly after their captivity was well 
known to science at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1908, the 
German zoologist Alexander Sokolowsky published a study of the spiritual 
life of great apes, focusing on their high mortality rate a few days after 
their arrival in Europe. Describing apes in captivity as apathetic, morose, 
and tending to hide themselves, Sokolowsky suggests that these apes could 
not overcome the loss of freedom, as for them freedom is an existential 
sine qua non, and without it they are likely to die.68 Such a description 
perfectly fts Red Peter in the frst few days after his capture, when he is 
confned in a crate on a boat sailing to Hamburg: 
I squatted with bent, continually trembling knees; and since at frst 
I may not have wanted to see anyone and was eager only to remain 
in the dark, I faced the crate while the bars of the cage cut into my 
fesh of my backside. . . . Glumly sobbing, painfully searching for 
feas, wearily licking a coconut, knocking my skull against the wall 
of the crate, sticking out my tongue whenever someone came near 
me—these were the frst occupations in my new life. (KSS, 78–79) 
If freedom is necessary to ape’s existence, as Sokolowsky asserts, then the 
captured Red Peter is no longer an ape, since he is now deprived of this 
quintessential quality. From his perspective, he is no longer an ape, not 
because he adopted human behaviors and human skills, but because he is 
divested of his ape’s freedom. 
During his captivity on the boat, Red Peter undergoes a process of 
obliteration, whereby he loses his “apishness” and, only afterward, does he 
begin the process of adopting human characteristics. Red Peter describes 
this process through a German idiom: “Tere is an excellent German ex-
pression, ‘to slip of into the bushes’: that is what I did, I slipped of into 
the bushes. I had no other way, presupposing that freedom was never an 
option” (KSS, 83). Te original German phrase, “sich in die Büsche schla-
gen” (E, 332), means willingly disappearing, or self-obliteration. 
Red Peter also repeatedly emphasizes that becoming human was merely 
the lesser of two evils, and not a fulfllment of his heart’s desire: “Now, in 
themselves these men had nothing that especially appealed to me” (KSS, 
81). After the completion of the species transition he states: “I did not 
overestimate it, not then, even less today” (KSS, 83). Red Peter chooses 
humanization for one reason only—not because he wishes to be human, 
but simply because he wants to live: “I was looking for a way out, for no 









other reason” (KSS, 82). Becoming human, as he stresses, was then his 
only way to survive, or in Frantz Fanon’s words, “A feeling of inferiority? 
No, a feeling of nonexistence.”69 
Te process of becoming human also includes learning, as Red Peter 
testifes: 
And, gentlemen, I learned.  .  .  . I used up many teachers, indeed, 
even several teachers simultaneously. When I had become more 
confdent of my abilities and the public world followed my prog-
ress, I had glimmerings of a future; I myself hired teachers, seated 
then in fve adjoining rooms and managed to study with them all 
at the same time by leaping incessantly from one room to the other. 
Tis progress! .  .  . Trough an efort that has hitherto never been 
repeated on the planet, I have reached the average cultural level of a 
European. (KSS, 83) 
Yet his Bildung is not based on learning, but largely on mimicry, which 
is a central concept in the postcolonial discourse: “It was so easy to imi-
tate these people. . . . I was not attracted to the idea of imitating men; I 
imitated because I was looking for a way out, for no other reason” (KSS, 
81–82). Colonial mimicry appears when members of a colonized society 
imitate and take on the culture of the colonizers. Homi Bhabha borrows 
the term “mimicry” from Lacan, who actually imported it from zoology, 
asserting that “the efect of mimicry is camoufage, in the strictly technical 
sense. It is not a question of harmonizing with the background but, against 
a mottled background, of becoming mottled—exactly like the technique 
of camoufage practised in human warfare.”70 Following Lacan’s defnition 
of mimicry, Bhabha opposes Fanon’s dichotomous “Turn white or disap-
pear,” suggesting that the process of imitation is never complete, as inevi-
tably there is always something lacking. Bhabha defnes colonial mimicry 
as “a subject of a diference, that is almost the same, but not quite.”71 
Instead of full transition from the identity of the colonized to the identity 
of the colonizer, Bhabha’s concept of mimicry is about ambivalence and 
hybridity, which is “at once a mode of appropriation and of resistance.”72 
As in Bhabha’s conceptualization of colonial mimicry, Red Peter is almost 
human, but not quite. In fact, Red Peter does not claim to be human, but 
only that he is no longer an ape. Hanging between the two species identi-
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and the oppressed nonhuman, manifesting multiplicities within species. 
His reaction to the female chimpanzee at the end of the story refects this 
very liminal state, in which he belongs to neither the oppressed nonhu-
mans nor the human oppressors. 
Furthermore, in this context Red Peter should not be perceived as an 
opportunist, who conveniently switches from the oppressed to the op-
pressor position. Like camoufage in both biology and warfare, mimicry 
protects the mimickers, enabling their survival, but also providing a posi-
tion from which to attack. Te human mask Red Peter wears allows him 
to unmask human society. Yet Red Peter is fully aware that while he might 
be able to unmask human society, he cannot tear of his human mask and 
return to his simian skin. Following his humanization Red Peter can no 
longer speak for the nonhumans. His report to the academy members be-
gins with the following statement: 
Exalted Gentleman of the Academy! You have granted me the honor 
of summoning me to submit to the Academy a report on my previ-
ous life as an ape. Unfortunately I am unable to comply with the in-
tent of your request. Almost fve years separate me from apedom, a 
span of time that is short, perhaps, when measured on the calendar, 
but infnitely long when galloped in the way I have done. (KSS, 76) 
Paradoxically, Red Peter can resist human exceptionalism only through 
humanization, but due to his humanization he can no longer do it as an 
ape, as he explains to the academy members: 
My memories have become more and more closed of from me. If 
at frst my return—had the world of humans wanted it—was open 
to me through the entire gateway that the sky forms over the earth, 
at the same time it became even lower and narrower under the lash 
that drove my evolution forward. I felt more comfortable and more 
fully enclosed in the human world; the storm that blew at my back 
from my past subsided; today it is only a draft that cools my heels; 
and the far-away gap, through which it comes and through which 
I once came, has grown so small that, if ever my strength and will 
were even adequate to run back to that point, I would have to scrape 
the hide from my body in order to pass through. To speak frankly, 
as much as I like to employ fgurative images for these things, to 
76 Kafka’s Zoopoetics 
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speak frankly: Your apedom, gentlemen, to the extent that you have 
something of the sort behind you, cannot be more remote from you 
than mine is from me. (KSS, 77) 
As Kari Weil shows, “A Report to an Academy” illustrates the signifcance 
of the fundamental problematic of “the animal question”: How does one 
have access to “the animal,” if it is the animal that must be “civilized” to ex-
ist in human society?73 Nevertheless, while the humanized ape is no longer 
a nonhuman being, and therefore he cannot fully represent nonhumans, 
he can do it to some degree, “in the most limited sense,” as Red Peter 
himself declares: 
In the most limited sense, however, I may indeed be able to respond 
to your inquiry, and I do so with great pleasure. . . . Naturally, to-
day I can use human words only to sketch my apish feelings of the 
time, and so I misstate them; but even if I cannot arrive at the old 
apish true, my recital at least leans in that direction, there can be no 
doubt. (KSS, 77, 79) 
In one of the most famous and enigmatic sentences of Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) Wittgenstein states that “if a lion could speak, we 
wouldn’t be able to understand him.”74 Red Peter’s report to the academy 
seems to refute Wittgenstein’s observation; if a lion could talk, we would 
be able to understand him, just as we understand Red Peter.75 Te only 
problem might be that he would no longer be a lion, just as Red Peter is 
no longer an ape. Wittgenstein does not explain why we would not be 
able to understand the speaking lion, but a Spivakian reading might shed 
light on Wittgenstein’s statement. Arguing that the necessarily Western 
perspective of the academic discourse of postcolonialism serves to silence 
other perspectives, Gayatri Spivak’s blunt answer to the question in the 
title of her landmark essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” is no, the subaltern 
cannot speak.76 Subalterns’ inability to speak is derived from the inabil-
ity to understand them, without enforcing the Western paradigm upon 
them. Or in other words: if subalterns would speak, we wouldn’t be able 
to understand them. Likewise, we would not be able to understand Witt-
genstein’s lion, because we are trapped in the anthropocentric paradigm, 
beyond which we cannot trespass. 
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hegemonic power structure, as also demonstrated in the introductory sec-
tion with the Aesopian fable “Te Man and the Lion Traveling Together.” 
In their account “Man and Beast” in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Hork-
heimer and Adorno proclaim that the backbone of resistance is language, 
and therefore “even the strongest animal is infnitely feeble.”77 In Te Dif-
ferend (1983) Jean-François Lyotard equivalently sees the nonhuman ani-
mal, who sufers wrongs but cannot claim damages, as “the paradigm of 
the victim.”78 
Trough the freedom of fction Kafka enables his nonhuman protago-
nist to be less feeble, less paradigmatically victimized, by providing him 
with “the backbone of resistance.” While the ability to speak does not seem 
to Red Peter as crucial to his becoming human, it is essential to his becom-
ing a narrator and protester. Interestingly, throughout this fctional dia-
logue between humanity, represented here by the academy members, and 
animality, represented by Red Peter, it is the humans who remain voiceless 
and silent, for a change. Unlike the subaltern, whose voice, according to 
Spivak, is mediated and interpreted by Western academics, here Red Peter 
speaks for himself, and his report is not rewritten by the academy mem-
bers or any other human narrator. Yet the freedom of fction Kafka uses in 
“A Report to an Academy” is still limited. In Kafka’s diegetic universe the 
protagonist can use human language, enabling him to protest against his 
oppression, but by doing that, he inevitably loses his nonhuman agency. 
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Jackals, and Arabs 
“Jackals and Arabs” (“Schakale und Araber”), written and published in 
1917, is a story of a European man traveling in the Arabian desert who 
is approached by a pack of talking jackals. Abhorring the Arabs who kill 
animals for food, the jackals ask the traveler to resolve their bloody strife 
with the Arabs by killing the latter with a small rusty pair of sewing scis-
sors. An Arab soon arrives on the scene; he mocks the jackals and dumps a 
camel carcass nearby. While the jackals devour the camel, the Arab cracks 
his whip at them, but the narrator attempts to stop him. As noted in the 
previous chapter, in a letter to the publisher, Kafka stressed that “Jackals 
and Arabs” and “A Report to an Academy” are not parables (and therefore 
should not be referred to as such) but rather “animal stories” (Tiergeschich-
ten). Despite this explicit authorial statement, the story has been primarily 
interpreted parabolically, reducing the interspecies clash standing at the 
core of the narrative to solely interhuman issues. 
Te fact that “Jackals and Arabs” was frst published in a Jewish peri-
odical (Der Jude) gave rise to parabolic interpretations of Jewish themes, 
according to which the jackals are the Jews, waiting for the Messiah to 
redeem them, or that they stand for the Zionists and the Arabs are the 
Palestinians.1 Another common Jewish interpretation of the story sees the 
dispute between the jackals and the Arabs, which centers on their dif-
ferent meat-eating habits, as a refection of the controversy over Jewish 
ritual slaughter (also known as kosher slaughter, or shechita).2 Te ferce 
debate over shechita in fn de siècle Europe was intensifed by antisemitic 
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myths, drawing a link between ritual slaughter and ritual murder.3 None-
theless, Kafka’s writing on slaughter should not be reduced to the debate 
over kosher slaughter and the antisemitic stereotypes it evokes. It should 
also be read in light of Kafka’s vegetarianism—his rejection of any kind of 
slaughter—and his deep identifcation with nonhuman animals. Follow-
ing Kafka’s own objection to killing animals and eating their fesh, as re-
fected in his texts, and the basic call of the jackals to end human slaughter 
of nonhuman animals, my analysis of “Jackals and Arabs” addresses the 
issue of slaughter, as well as human dominion over other animals. 
Resisting Slaughter 
Kafka often drew an analogy between the murder of people and the slaugh-
ter of nonhuman animals, and also depicted himself as a slaughtered ani-
mal. As he himself reports in a letter to Max Brod: “My mind is daily prey 
to fantasies, for example that I lie stretched out on the foor sliced up like a 
roast, and with my hand am slowly pushing a slice of meat toward a dog in 
the corner” (LFFE, 95). Likewise, Te Blue Octavo Notebook (Die Acht Ok-
tavhefte) contains fragments, excerpts from journals, and aphorisms, where 
Kafka describes himself as a hunted animal to be slaughtered: 
I lay on the ground by a wall, writing in pain, trying to burrow into 
the damp earth. Te huntsman stood beside me and lightly pressed 
one foot into the small of my back. “A splendid beast,” he said to 
the beater, who was cutting open my collar and coat in order to feel 
my fesh. (BON, 84) 
Te murder/slaughter connection also appears in Kafka’s diary: 
Always the image of a pork butcher’s broad knife that quickly and 
with mechanical regularity chops into me from the side and cuts 
of very thin slices which fy of almost like shavings because of the 
speed of the action. (D, 223) 
Between throat and chin would seem to be the most rewarding 
place to stab. Lift the chin and stick the knife to the tensed muscles. 
But this spot is only rewarding only in one’s imagination. You ex-
pect to see a magnifcent gush of blood and a network of sinews and 
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In like manner, Gustav Janouch recounts that when Kafka saw him 
reading Alfred Döblin’s Te Murder of a Buttercup (Die Ermordung einer 
Butterblume), he said, “How strange it sounds, when one takes a perfectly 
ordinary idea from the world of a carnivorous culture and couples it with 
some frail botanical name.”4 In a letter to Milena, Kafka includes a descrip-
tion and a drawing of an execution machine, whose inventor copied from 
a butcher: 
So that you can see something of my “occupations,” I’m enclosing 
a drawing. Tese are four poles, through the two middle ones are 
driven rods to which the hands of the “delinquent” are fastened; 
through the two outer poles rods are driven for the feet. After the 
man has been bound in this way, the rods are drawn slowly outward 
until the man is torn apart in the middle. Against the post leans the 
inventor who, with crossed arms and legs, is giving himself great 
airs, as though the whole thing were his original invention, whereas 
he has only copied the butcher who stretches the disemboweled pig 
in his shop-front. (LM, 201) 
Rejecting meat culture and drawing a parallel between the slaughter 
of nonhumans and the murder of humans can also be found in Kafka’s 
fction. For example, Kafka links slaughter and murder in his short story 
“A Fratricide” (“Ein Brudermord”), wherein the murder weapon is “half 
bayonet, half kitchen knife” (KSS, 73). Schmar, the killer, literally slaugh-
ters his victim, Wese, as he stabs him in his throat, and the victim’s death 
rattle is compared to the sound made by water rats when they are slit open 
(KSS, 74). 
The Nonhuman Case against Slaughter 
“Jackals and Arabs” opens when the narrator, a traveler from the North, 
accompanied by Arab guides, is camped out in a desert oasis. When night 
falls, a pack of jackals throngs around him. Te eldest in the pack appears 
and speaks up, telling the narrator that his arrival has been long awaited by 
numerous generations of jackals: 
“We know,” the eldest began, “that you have come from the North, 
that is exactly what our hope is based on. Tere is a rationality there 




   
 
that cannot be found here among the Arabs. From their cold ar-
rogance, you know, not a spark of reason can be struck.” (KSS, 69) 
Te eldest jackal seeks here a cross-species alliance between rational 
beings against the irrational beings. Te distinction between the rational 
and the irrational certainly has deep roots in Western thought, drawing the 
line between human being, who is arguably the only animal rationale, and 
the rest of the animals, who are all irrational. Instead, for the jackals the 
rational/irrational division does not overlap with the human/nonhuman 
distinction. For them, both the jackals and the Northerners are rational 
beings, and they should therefore collaborate and act against the Arabs, 
who are irrational. 
It soon turns out, as the eldest jackal continues, that he categorizes the 
Arabs as irrational, in opposition to his fellow rational jackals, because 
they kill animals to eat them and despise carrion (KSS, 70). Eating carrion 
is culturally regarded as contemptible; people eschew scavenging, while 
eating nonhuman animals that were killed specifcally for this purpose is 
considered socially appropriate and legitimate. From the jackals’ perspec-
tive, though, the opposite is true; scavengers do not harm living beings and 
are, therefore, ethically superior. Eating carrion is also ecologically sound, 
as the scavenging jackals demonstrate; they cleanse the earth of the carrion 
left over by the carnivorous Arabs. Hence, in their scheme, eating carrion 
is not—as commonly assumed—a mark of squalor and pollution—but 
rather of cleanliness and purity: 
“We must have peace from the Arabs; air we can breathe; a view of 
horizon cleansed of them; no bleated lament from a ram slaugh-
tered by an Arab; all creatures must perish quietly; undisturbed, 
they must be drunk dry by us and purifed right down to the bone. 
Purity, nothing but purity, is what we want,” concludes the eldest 
jackal. (KSS, 71) 
Tis inversion is obtained not only by the content of the jackal’s words, 
but also in the terminology he uses. Tere is often a lexical diferentiation 
of comparable human and nonhuman terms, and in German even to a 
larger degree than in English. Transgressing the common use of language 
produces alienation, which undermines the clear-cut anthropocentric dis-
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In his classic essay “Politics and the English Language” (1946), George 
Orwell criticizes such political language: 
Political language . . . is designed to make lies sound truthful and 
murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure 
wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least 
change one’s own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one 
jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase—some 
jackboot, Achilles’ heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno
or other lump of verbal refuse—into the dustbin where it belongs.5 
Joan Dunayer, in her study of language and nonhuman oppression, ex-
pands the concept of political language beyond the boundaries of human-
ist discourse, implementing it in a postspeciesist context: 
How do we justify our treatment to nonhumans? We lie—to our-
selves and to each other, about our species and about others. De-
ceptive language perpetuates speciesism, the failure to accord non-
human animals equal consideration and respect. Like sexism and 
racism, speciesism is a form of self-aggrandising prejudice. Bigotry 
requires self-deception. Speciesism can’t survive without lies. Stan-
dard English usage supplies these lies in abundance. Linguistically 
the lies take many forms, from euphemism to false defnition. We 
even lie with our punctuation.6 
In numerous cases Kafka transgresses this separation, using words 
whose German denotation is strictly animalistic when referring to humans, 
and words that are exclusively human to describe nonhuman animals. For 
example, in Kafka’s “A Crossbreed” (“Eine Kreuzung”) the narrator men-
tions that the crossbreed, who is half kitten, half lamb, can lie in wait for 
hours beside the hen coop, “but it has never yet seized an opportunity 
for murder” (KSS, 125).7 In common parlance, the word “murder” refers 
exclusively to the killing of a human being by another human being. In 
“A Crossbreed” neither the victimizer nor the victim is human—both are 
nonhuman animals (a kitten-lamb crossbreed and a hen respectively)—
and yet the narrator uses the term “murder” (Mord) and not “killing” 
(Töten). By choosing this seemingly inadequate term, Kafka resists the 
speciesist language in which the oppressive relationship of our species to 






other ones is encoded, sending the human-normative terminology of hi-
erarchy that naturalize speciesism—in Orwell’s words—“into the dustbin 
where it belongs.” 
A similar transgression, which is inevitably lost in translation, occurs in 
“Jackals and Arabs.” Te eldest jackal’s claim against the Arabs, that they 
kill animals to eat, is “Sie töten Tiere, um sie zu fressen” (E, 281). Both 
essen and fressen in German are translated as “to eat” in English; in German 
the term depends on the identity of the eater; essen is used in a human con-
text, while fressen applies to nonhumans. Te fact that the jackal refers to 
the Arabs’ act of eating as fressen exposes the speciesist politics of language; 
essen is what we do, fressen is what others do. When the ingroup is humans 
and the outgroup is nonhuman animals, as presumed in most contexts, the 
word essen designates humans and fressen is used for nonhuman animals. 
But when the “us” are nonhuman animals, as in “Jackals and Arabs,” the 
terms are reversed. Moreover, while the denotative meaning of fressen and 
essen difers according to the identity of the subject who performs the act 
of eating, the terms also hold a diferent connotative meaning; essen is eat-
ing in a civilized manner, while fressen is eating in an uncivilized, barbaric 
manner. Terefore, the inversive use of essen and fressen by the jackal is not 
only perspectival (what we do is essen, what others do is fressen), but is also 
objectively justifed; what we jackals do is essen, as we do not kill other 
animals, whereas what the Arabs do is fressen, since they do kill others. 
Te common essen/fressen distinction, which refects how human beings 
perceive themselves in opposition to other animals, has therefore not only 
been invalidated, but completely inverted in the story. 
Te antislaughter message in “Jackals and Arabs” is enhanced when 
read in dialogue with a Kafka’s contemporaneous story “A Page from an 
Old Document” (“Ein altes Blatt”), which Elias Canetti dubs “the loudest 
passages in Kafka’s work [that] tells of this guilt with respect to the ani-
mals.”8 Te narrator of “A Page from an Old Document” reports that no-
mads from the North invaded the capital, took over the town, and looted 
and plundered all the stores and goods, and no one could stand up to 
them. Te height of human brutality is epitomized here by humans’ inhu-
mane treatment of animals, since the carnivorous habits of the nomadic 
invaders are presented as the worst cruelty and brutality: 
No sooner has he brought in his goods than everything is snatched 
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eaters; often a rider lies next to his horse while both feed of the 
same piece of meat, one at each end. Te butcher is frightened and 
does not dare to stop the meat deliveries. We understand this, how-
ever, pool our money, and support him. If the nomads were not to 
get meat, who knows what would occur to them to do; who knows, 
for that matter, what will occur to them even if they do get their 
daily meat. Recently the butcher thought that he could at least save 
himself the trouble of slaughtering, and in the morning he brought 
in a live ox. Tat is something he had better not repeat. For about 
an hour I lay fat on the foor far back in my workshop, with all my 
clothes, blankets, and pillows piled on the top of me just so as not 
to hear the ox’s bellowing as the nomads sprang on it from all sides 
to tear pieces from its warm fesh with their teeth. (KSS, 67) 
Curiously, in both cases, when Kafka condemns human slaughter-
ous culture, he uses non-Western subjects (the Arabs in “Jackals and
Arabs” and the northerner nomads in “A Page from an Old Docu-
ment”), while the other humans (the traveler from the North and the
local narrator respectively) are not part of this slaughterous culture.
Nevertheless, in “A Page from an Old Document,” the seemingly cate-
gorical polarization between the uncivilized, slaughterous nomads and
the civilized narrator is implicitly disrupted: “You cannot talk to the
nomads. Tey do not know our language; indeed, they hardly have one
of their own. Tey communicate with each other like jackdaws. Again
and again we hear this screech of jackdaws” (KSS, 67). Despite the
nomads’ description as the ultimate Other, animalistic invaders who
take over the narrator’s civilized town, Kafka chooses to depict them as
jackdaws (Dohlen), which in Czech is translated to Kafka (or Kavka in 
standard orthography). Jackdaws also famously adorned the letterhead
of the family frm.9 It thus seems that the dreadful animalistic strangers
who invaded the city are, in fact, part of Kafka himself, standing for
both animality and alterity within the self. 
Likewise, the Arab/Northerner division in “Jackals and Arabs” is also 
subverted; the alleged opposition, presented by the eldest jackal, between 
the unreasoned and impure Arabs and the reasoned and pure Northerners, 
is ironized as he continues, and it turns out that what makes the Arabs un-
reasoned and impure is killing animals for eating. Such killing is presented 
as an exceptional practice, followed only by the Arabs, whose “flth is their 






white; flth is their black; their beard is horror; one has to spit at the site of 
the corner of their eye; and when lift their arm, all hell breaks loose in their 
armpits” (KSS, 71). Te eldest jackal presumes that the narrator comes 
from a place where this slaughterous practice is unacceptable, and there-
fore distinguishes between him, as well as the rest of the Northerners, and 
the Arabs. Rhetorically, it creates an aesthetic distance, which encourages 
the narrator, and the reader too, to take the antislaughter perspective. Both 
the narrator and the reader are asked to take a stand against the slaughter-
ous norms of the Arabs, and not against the slaughterous habits of their 
own culture. One can, however, easily realize that the Arabs’ slaughterous 
practice, the criterion defning them as unreasoned and despicable, cer-
tainly does not situate Western people on the opposite side of the division; 
they are as unreasoned and despicable as the fctional Arabs, who are also 
untypically portrayed in the very opening of the story as “tall and white” 
(KSS, 69). Tis rhetoric is used simultaneously by the jackals on the nar-
rator, and by Kafka on his readers. 
It is important to note that the narrator is initially introduced as a 
man who comes from the North, and not as European. Only toward the 
end of the story—after the Arab leader of the caravan tells the narrator 
that the jackals have the same conversation with every European, as “ev-
ery European is just the man who seems to them to have been chosen” 
(KSS, 71)—it is indicated that the narrator is a European. Europeans, as 
known by all, also kill animals for eating. It therefore becomes clear that 
the jackals’ condemnation of the Arabs applies to the narrator, and to the 
reader (who is also European) as well. Postponing the characterization of 
the narrator as European and describing him as a northern outsider allows 
us to see him as an antithetical counterpart of the animalistic invaders in 
“A Page from an Old Document,” who are also northern outsiders.10 In
opposition to the brutal northern outsiders in “A Page from an Old Docu-
ment,” the northern outsider in “Jackals and Arabs” is the alleged savior 
of the nonhuman fgures from the brutal humans. Exposing the narrator 
of “Jackals and Arabs” as European can be then viewed in parallel to the 
association of the nomads with Kafka through depicting them as jackdaws. 
Tere, the outsiders’ brutality turns out to characterize also the insiders. 
Likewise here, it becomes apparent that the insiders’ brutality is shared by 
the outsiders as well. 
Te initial opposition between the Arab and narrator, as presented in 
the opening of the eldest jackal’s words, is also undermined when the el-
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dest of the pack tells the narrator, who thinks the jackals are about to try 
to kill the Arabs, “you misunderstood us . . . in the manner of humans, 
which, I see, is not lost even in the far North. We are certainly not going 
to kill them. All the waters in the Nile would not wash us clean” (KSS, 
70). Here the jackal seems to realize that the interspecies coalition between 
the jackals and the narrator against the Arabs is somewhat limited, as the 
basic opposition is, after all, between humans and nonhumans, and thus 
the narrator, as a human being, is closer to the Arabs than it seemed at 
frst. Te main opposition between the pure and rational beings and the 
impure and irrational ones corresponds now with the human/nonhuman 
division (the jackals vs. both Arabs and the narrator), yet its criterion is 
still inversed. It is the nonhumans who are pure and rational, whereas the 
humans are impure and irrational. Terefore, the jackals ask the narrator 
to kill the Arabs, as they cannot do it; it takes one (from a slaughterous 
society, namely human) to kill one. 
The Vegetarian Case against Slaughter 
Discussing “A Page from an Old Document,” Elias Canetti sees the narra-
tor, who agonizes over the bellowing of an ox, as analogous to Kafka, since 
both recoil from the brutal, barbaric devouring of meat: 
Might one say that the narrator was withdrawing from what could 
not be endured, that he found peace again? Or after such bellowing 
can there be no peace? It is Kafka’s own position; but all the clothes, 
rugs, and pillows in the world could not lastingly silence the bel-
lowing in his ears. If he ever withdrew from it, it was only to hear it 
again, for the bellowing did not stop.11 
Another story that expresses Kafka’s vegetarian stance is “A Hunger 
Artist” (“Ein Hungerkünstler”). Tis story, written in 1923 and frst pub-
lished shortly before Kafka’s death in 1924, describes a circus act in which 
a man fasts for many days. It follows the decline of the artist’s career, who 
ends up forgotten and neglected in his cage until his death. Many inter-
preters have identifed the hunger artist with Kafka himself, as both were 
dying artists, as well as gaunt men.12 Margot Norris points out another 
common denominator between them, by comparing Kafka, as a vegetar-






ian who refrains from eating meat, to the hunger artist, who abstains from 
food entirely. Norris sees the hunger artist’s dismissive rejection of food as 
an amplifcation of Kafka’s abstinence from meat, and consequently she 
draws an analogy between the attempts of Kafka’s family to thwart his 
vegetarianism and the impresario in the story who sets a limit of forty days 
on the fast of the hunger artist, which the latter resents, since he wants to 
go on fasting indefnitely.13 
Additionally, the narrator of “Te Hunger Artist” mentions that the 
permanent watchmen, chosen from the public to watch the hunger artist 
are “oddly enough, usually butchers” (KSS, 87), reinforcing the view of the 
fast as an expansion of vegetarianism. Te butchers emblematize the car-
nivorous society from which the hunger artist—like Kafka himself—sets 
himself apart. Te hunger artist is juxtaposed not only with the watchers/ 
butchers, who “threw themselves with the appetite of healthy men” on 
their opulent breakfast (KSS, 87), but also with the panther who replaces 
him in the cage after his death. Te description of the vigorous young 
predator, whose “joy of life sprang from its maw in such a blaze of fre” 
(KSS, 94), is contrasted with the one of the hunger artist. But at the same 
time, the panther is also analogous to the hunger artist; like the panther, 
the artist is an outsider in human society, and both are put in a cage and 
displayed to the public. Te artist’s alienation from society corresponds 
to Kafka’s own estrangement, and the analogy between the hunger artist 
and the panther is parallel to the identifcation Kafka felt with nonhuman 
animals. 
In the same vein, the narrator of “Jackals and Arabs” should also be 
interpreted in the light of Kafka’s vegetarianism. One of the major weak-
nesses of the Jewish readings of the story, as well as other parabolic ac-
counts, is the identity of the narrator. If the jackals are the Jews and the 
Arabs are the Gentiles, who then is the narrator? Regarding the narrator as 
Kafka’s own position as a secular (or assimilated) Jew, witnessing the con-
fict between Jews and Gentiles, does not accord with the story, where the 
narrator—as a human being—is objectively closer to the Arabs, although 
he identifes with the jackals. Alternatively, the narrator serves as a stand-in 
for the author, not as a Jew but rather as a vegetarian. Belonging to neither 
the slaughterous human society nor their nonhuman victims, the vegetar-
ian narrator is objectively closer to the Arabs (slaughterous humanity), but 
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Kafka was a vegetarian who eschewed eating meat almost all his life, 
for both ethical and health reasons. His letters and diaries attest that veg-
etarianism had a major role in his life and identity. For instance, in No-
vember 1912 he wrote in a letter to his fancée Felice Bauer: “First of all, 
I am delighted that you are a vegetarian at heart,” and on the same day, 
in a letter to Grete Bloch, Felice’s friend, Kafka tries to convince her to 
become vegetarian, declaring that “meat causes nothing but devastation” 
(LF, 60). Sander Gilman states that Kafka saw his vegetarianism as being 
profoundly linked to who he was, to his sense of self, but also to a marginal 
world he felt he belonged to.14 
Ronald Hayman, in his biography of Kafka, connects Kafka’s vegetari-
anism to the fact that he, as a grandson of a Jewish slaughterer (shochet), 
was exposed to slaughter in an early age: 
Kafka’s vegetarianism may have had one root in revulsion at the idea 
of his father’s father’s daily activity—ritually slitting the throats of 
animals, hacking up their bodies, feeding his family with money 
earned from butchering. Te butcher’s knife will be recurrent in 
Kafka’s nightmares, fantasies and fction; the animal identifcations 
may have seemed, at one level, like a means of making amends to 
the animals, or, at least, siding with them against slaughterous hu-
manity.15 
In a similar fashion, Pietro Citati, another biographer of Kafka, writes: 
While the others ate meat—that meat brought back to his memory 
vivid with hatred and disgust all the violence that man has sown 
over the earth, and the minuscule flaments between one tooth and 
the next seemed to him germs of putrefaction and fermentation like 
those of a dead rat between two stones—he poured onto his table 
nature’s rich cornucopia.16 
Max Brod also refects on Kafka’s steadfast commitment to vegetar-
ianism. In his biography of Kafka, Brod relates that Kafka explained
the Bible from a vegetarian standpoint; accordingly, Moses led the Jews
through the desert so that they might become vegetarian and stop long-
ing for the “feshpots of Egypt” in these forty years, while eating a meat-









less diet of manna. 17 Brod also describes an episode when Kafka went
to the Berlin aquarium and suddenly began to speak to the fsh in their
illuminated tanks, saying, “Now at last I can look at you in peace, I don’t
eat you anymore.”18 
As a vegetarian who refrains from eating nonhuman animals, Kafka can 
look at them in peace, without repelling the animal gaze because “it’s only 
an animal.”19 Likewise, the arguably vegetarian narrator of “Jackals and 
Arabs” can support the nonhuman animal fgures in the story, as he does 
not eat them. Te jackals ask the narrator to help them end the slaughter-
ous practice of the Arabs, because they regard him as someone who comes 
from a place where this slaughterous activity is unacceptable: “You have 
come from the North, that is exactly what our hope is based on. Tere is 
a rationality there” (KSS, 69). A site wherein human beings do not kill 
animals for food does not exist geographically, but it does exist ideologi-
cally, as there are individuals who, by abstaining from eating animal fesh, 
do not take part in the slaughterous practice. In fact, by asking the narra-
tor, “How can you bear to live in this world, you with a noble heart and 
bowels of tenderness?” (KSS, 71), the eldest jackal seems to recognize that 
human slaughterous norms are universal, and he regards the narrator as a 
particularly sensitive and ethical individual. 
Although the narrator, as a human being, is objectively closer to the 
Arabs than he is to the jackals, he seems more inclined to side with the 
jackals. His initial reaction to the eldest jackal’s claim against the Arabs 
is “Don’t speak so loudly . . . there are Arabs sleeping nearby” (KSS, 70), 
and his response to the jackal’s wish to kill the Arabs is “‘Oh!’ I said more 
fercely than I intended. ‘Tey will defend themselves; they will shoot 
down packs of you with their muskets’” (KSS, 70). Tese comments re-
fect the narrator’s concern for the jackals’ well-being and protective stance 
toward them. His afnity with the jackals can be taken as an oblique refer-
ence to Job’s lamentation, “I am become a brother to jackals” (Job 30:29). 
Following the narrator’s magnanimous care for the jackals, which stands 
in contrast to his indiference toward his fellow human beings (that is, his 
Arab companions) Robert Lemon asks: “Why does the European display 
so little loyalty to his species?”20 Yet, the narrator, whose pro-jackal stance 
seems to be against identity politics, might follow an alternative identitar-
ian politics—that of a vegetarian. 
When the Arab leader mercilessly whips the jackals, the narrator inter-
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Ten the leader whipped his sharp lash back powerfully and forth 
across their backs. Tey raised their heads; half in ecstasy, half in 
stupor; saw the Arabs standing in front of them; now were made 
to feel the whip on their muzzles; retreated with a jump and ran 
backward a ways . . . the leader raised the whip again; I took him by 
the arm. “You are right, Master” he said, “we will leave them to their 
vocation; besides, it is time to break camp.” (KSS, 72) 
Due to its triangular victim-victimizer-spectator structure, parallels have 
also been drawn between “Jackals and Arabs” and “In the Penal Colony.” 
Both stories are told from the perspective of an outsider, a European trav-
eler coming to a strange place and getting caught up in a deadly con-
fict between two sides, each trying to convince him of the justness of its 
cause.21 Te dilemma of the narrator-spectator in the penal colony—to in-
terfere, or not to interfere, in the violent act he is witnessing—is rendered 
in the form of a detailed interior monologue: 
Te traveler refected: It is always a sensitive matter to interfere de-
cisively in other people’s afairs. He was neither a citizen of the pe-
nal colony nor a citizen of the country to which it belonged. If he 
wanted to condemn or even block this execution, they could say to 
him: You’re a foreigner, keep quiet. To this there was no response 
except to add that in this case he did not understand himself, since 
he was traveling with the sole purpose of observing and by no means 
altering other people’s legal institutions. Here, however, the situa-
tion was certainly very tempting. Te injustice of the procedure and 
the inhumanity of the execution were beyond all doubt. (KSS, 46) 
Finally, and unlike the narrator-spectator in “Jackals and Arabs,” he does 
not interfere. 
Te very last scene of “Jackals and Arabs,” where the narrator stops the 
Arab leader from lashing the jackals, is also comparable, as Walter Sokel 
suggests, to the ffth chapter of Te Trial, entitled “Te Trasher” (“Der 
Prugler”). A similar triangle of victim-victimizer-spectator is presented 
here as well when Josef K. witnesses the thrasher lashing the warders. As in 
“Jackals and Arabs,” the victims in Te Trial also appeal to the spectator for 
help, but unlike the spectator in “Jackals and Arabs” Josef K. does noth-
ing to stop the violence, but rather leaves the scene while the lashing is in 









progress.22 On the background of the passivity of both the traveler in the 
penal colony and Josef K., the narrator’s interventive act in “Jackals and 
Arabs” stands out. Te fact that the reliable narrator, at the very end of the 
story, untypically intercedes on behalf of the jackals, encourages the reader 
to side with them. 
And yet, although the jackals, like Kafka himself, reject killing animals 
for food, they do not refrain from eating animals. Te narrator indeed 
interferes on behalf of the jackals, and they are perceived as the victims of 
the Arabs, but their humiliation and dismal fate stem—particularly from 
a vegetarian standpoint—from their obsession with other animals’ blood: 
Te all-obliterating immediate presence of the powerfully reeking 
corpse bewitched them. One was already at the throat, and its frst 
bite found the jugular. Like a small rushing pump, which struggles 
both wholeheartedly and hopelessly to extinguish an overwhelming 
fre, every muscle of his body tugged and twitched in place. And 
already, hard at the same work, all lay piled high up on the carcass. 
Ten the leader whipped his sharp lash back powerfully and forth 
across their backs. Tey raised their heads; half in ecstasy, half in 
stupor. . . . But the camel’s blood already lay in steaming puddles; 
the body was torn wide open in several places. Tey could not resist. 
(KSS, 71–72) 
Ironically, the jackals’ bloodthirstiness, as revealed in the presence of 
the camel’s dead body, makes them at least somewhat equivalent to their 
ultimate nemesis. Teir behavior in the presence of the corpse—tearing 
the camel’s fesh to pieces—is, in fact, reminiscent of the ferocious nomads 
in “A Page from an Old Document.” Te nomads rip a live animal and 
the jackals a dead one, but both arouse revulsion, especially for a veg-
etarian who abhors carnivorous practices altogether. Moreover, as Clayton 
Koelb states, both the nomads and the jackals present an uncomfortable 
combination of animal and human characteristics, that we believe nature 
keeps rigorously separate. While “Kafka’s jackals are distressing because the 
human aspect of their behavior seems impossible: animals simply do not 
converse in perfect German in the world we inhabit,” Koelb argues, “the 
nomad’s behavior shocks us because it is possible. Human beings ought 
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Resisting Anthroparchy 
Te jackals loathe the Arabs’ slaughterous and oppressive ways. Teir case 
against killing animals for food is therefore a part of a wider radical case 
against anthroparchy, a neologism for the structure of attitudes, practices, 
and institutions by which human beings dominate, exploit, and abuse 
members of other species.24 
The Handless Resistance to Anthroparchy 
Te narrator’s statement following the jackal’s opening words, that he
was long awaited by generations of jackals, is “Tat comes as a surprise
to me” (KSS, 69). One might think that the narrator is surprised at the
jackal’s ability to speak, as nothing in the text so far has indicated that
the story exceeds the realistic framework. But as the narrator continues,
“I’m very surprised to hear that. It is pure chance that I have come from
the far North, and I am on a brief trip. What is it, then, that you jack-
als want?” (KSS, 69), it transpires that he does not marvel at the talking
jackal. It is not the jackal’s speaking ability that surprises the narrator,
but solely the content of his words, the fact that the jackals have been
waiting for him for a very long time. Te indiference of the narrator to
the jackal’s conversational skills, which takes place at an early point in
the narrative, indicates the diegetic norms, according to which nonhu-
man animals can speak. 
Tese diegetic norms are diferent from the ones presented in “A Re-
port to an Academy,” Kafka’s earlier narrative of a talking nonhuman, ex-
amined in the previous chapter. Red Peter’s ability to speak is presented as 
abnormal and a quasi-realistic explanation for this anomaly is provided. 
Moreover, “A Report to an Academy” is entirely centered around the hu-
manization process of the simian protagonist, who—due to the human 
features he has acquired—is no longer perceived as an ape, at least within 
the diegesis (by the academy members, by other humans, as well as by 
Red Peter himself ). Unlike Red Peter’s verbal skills, the jackals’ capacity to 
speak is presented as normative within the diegesis and taken for granted 
by all participants (the narrator, the Arabs, and the jackals themselves). 
Nevertheless, despite their speaking ability, the jackals are portrayed and 








perceived as jackals in every respect. With the exception of this capability, 
the descriptions of the jackals—their movements, eating habits, and gen-
eral demeanor—accord with their biological species: 
And all the jackals began panting even more quickly; with racing 
lungs although they were standing still. . . . And all the jackals in 
the circle, who in the meantime had been joined by many others 
coming from afar, lowered their heads between their front legs and 
polished them with their paws. (KSS, 70) 
Te jackals’ speaking ability allows them to deplore the Arabs, who rule 
over them. However, despite being provided with language, defned by 
Horkheimer and Adorno as “the backbone of resistance,” without which 
“even the strongest animal is infnitely feeble,”25 the jackals are still funda-
mentally weak. Tey cannot save themselves, but need to be redeemed by 
a human agent, as the eldest jackal tells the narrator: 
“I am glad to still be able to welcome you here. I had almost given 
up hope, since we have been waiting for you for time without end; 
my mother waited, and her mother and, farther back, all her moth-
ers up to the mother of all jackals. Believe me!”  .  .  . “Master, we 
want you to put an end to the quarrel divides the world in two. You 
are precisely the man whom our ancestors described as the one who 
would accomplish this. We must have peace from the Arabs; air we 
can breathe; a view of the horizon cleansed of them; no bleated la-
ment from a ram slaughtered by the Arab; all creatures must perish 
quietly.” (KSS, 69, 71) 
Like the narrator, the jackals have both language and reason, but the 
narrator—as a human being—also has something the jackals crucially 
lack, which is hands. “We are poor creatures, as we only have our teeth; for 
everything we want to do, good and bad, all we have is our teeth” (KSS, 
70–71), notes the eldest of the pack. Te jackals can neither fght their 
armed oppressors with their teeth, as, the narrator warns them, “they will 
shoot down packs of you with their muskets” (KSS, 70), nor can they hold 
weapons. All they can do is use language in order to recruit to their side 
a human agent, who—unlike them—does have hands. Tis “handy man” 
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redeem them: “Oh dear Master, with the help of your all-powerful hands, 
cut their throats” (KSS, 71). 
Te jackals’ animality, which is encapsulated here in their lack of hands 
(and untypically not in their lack of reason or language), brings in mind 
Heidegger’s conception of the hand, as well as Derrida’s critique thereof. In 
What is Called Tinking? Heidegger marks the hand as another exclusively 
human feature, alongside thinking and speaking. For him, the human be-
ing is not merely the rational animal or the speaking animal, but also the 
animal with hands: 
Te hand’s essence can never be determined, or explained, by its be-
ing an organ which can grasp. Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, 
but they do not have hands. Te hand is infnitely diferent from all 
grasping organs—paws, claws, or fangs—diferent by an abyss of es-
sence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hand . . . 
the craft of the hand is richer than we commonly imagine. Te hand 
does not only grasp and catch, or push and pull. Te hand reaches 
and extends, receives and welcomes—and not just things: the hand 
extends itself, and receives its own welcome in the hands of others. 
Te hand holds. Te hand carries. Te hand designs and signs. . . . 
Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself 
through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears it-
self in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking.26 
Te craft of the hand, which is traditionally recognized as what makes 
the human being a homo faber, “man the maker,” allowing humans to con-
trol their fate and their environment through tools, is expanded here by 
Heidegger. Te craft of the hand, he stresses, goes beyond creating con-
crete tools, as the hand is chiefy a semiotic vehicle. Derrida provides a 
detailed analysis of Heidegger’s notion of the hand, as it exemplifes the 
anthropocentric dimension of humanism in general and Heidegger’s own 
reductive understanding of the human-animal distinction and its reliance 
on binary oppositions, in particular. Derrida notes that Heidegger’s re-
mark, that “apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have 
hands,” lacks scientifc and ontological grounding and sweepingly ignores 
the whole body of zoological knowledge. Derrida therefore labels this Hei-
deggerian account of the hand as “Heidegger’s most signifcant, symptom-
atic, and seriously dogmatic [statement].”27 






At frst glance it seems that Kafka’s portrayal of the jackals supports 
Heidegger’s view of the hand; if humans are merely the rational animals 
that can speak, the jackals—who are also rational and can speak—should 
be practically regarded as human. Yet, despite their speaking and cognitive 
abilities, the jackals are still eminently nonhuman beings, due to their lack 
of hands, which are the third essential element in Heidegger’s human-
ist trinity. Nonetheless, the multiplicity of the hand in the Heideggerian 
scheme is a vast array of complex functions, as the hand is not the grasping 
organ, but rather the signing organ. In fact, the elaborate list of “things we 
do with hands” Heidegger provides in this passage is equivalent to the for-
malization of speech acts in pragmatics,28 and thus should be respectively 
regarded as “signing acts.” 
Te jackals, on the other hand, lack hands not as signing organs, but 
simply as a grasping organ. In Heidegger’s terms, the jackals actually do not 
lack hands, but merely grasping organs. Having organs that can grasp, as 
apes do (as Heidegger himself notes), would be sufcient. If the story were 
“Apes and Arabs,” instead of “Jackals and Arabs,” it would entirely lose 
its narratological potential; having grasping organs, the nonhuman pro-
tagonists could hold weapons and therefore would not need to approach 
the narrator in the frst place.29 But jackals, unlike humans and apes (and 
raccoons, for that matter) do not have these grasping organs and therefore 
cannot resist their oppressors by holding weapons. While throughout the 
story none of the characters holds a weapon, the human narrator ulti-
mately protects the jackals with his very hand, which he uses to stop the 
Arab’s whip. Both Heidegger and Kafka view the hand as crucial for hu-
man existence. But whereas for Heidegger humans are the animals with 
hands, allowing a wide range of nuanced gestures, for Kafka humans are 
the animals with hands that enable one prosaic gesture: holding a weapon, 
which allows them to oppress other animals. 
The Resistance to Anthroparchy as a Class Struggle 
Te fctional scenario, in which the jackals are bestowed with human lan-
guage, demonstrates that anthroparchy—human domination and control 
over other species—is not established due the inability of nonhuman ani-
mals to talk or reason. It can be explained, rather, in materialist terms: 
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Arabs, who represent humanity, due to their lack of both natural (hands) 
and technological (guns) means. Nonhuman animals can neither produce 
nor use weapons. Te strife between the jackals and the Arabs, as well as 
between nonhumans and humans in general, is equivalent to class struggle 
in the Marxist sense; an inevitably violent confict of interests between the 
oppressed and the ruling class, as the narrator remarks: “It seems to be a 
very old quarrel; hence it probably runs in blood; and so it will probably 
end only in blood” (KSS, 70). Te fact that the story was written in 1917, 
in parallel to the Russian Revolution, in which Kafka—who was an ardent 
socialist—expressed great interest,30 supports this reading. 
In this anthroparchy-capitalism analogy, the Arabs are the bourgeoisie, 
the ruling class, and the jackals are the proletariat, the oppressed class. 
Te narrator then stands for the communists, whose duty is to carry out 
the “overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, [and the] conquest of politi-
cal power by the proletariat,”31 or in the context of the species struggle, 
to carry out, literally with his hands, the overthrow of anthroparchy. Yet 
it turns out that not only do the jackals lack hands to hold weapons, the 
weapon they provide the narrator, “a small pair of sewing scissors covered 
with old rust” (KSS, 71), is evidently inadequate for the task, and vastly 
inferior to the Arabs’ muskets. Te rusty pair of sewing scissors indicates 
that the jackals pose no real threat to the Arabs.32 
Consequently, as the fnal scenes reveal, anthroparchy—unlike capital-
ism in the Marxist doctrine—cannot be overthrown. As soon as the rusty 
sewing scissors are presented, the leader of the Arabs appears, armed with 
a giant whip, shouting, “Well, fnally, the scissors, and that’s enough of 
that!” (KSS, 71) Te narrator is surprised that the Arabs are aware of the 
jackals’ plot and fnd it unthreatening, and the Arab elucidates: 
Of course, Master . . . it is common knowledge; for as long as there 
are Arabs, this pair of scissors will go wandering through the desert, 
and it will wander with us until the end of time. . . . Tese creatures 
possess an absurd hope; fools, true fools they are. Tat is why we 
love them. Tey are our dogs; more beautiful than yours. (KSS, 71) 
Tis disparaging response underscores how frmly established an-
throparchy is. Te jackals’ hope to end anthroparchy is nothing but
a utopian ideal, as they are not aware of their inherent helplessness
vis-à-vis the Arabs. 






By depicting them as their dogs, the Arab relates to the jackals’ de-
pendency on humans.33 Not only do the Arabs own the means of control 
(guns, whips, and hands), which the jackals crucially lack, they also gain 
their power over the jackals by controlling access to food. In order to il-
lustrate the power relations to the narrator, the Arabs throw down a camel 
carcass in front of the jackals: 
Hardly had it hit the ground when the jackals lifted up their voices. 
As if irresistibly drawn on cords, every one of them, they came up, 
haltingly, their bodies scraping the ground. Tey had forgotten the 
Arabs, forgotten their hatred; Te all-obliterating immediate pres-
ence of the powerfully reeking corpse bewitched them.  .  .  . Ten 
the leader whipped his sharp lash back powerfully and forth across 
their backs. Tey raised their heads; half in ecstasy, half in stupor; 
saw the Arab standing in front of them; now were made to feel the 
whip on their muzzles; retreated with a jump and ran backward 
a way. But the camel’s blood already lay in steaming puddles; the 
body was torn wide open in several places. Tey could not resist. 
(KSS, 71–72) 
Te Arabs divert the jackals’ revolutionary energies away from political 
action by throwing the camel carcass in front of them in the classic panem 
et circenses manner. Te ruling class here literally feeds and entertains the 
masses as an instrument to distract them from fghting their oppressors. 
And indeed, as soon as the heavy carcass hits the ground, the jackals, as the 
narrator notes, “had forgotten the Arabs, forgotten their hatred.” “Tey 
couldn’t resist” (“Sie konnten nicht widerstehen,” E, 284) refers here to the 
jackals’ inability to resist the carcass of the camel, but it also refers to their 
incompetence to resist the Arabs, or in the broader sense—the impossibil-
ity of resisting anthroparchy. 
Te story ends with the Arab leader’s nonchalant remark at the jackals 
devouring the carcass: “We will leave them to their vocation; besides, it is 
time to break camp. Now you have seen them. Wonderful animals, aren’t 
they? And how they hate us!” (KSS, 72) Te Arabs are not threatened by 
the jackals, despite their ferce hatred and overt political ploy. Te power 
relations are so unbalanced that even the use of the whip is redundant. By 
the end of the story it is clear, to both the narrator and the reader, that the 
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rative, is merely the jackals’ wishful fantasy. In fact, the initial description 
of the jackals’ “lean bodies, as if under the whip, moving nimbly” (KSS, 
69), is to be read in retrospect literally; “under the whip” is not a metaphor 
for their nimble moves, but for their very existential condition. Ironically, 
it turns out that the jackals do not live as if under the whip, but live under 
the whip in the most literal sense of the term. Long before the narrator 
witnessed the whip, held by the Arabs against the jackals, the whip has 
been present in the interspecies power relations between the jackals and 
the Arabs, shaping the jackals’ lives, both physically and mentally. 
Interestingly, in November 1917, about a month after the publication 
of “Jackals and Arabs,” Kafka described in his Tird Octavo Notebook 
an act of self-fagellation, which may serve as an alternative ending to the 
story: “Te animal wrests the whip from its master and whips itself in 
order to become master, not knowing that this is only a fantasy produced 
by a new knot in the master’s whiplash” (BON, 24). Tree years later, in 
November 1920, Kafka quoted this sentence in a letter to Milena, adding 
that “torture is extremely important to me—my sole occupation is tortur-
ing and being tortured” (LM, 214). Here too, as in the original version, 
nonhuman animals cannot escape their dismal fate as oppressed beings. 
For the nonhuman animal, both ends are dead ends, leading to nothing 
but oppression. Te only power nonhuman animals can have is against 












Speciesist Researches of a Dog 
“Researches of a Dog” (“Forschungen eines Hundes”), a short story writ-
ten by Kafka in 1922 and frst published posthumously in 1931, is a quasi-
scientifc query, performed by a canine narrator. Unlike Kafka’s earlier 
nonhuman protagonists—Gregor Samsa the vermin, Red Peter the ape, 
and the jackals—who all possess at least some animal characteristics ac-
cording to their species, the nonhuman animal at the center of “Researches 
of a Dog” has very little canine or any other nonhuman attributes, despite 
the fact that he was born and raised as a dog. It is a story about a philo-
sophical dog, who—right from the outset—declares he is no longer part of 
the canine community and concerns himself with complex metaphysical 
inquiries. Tis pronounced anthropomorphic portrayal has brought many 
of the story’s commentators to regard it as a fable.1 Te tale of an outsider 
dog—who describes himself as “withdrawn, solitary, preoccupied only 
with . . . little researches” (KSS, 132)—has been widely read as an examina-
tion of the individual/community relationship, or more particularly—the 
relationship between the modern Jew and Jewish community, or between 
the author and society.2 
Te allegorical interpretations could not, however, “save” the story, 
which has remained largely abstruse. Tus, for instance, the story has 
been often taken as part of Kafka’s reports, like “A Report to an Academy,” 
but—as some critics have already pointed out—it is unclear to whom 
this report is addressed.3 Unlike Red Peter, Kafka’s simian narrator, who 
is aware of his audience and uses well-structured arguments, Kafka’s ca-
nine narrator speaks in a confused, disjointed manner, deviates from his 
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ideas. In fact, most Kafkalogists have ended up according little signifcance 
to this story.4 Alternatively, I read “Researches of a Dog” in relation to 
other literary dogs, focusing on human/canine interspecies dynamics. 
The Paradigmatic Interspecies Power Relations 
The Paradigm of the Faithful Dog 
Dogs abound in Western literature, typically portrayed as humans’ best
friends. Yet, unlike “the big bad wolf” or “the cunning fox,” the concep-
tion of “the faithful dog” is not merely a folkloric construction, but also a
biological one. Dogs were the frst species to be domesticated by humans,
approximately ffteen thousand years ago. Te process of domestication is
based on the selection of traits desired by humans, which were transmitted
to ofspring; thus dogs were genetically designed to ft human wishes. Cer-
tain wolfsh characteristics proved benefcial to humans during the domes-
tication process, such as their hunting skills and their territorial instincts,
which made them into guard dogs. In a similar fashion, the strong social
ties between individuals in a pack, as well as the hierarchical structure that
dictates obedience to the leader of the pack, were translated into loyalty and
compliance to humans. In addition, selective breeding (also known as arti-
fcial selection) has fashioned dogs as a perennial puppy, perpetuating cer-
tain traits—both physical (such as rounded skulls) and behavioral (such as
playfulness)—related to their function as a pet, that reinforced their depen-
dence on humans.5 As Darwin states in Te Origin of Species, “It is scarcely
possible to doubt that the love of man has become instinctive in the dog.”6 
Te representation of dogs as humans’ best friends in Western litera-
ture goes back to Homer’s Odyssey, as the prototype for this model is the 
character of Argos, Odysseus’s faithful dog. Dejected and worn out after 
years of separation, Argos waited for Odysseus’s return, only to wag his tail 
and expire soon afterward: “Argos the dog went down into the blackness 
of death, that moment he saw Odysseus again after twenty years.”7 Te 
canine protagonists in Miguel de Cervantes’s 1613 novella Te Dialogue 
of the Dogs (El coloquio de los perros) refexively discuss how dogs are de-
picted in human culture: “What I have heard highly extolled is our strong 
memory, our gratitude, and great fdelity; so that it is usual to depict us as 
symbols of friendship.”8 









Te paradigm of the faithful dog is also most common in modern lit-
erary works, in which dogs’ devotion to humans often stands in unfortu-
nate contrast with the lack of humans’ loyalty to them. Ivan Turgenev’s 
“Mumu” (1854), Anton Chekhov’s “Kashtanka” (1887), Jack London’s 
White Fang (1906), Mark Twain’s “A Dog’s Tale” (1904), and Tomas 
Mann’s “Man and His Dog” (“Herr und Hund,” 1919) are among the 
modern manifestations of this canine archetype.9 Te image of the faithful 
dog abounds also in the modern literary canon written after Kafka, in-
cluding, among many others, Virginia Woolf ’s Flash (1933), Eric Knight’s 
Lassie Come Home (1938) and its famous cinematic adaptations, and Paul 
Auster’s Timbuktu (1999). However, the representation of dogs in Kafka’s 
oeuvre conspicuously deviates from this literary tradition of canine loyalty. 
Kafka’s canine fgures are not portrayed positively, as humans’ best friends, 
rather as negatively, as either submissive or despicable beings. 
The Paradigm of the Despicable Dog 
Aside their emblematic role as humans’ best friends, dogs—as per Der-
rida’s formulation—are also “the fraternal allegory of social poverty, of the 
excluded, the marginal, the homeless.”10 Te paradigm of the despicable 
dog also has ancient roots. In his illuminating study of the human rela-
tionship with other animals, James Serpell suggests that the perception of 
dogs as unclean harks back to the Hebrew Bible and that it was current 
in Europe until the seventeenth century.11 Te negative approach to dogs 
in the Bible, both concretely and metaphorically, may be illustrated by 
the saying, “As a dog that returneth to his vomit, so is a fool that repea-
teth his folly” (Proverbs 26:11). In fact, the proverb Kafka’s father infa-
mously employed to resent his son’s friendship with the Yiddish theater 
actor Yitzchak Lowy—“Whoever lies down with dogs gets up with feas” 
(LFBV, 21)—reveals not only a prevailing negative attitude of many Ger-
man Jews toward Eastern European Jews, as indicated by several scholars,12 
but also toward dogs. 
James Serpell maintains that dogs have been regarded as unclean and 
despicable because they seem to engage unashamedly in activities that are 
prohibited or taboo in human culture, such as sexual promiscuity, incest, 
indolence, and the eating of carrion and feces.13 Tis idea is already found 
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It would be incomprehensible, too, that a man should use the name 
of his most faithful friend in the animal world—the dog—as a term 
of abuse if that creature had not incurred his contempt through two 
characteristics: that it is an animal whose dominant sense is that of 
smell and one which has no horror of excrement, and that it is not 
ashamed of its sexual functions.14 
Dogs are certainly not diferent from many other nonhuman animals in 
this respect, but unlike members of other species, dogs—as domesticated 
animals living with humans in their homes—exist on the boundary be-
tween nature and civilization. As various animal studies scholars have re-
marked, due to their liminal status dogs arouse ambivalent feelings of both 
afection and revulsion.15 
With the exception of the canine representation in “Researches of a 
Dog,” Kafka’s dogs are vastly presented as despicable. In the opening of 
Kafka’s “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor” (“Blumfeld ein älterer Jungge-
selle”) the protagonist considers adopting a dog, but eventually, after 
weighing the two paradigms—the faithful versus the despicable dog—he 
determines in favor of the second, and relinquishes the idea: 
He had already been wondering whether he shouldn’t acquire a little 
dog. Tese animals are gay and above all grateful and loyal; one of 
Blumfeld’s colleagues has a dog of this kind; it follows no one but its 
master and when it hasn’t seen him for more than a few moments it 
greets him at once with loud barking, by which it is evidently trying 
to express its joy at once more fnding that extraordinary benefactor, 
its master. True a dog also has its drawbacks. However well kept it 
may be, it is bound to dirty the room. Tis just cannot be avoided; 
one cannot give it a hot bath each time before letting it into the 
room; besides, its health couldn’t stand that. Blumfeld on the other 
hand, can’t stand dirt in the room. (CS, 18) 
Comparably, under the title “A Life” (“Ein Leben”) in the Blue Octavo 
Notebooks Kafka portrays a despicable female dog: 
A stinking bitch, mother of countless whelps, in places already rot-
ting, but everything to me in my childhood, a faithful creature that 
follows me unfailingly, which I cannot bring myself to beat, from 







which, shunning her breath, I retreat step by step, and which nev-
ertheless, if I do not decide otherwise, will push me into the corner 
between the walls, the corner that I already see, there to decompose 
completely, upon me and with me, right to the end—is it an honor 
for me?—the purulent and wormy fesh of her tongue upon my 
hand. (BON, 17) 
Additionally, in a fragment of his diary entitled “Temptation in the Vil-
lage” (“Verlockung im Dorf”), Kafka describes how while sleeping in an 
attic in a village, he was disturbed by a diabolic dog, which he tries to fend 
of: “very small bushy dog, one of those repulsive little lap dogs with dis-
proportionately large heads encircled by curly hair, whose eyes and muzzle 
are loosely set into their heads like ornaments made out of some kind of 
lifeless horny substance” (D, 277). 
The Paradigm of the Submissive Dog 
Te loyalty of dogs is dialectically perceived; it is not always viewed in a 
positive light, but also negatively, as dogs are often considered slavish and 
groveling creatures. Te roots of this paradigm can also be traced to antiq-
uity. For example, in Aesop’s fable “Te Wolf, the Dog, and the Collar,” 
the dog emblematically stands for submissiveness, in opposition to the 
autonomous wolf: 
A wolf saw a huge dog wearing a large wooden restraining-collar and 
asked him: 
“Who has chained you up and fed you like that?” 
“A hunter,” replied the dog. 
“Ah, God preserve wolves from him, as much as from hunger and a 
heavy restraining-collar!”16 
In this Aesopian fable, both the dog and the wolf are anthropomorphized 
and used allegorically in order to demonstrate a lesson that freedom is 
priceless. Yet, whereas nonhuman animals in fables are used instrumen-
tally, serving as a mere metaphor for intrahuman content, this fable can 
be also deallegorized and read as a tale about domestication.17 Tis read-
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which dogs have chosen domestication, because they preferred—like the 
dog in the Aesopian fable—human protection over their freedom.18 Kari 
Weil traces a similar approach throughout modernity, from Rousseau and 
Nietzsche to contemporary thinkers, such as Deleuze and Guattari. Tey 
all condemn dogs—as well as other pets—for being domestic, deanimal-
ized creatures that are stripped of their original virile wildness and tamed 
into an inauthentic servitude.19 
Dogs are also often used metaphorically in Kafka’s writings; since
Kafka’s dogs mark degradation, humiliation commonly takes a canine
form.20 Kafka’s canine metaphors are systematically negative, function-
ing as a derogatory term to describe submissive, wretched, or loathsome
people. Tus, for example, already at the opening of “In the Penal Col-
ony” the narrator portrays the bound condemned man as doglike (hün-
disch): “In fact, the commended man looks so doggishly submissive that
it seemed you could let him run around freely on the slopes and would
only have to whistle at the start of the execution for him to come” (KSS,
36). Later on, the commended man literally acts like a dog, as when he
was served with porridge, “He began to snap at the porridge with his
tongue” (48). 
Likewise, in “Jackals and Arabs,” as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Arab leader indicates that the jackals and their murderous schemes do 
not threaten him, by saying: “Tey are our dogs” (KSS, 71). Te business-
man Block in Te Trial defnes the attorney humiliating himself as doglike, 
whereas the narrator describes how Block ingratiates to the attorney as if 
he literally ceased to be a client and becomes a dog: “Such a person was 
no longer a client, he was the lawyer’s dog. If the lawyer had ordered him 
to crawl under the bed, as if going into a kennel, and bark, he would have 
done so with pleasure” (T, 139). Te most famous dog image in Kafka’s 
oeuvre appears at the very end of this novel. Te last words of Josef K., 
who is executed in public, are “like a dog” (T, 165), that is to say, he dies 
humiliatingly, with no rights or dignity.21 In his letters too, Kafka uses dogs 
as an image of humiliation. For example, in a letter dated March 1915 to 
Felice Bauer, he writes: 
I can give it to you, if at all, only when running along behind you in 
the Tiergarten, you always on the point of vanishing altogether, and 
I on the point of prostrating myself; only when thus humiliated, 
more deeply than any dog, am I able to do it. (LF, 372) 












The Inverted Interspecies Power Relations 
The Ontological Inversion 
Te canine representation in “Researches of a Dog” not only breaks with 
the traditional representation of dogs in Western literature as humans’ best 
friends, but is also markedly diferent from any other reference to dogs in 
Kafka’s work. Te protagonist of the story is neither a paragon of faithful-
ness, nor despicable, nor submissive. All three paradigms hinge on the de-
pendence of dogs on humans. Conversely, the protagonist of “Researches 
of a Dog” seems not to be dependent on people, yet he is also not a stray 
dog and does not live a “dog’s life,” in the fgurative sense. In fact, humans 
are completely absent from his inquiry, as he deals exclusively with canine 
community. Members of all other species are only briefy mentioned as 
one insignifcant and inferior unit of nondogs: 
When I think about it—and for this I have the time, the desire,
and the ability—dogdom does have some truly strange character-
istics. Beside us dogs there are many diferent kinds of creatures all
around—poor, meager, mute beings, whose speech is limited only to
certain cries; Many of us dogs study them, have given them names,
seek to help them, educate them, improve them, etc. (KSS, 132) 
From the standpoint of the narrator, canine superiority is self-evident. 
He does not even refer to the possibility that human beings—or members 
of any other species—ever had, or may have, a superior status. Not only 
do dogs conduct research, talk, study, contemplate music and science, and 
so on, they also rule over other species by dint of technological and intel-
lectual superiority: 
For what else is there besides dogs? Who else can you call upon in 
this vast, empty world? All knowledge, the totality of all questions 
and all answers, resides in dogs.  .  .  . People22 often boast of the 
universal progress of dogdom through the ages, and they probably 
mean mainly the progress of science. (KSS, 141, 148) 
It thus seems that by presenting dogs as the dominant species, who rule over
other species, due to their technological and intellectual superiority, “Re-
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Inverted power relations, as shown in the previous chapter through 
Henri Bergson’s account of laughter, have a comic efect, and indeed, the 
story has been often regarded as either humorous, satirical, or parodic.23 
Nevertheless, the efect of inverted power relations is not merely comic; 
such inversion also has a defamiliarizing efect, in the Russian formalist 
terms,24 causing the reader to reexamine and question issues taken for 
granted. In the case of inverted power relations between humans and other 
animals, it challenges anthropocentric views of human superiority over 
other species. 
Such inversion of interspecies power relations appears in Jonathan 
Swift’s satirical masterpiece Gulliver’s Travels (1726), which is known to 
have greatly infuenced Kafka.25 In his fourth voyage, Gulliver arrives at an 
island, wherein the equine Houyhnhnms are the civilized, intelligent, and 
dominant species, while the human beings on that island—who are called 
Yahoos—are defned as “the most flthy, noisome, and deformed animals 
which nature ever produced.”26 Te inverted interspecies power relations 
in Swift’s classic novel undermine and blur the boundaries between hu-
mans and other animals while—at the same time—raising doubts about 
anthroparchy. Trough the fantasy of the Houyhnhnm Land, the reader, 
following Gulliver himself (who can actually be regarded as the frst post-
humanist protagonist in the Western literary canon) becomes critical of 
human society and its values, including its treatment of other animals 
(horses in particular). Likewise, the world depicted by the canine narra-
tor in “Researches of a Dog” seems to be a world in which dogs are the 
dominant species. 
Te story of the alleged inverted interspecies power relations is, how-
ever, not narrated by an external narrator, but rather by its canine pro-
tagonist. Te option of recognizing the canine narrator as an “unreliable 
narrator,” in Wayne Booth’s terms, whose credibility has been seriously 
compromised,27 is gradually established throughout the process of reading, 
as the reader doubts the validity of the narrator’s research fndings. Ques-
tioning the narrator’s credibility allows a diferent reading of the story, 
wherein the inversion of interspecies power relations is not ontological 
but perspectival. Te reversal, in this case, is not an attribute of the repre-
sented world but derives solely from the manner the dog—as an unreliable 
narrator—represents it. A close reading of the text reinforces this hypoth-
esis, as I shall demonstrate shortly. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the reader is introduced to the inverted world 
right at the beginning, before the narrator’s reliability is put in question, is 








rhetorically signifcant. Te defamiliarization efect of the inversion, which 
challenges the human-animal hierarchies, does not disappear even when it 
gradually becomes apparent that the inversion is not taking place in the 
diegetic universe, but rather merely in the way the canine narrator sees this 
universe. In fact, the defamiliarization efect of the inverted interspecies 
power relations is particularly strong here because dogs are the dominant 
species, whereas the cultural representations of dogs—either positive, as 
typically in the literary canon, or negative, as in the work of Kafka—is 
thoroughly based upon their subordination to humans. 
The Perspectival Inversion 
Te frst event recounted in the story, the one that triggers the researches of 
the dog, is his encounter with the company of seven acrobatic dogs: 
Tey did not speak, they did not sing, in general they held their 
tongue with almost a certain doggedness, but they conjured forth 
music out of the empty space. Everything was music, the way they 
raised and set down their feet, certain turns of their heads, their 
running and their resting, the attitudes they assumed toward one 
another, the combinations they formed with one another like round 
dance, as when, for example, one braced his front paws on the oth-
er’s back and then and they all positioned themselves so that the frst 
dog, erect, bore the weight of all the others, or as when, their bodies 
slinking close to the ground, they formed intertwined fgures and 
never made a mistake. (KSS, 134) 
Tese acts, accompanied by loud music, perceived by the canine narrator 
as senseless and enigmatic: “To tell the truth, I marveled less at the art of 
the seven dogs—it was incomprehensible to me, quite outside my abilities 
and hence something I could no way relate to” (KSS, 135). When examin-
ing the dogs from a short distance, he realizes that 
it was not so much calm as extreme tension with which they 
worked—their legs, seemingly moving such assurance, twitched at 
every step with an incessant anxious trembling; these dogs gazed 
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forever tried to control, after each attempt immediately protruded 
slackly from their muzzles again. (KSS, 136) 
But he still cannot fgure out the situation, astonishingly asking, “What, 
then, could they be afraid of? Who was forcing them to do what they are 
doing here?” (KSS, 136) 
Unlike the canine narrator, the human reader can more easily explain 
the situation. As indicated by many critics, the reader does know the an-
swers to the dog’s inquiries; this peculiar event of the agitated dogs, shiv-
ering while performing acrobatics, can be simply understood as a circus 
show, in which the trained dogs are forced to perform unnatural tricks for 
human entertainment.28 Te questions “Why were they afraid? Who then 
forced them to do what they were doing?” represent the gap of under-
standing between the canine narrator and the human reader. Whereas the 
narrator fnds the behavior of the dogs inexplicable, the reader can answer 
these questions efortlessly; the dogs afraid of their human trainers, who 
force them to perform unnatural acts. Te following description of the 
dogs standing on their hind legs seems to support this hypothesis: 
Because of the loud music I had not noticed until now, but they had 
truly cast of all shame; these miserable creatures were doing some-
thing that was at once most ridiculous and most obscene—they 
were walking upright on their hind legs. Ugh! Tey were exposing 
themselves and openly faunting their nakedness; they prided them-
selves on it, and whenever they obeyed their better instincts for a 
moment and lowered their front legs, they were literally horrifed 
as if it were a mistake, as if nature were a mistake, and once again 
they rapidly raised their legs, and their eyes seemed to be asking 
forgiveness that they had to desist a little from their sinfulness. Had 
the world turned upside down? Where was I? What had happened? 
(KSS, 136–37) 
At this point, the reader can certainly suspect, if not realize, that the di-
egetic universe is not turned upside down but only seems this way from 
the inverted perspective of the canine narrator. 
Te enigma of food—as several critics have shown—can be likewise 
explained. Te narrator contemplates the source of food, presuming it just 
falls from the sky. Te reader, however, can reconstruct an alternative, yet 






a very simple, explanation whereby the food does not fall from the sky 
but is rather dropped to the dogs by human beings.29 In the same vein, 
the mystery of the “air dogs” (Lufthunde) is not a real puzzle to the reader. 
Te Yiddish term Luftmenschen (which literally means “air people”), re-
ferring to impractical contemplative people with no defnite income, has 
been suggested as the source of this neologism.30 Beyond the etymology 
of the term, the reader can also identify these air dogs, allegedly hovering 
in the air and only rarely touch the earth, as highbred lap dogs, carried 
by human hands.31 But the canine narrator, who perceives nothing of the 
human world, fnds himself again fumbling in the dark with a series of 
unanswered questions: 
But why, great-hearted dogdom, why do these dogs foat? What 
is the meaning of their vocation? Why can’t you get one word of 
explanation out of them? Why are they foating around up there, 
allowing their legs, the pride of dogs, to wither, cutting themselves 
of from the nourishing earth: they sow not and yet they reap, and 
they are even, I hear, especially well nourished at the expense of 
dogdom. (KSS, 144) 
Toward the end of the story, the narrator relates his encounter in the 
forest with a strange dog, who was “lean, long-legged brunet, fecked here 
and there with white, and he had a beautiful, strong, searching gaze” (KSS, 
158). Te strange dog says he is a hunter and that he has to hunt. Te 
narrator cannot understand why he has to hunt, and the canine hunter 
replies: “My dear little dog, do you really not understand that I have to? 
Don’t you understand things that are self-evident?” (KSS, 159). Shortly 
after, a melody, which grew stronger and stronger, almost burst the narra-
tor’s eardrums, and he presumes that it is the canine hunter who sings. Te 
reader can, however, realize behind the narrator’s back, that the other dog 
is not an actual hunter but a hound, and the melody is not his singing but 
rather the horns of the approaching human hunters.32 
As the story progresses, the hypothesis of the canine narrator as an un-
reliable narrator is frmly established. It gradually becomes clear that the 
dog consistently misinterprets the phenomena he encounters, because he 
is incapable of noticing other species, and humans in particular.33 Com-
pletely eliminating the function of human beings in dogs’ life leaves the 
canine narrator with a missing link, and, therefore, he fnds simple and 
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Lately I have been refecting more and more on my life, looking for 
when I might have made the crucial mistake that is to blame for 
everything, but I cannot fnd a mistake. And yet I must have com-
mitted some error, for if I had not committed it and still failed to 
achieve what I wanted by the honest work of a long life, that would 
prove that what I wanted was impossible, and complete hopeless-
ness would follow. Look at your life’s work! (KSS, 142) 
William Riggan classifes fve types of unreliable narrators: the picaro, 
the madman, the clown, the naïf, and the liar.34 Kafka’s canine narrator 
certainly does not ft into any of these types, but the closest model is the 
naïf, who is typically a child, as his unreliability is a result of perceptual 
limitations. Te limitations of the dog’s research are actually the limita-
tions of his canine conciseness, which he cannot surmount. As the human 
readers are not restricted to such canine conciseness, they can easily read 
beyond it, identifying the missing links in his account. Te frst-person 
narration mode of the story seems to open up an ironic gap between the 
canine narrator and the human readers. 
The Critical Inversion 
Little by little it becomes clear that this is not a topsy-turvy world where 
dogs are humans’ masters, but the power relations between humans and 
dogs are identical to the ones we are familiar with in the extratextual real-
ity. Te inversion is a mistaken corollary of the narrator, who consistently 
denies the role of humans in dogs’ lives. Te reader, who is necessarily 
human, and therefore possesses a diferent perspective than the dog, rec-
ognizes the limitations of the dog’s inquiry and sees beyond it. Tis gap in 
perspective has a comic efect; it pokes fun at the dog who—either con-
sciously or unconsciously—tries to ft reality into his positions, and not 
vice versa. Bergson, in his treatise on humor, addresses the comic efect of 
this kind of reversal: 
At the root of the comic there is a sort of rigidity which compels its 
victims to keep strictly to one path, to follow it straight along, to 
shut their ears and refuse to listen. . . . a character following up 
his one idea, and continually recurring to it in spite of incessant 
interruptions! Te transition seems to take place imperceptibly from 







the man who will listen to nothing to the one who will see nothing, 
and from this latter to the one who sees only what he wants to see. A 
stubborn spirit ends by adjusting things to its own way of thinking, 
instead of accommodating its thoughts to the things.35 
But the comic efect is not the only consequence of the limited perspec-
tive of the canine narrator and his philosophical myopia. Te initial comic 
efect, as Michael Uhall argues, confrms the anthropocentric presumption 
of superiority: 
Tis could be read condescendingly, such that the human reader 
elevates herself above Dog and attributes Dog’s failures to his status 
as a mere animal (or as the anthropomorphized representative of a 
particular form of misanthropy). Tis reading of the story might 
interpret it, then, as nothing more than an expression of, or medita-
tion on, dissatisfaction, isolation, and fnitude—Dog’s or, perhaps, 
Kafka’s own—but such a reading also would reassure the reader im-
plicitly of her position as a superior breed.36 
While the story does not actually undermine the interspecies power 
relations, it does undercut speciesism and the very notion of species supe-
riority. Te narrator’s caninocentrism can, in fact, be construed as a sat-
ire or parody of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. Just as for 
us humans, “Man is the measure of all things,” as Protagoras put it, for 
dogs, “Te dog is the measure of all things.” Te dog’s depreciation of 
other animals, whom he lumps together into one category, is analogous to 
the human attitude to other animals. Te very term “animals”—except in 
specifc biological contexts—serves as a description of beings other than 
human beings, even though it is indisputable that humans themselves are 
animals. In a parallel manner, given the canine prism in the story, the 
dividing classifcation here is not between humans and nonhumans, but 
between dogs and nondogs. Te critical gaze, which was initially directed 
at the unreliable narrator’s canine exceptionalism, is thus soon turned in-
ward, toward human exceptionalism. Te dog’s speciesist fallacy within the 
diegesis exposes the fundamental speciesist fallacy of human beings in the 
extradiegetic reality. 
Moreover, unlike the descriptive question of who the dominant species 
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one, as to a large extent it depends on the eye of the beholder. In the previ-
ous chapter, such relativism was demonstrated through the jackals’ claim 
for superiority over the Arabs; while people see scavengers as contemptible, 
for the jackals, who feed on dead animals found in their habitat, animals 
that kill for food, like human beings, are contemptible. In “Researches 
of a Dog” this relativism is presented, among other things, through the 
canine narrator’s claim for the superiority of four-legged over two-legged 
animals. Walking on two legs distinguishes human beings from most other 
mammals, and as such, it is viewed positively within the anthropocen-
tric ideological framework. Te canine narrator, on the other hand—as a 
four-legged animal—views it negatively. Form him, as for the animals in 
Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945), “four legs good, two legs bad!”37 He actually 
rationalizes it by claiming that walking on two legs exposes the genitals 
(KSS, 136), a claim that ironically echoes the anthropocentric linkage be-
tween covering the genitals and mental supremacy, as appears in the bibli-
cal story of Adam and Eve and discussed in the second chapter. 
Te reader can clearly recognize the circular nature of the narrator’s 
argument. Te dog identifes superior characteristics with canine charac-
teristics, and as members of other species perform these characteristics to 
a lower extent, he sees that as a proof of their inferiority. It is easy to no-
tice that the dog falls here into the logical fallacy of begging the question 
(petitio principii). Yet, by exposing the dog’s caninocentric fallacy, using 
aesthetic distancing, the story also reveals the anthropocentric fallacy. If 
one position implies a logical fallacy, surely, the other does as well. While 
caninocentrism is anchored only in the fctional universe of the story, an-
thropocentrism is frmly lodged in our social reality. Tus, the comic ef-
fect, which at frst seems to be directed toward the caninocentric narrator, 
is reversed, turning toward the readers, as being part of the anthropocen-
tric social reality. 
In his infuential 1980 treatise “Why Look at Animals?” John Berger 
analyzes the efect of seeing oneself seen by a nonhuman animal: 
Te eyes of an animal when they consider a man are attentive and 
wary. Te same animal may well look to another species in the same 
way. He does not reserve a special look for man. . . . And so, when 
(man) is being seen by the animal, he is being seen as his surround-
ings are seen by him. His recognition of this is what makes the look 
of the animal familiar. . . . animals are always the observed. Te fact 







that they can observe us has lost all signifcance. Tey are the object 
of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know about them is an 
index of our power, and thus an index of what separates us from 
them.38 
Kafka, in “Researches of a Dog,” inverts the observer-observed relations 
between human and nonhuman animals, reminding us—what according 
to John Berger “has lost all signifcance”—that we can also be observed by 
them. When observed by a nonhuman animal, we are just another species, 
and just as nonhuman animals are vastly invisible to us, so are we to them, 
as Kafka’s dog demonstrates. 
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The Burrow of the Indeterminable 
“Te Burrow” (“Der Bau”) is an unfnished work Kafka wrote in the last 
winter of his life (1923–24), and was frst published posthumously in 1931. 
It centers around and is narrated by a ground-dwelling being, seeking 
protection through the construction of a labyrinthine burrow. Te inter-
pretations of the story include a varied range of themes, but it has been 
primarily read as an autobiographical work, in which Kafka deals with 
writing, or with his imminent death.1 Kafka’s nonfction writing supports 
such readings; for example, in a letter to Max Brod in 1904, he writes: “We 
burrow through ourselves like a mole and emerge blackened and velvet-
haired from our sandy underground vaults” (LFFE, 132). Kafka’s descrip-
tion of himself as if he were a mole seems to realize itself in “Te Burrow,” 
in which Kafka is a mole. 
Nevertheless, the identifcation of the burrower in the story as a mole 
should not be taken for granted. Most of Kafka’s nonhuman fgures are 
introduced by their species (such as jackals, a dog, a tiger, a leopard, an ape, 
a mouse, a vulture, and even a fctitious lamb-kitten crossbreed). Regard-
less of Kafka’s tendency to anthropomorphize the nonhuman animals in 
his stories and his critics’ impulse to allegorize them, their biological iden-
tity is typically given and unquestionable. However, as discussed in the 
frst chapter, Gregor Samsa, the protagonist of Kafka’s frst animal story, 
is biologically unspecifed, and this indeterminacy is central to the story. 
Like the vermin in “Te Metamorphosis,” the species of the protagonist in 
“Te Burrow” is also undefned.2 Te unspecifed burrower is described in 
the story as a solitary being, living a subterranean life, preying on smaller 
animals and hoarding food. 
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In his 1931 phenomenological study of the manner by which literary 
works assume their meaning to us, Roman Ingarden stated that the reader 
tends to choose the most probable option of flling out “places of indeter-
minacy” in the story from among those that are possible.3 By doing so the 
reader, consciously or unconsciously, applies the principle of Ockham’s 
razor to literature. Another way to describe Ingarden’s account of literary 
indeterminacy is by using the “duck test,” or in this particular case—the 
“mole test”: if the protagonist lives, eats, and behaves like a mole, we can 
conclude that s/he4 is a mole. It seems, however, that the burrowing pro-
tagonist cannot pass the “mole test.” A good deal of argument has arisen 
among the story’s commentators over the question of whether the burrow-
dweller is a mole or a badger or bits of both. As the burrower eats rats, 
while moles do not, and collects supplies of food for use in winter, whereas 
badgers do not, it seems that identifying the animal is an ultimately futile 
task. 
It is important to note that while the burrower has features of both 
mole and badger, the creature is not a mole-badger hybrid. A hybrid stands 
at the center of Kafka’s “A Crossbreed,” which opens with the narrator’s 
description of this animal: 
I have a curious animal, half-kitten, half-lamb. It is an heirloom 
from my father’s estate, but it only during its time with me that it 
has developed; formerly it was far more lamb than kitten, but now 
it has about the same amount of each. From the cat, head and claws; 
from the lamb, size and shape; from both, its eyes, which are fick-
ering and mild, the hair of its coat, which is soft and lying close to 
the skin, its movements, which are at once skipping and slinking; in 
the sunshine on the window sill it curls up into a ball and purrs; on 
the meadow it rushes around like mad and can scarcely be caught; it 
runs away from cats, it tries to attack lambs; on moonlit nights the 
roof gutters are its favorite promenade; it cannot meow and loathes 
rats. (KSS, 125) 
Tis hybrid animal, who signifes that fxed ontological categories of spe-
cies no longer apply, is still biologically defned. Unlike this kitten-lamb 
crossbreed, and like Gregor Samsa, the burrower is an indefnable be-
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burrow-dweller, endeavors that are doomed to failure, or merely overlook-
ing this biological indeterminacy and focusing on possible allegorical con-
texts, I would like to discuss the animalistic and humanimal implications 
of this biological indeterminacy. 
Nonhuman Indeterminability 
The Burrower as Everybeing 
In the second chapter I have discussed the efect of anonymity of Kafka’s 
fgures, who are often devoid of defning characteristics, such as social 
standing, nationality, and so on, and in some cases—even a name. Tis 
anonymity brings out their transcendent quality and marks them as Ev-
erymen. Representing any human being, the Everyman is an ordinary fg-
ure, with whom the reader is supposed to be able to identify with readily. 
Te literary tradition of the Everyman dates back to a sixteenth-century 
English morality play entitled Te Summoning of Everyman (c. 1510) and 
can be found in contemporary works as well, such as Philip Roth’s novel 
Everyman (2006). Nonetheless, an Everyman is not always unequivocally 
marked as such. For example, Leopold Bloom, the protagonist of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) is considered one of the best-known Everymen in 
modern literature, albeit not explicitly defned as such. 
Te story of the anonymous burrow-dweller, which was written a year 
after the publication of Ulysses, can likewise be read as a story of the Every-
man. Bloom is often considered “the twentieth century symbol for Every-
man, the wanderer, the outsider, the exile in every man.”5 Yet the burrow-
ing protagonist is a more nightmarish version (as can be expected from 
Kafka) of the twentieth-century embodiment of the Everyman. Kafka’s 
Everyman is an image of a terrifed, helpless being, invariably engaged in 
the struggle for survival, fghting an undetectable enemy. Whereas Joyce 
challenged religious and ethnic boundaries by portraying a Jew as an Ev-
eryman, Kafka’s nonhuman Everyman has further broadened the concept 
of the Everyman, challenging species boundaries. In this sense, the bur-
rower is in fact not an Everyman, but an Everybeing, who stands for every 
human and nonhuman alike. 
Te dominant feeling expressed in “Te Burrow” is undoubtedly fear. 





Te constant trepidation that surrounds the protagonist’s life is a central 
element in the story. Whereas the frst half of the story focuses on build-
ing the burrow, the second half entirely revolves around the protagonist’s 
fright of an invader and constant anxiety about the unexpected. Te open-
ing of the story, “I have established my burrow, and it seems to be a suc-
cess” (KSS, 162), seems to indicate that the protagonist is pleased with the 
handiwork and feels secure and complacent. But it soon becomes clear 
that despite having a dwelling, the burrower is nevertheless far from safe. 
Tis opening sentence actually evokes the biblical story of the creation of 
the world. It contains two parts—the frst referring to the completion of 
the structure, and the second expressing the satisfaction the builder feels at 
the completed work. A similar structure is repeated seven times in Genesis 
1, after completing diferent components of the world, and concluded at 
the end of the sixth day: “And God saw everything that he had made, 
and, behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Yet, unlike God, who after 
completing the creation of the world “rested on the seventh day from all 
His work which He had done” (Genesis 2:2), the completion of the bur-
row does not ofer its creator any peace of mind. On the contrary, it is an 
additional source of disquiet, since having to guard the burrow generates 
constant apprehension. 
Having a secured abode has, paradoxically, heightened the burrower’s 
sense of insecurity. Watching the burrow from outside to check its safeness 
only increases the burrower’s feeling of angst: 
What does this kind of security actually amount to? For the experi-
ence I have gathered here, outside the burrow, can I possibly judge 
the dangers surrounding me outside it? Can my enemies snif the 
correct scent of me when I am not in my burrow? Certainly, they 
have something of my scent, but not the full efect. And isn’t it the 
existence of the full scent often the precondition for normal danger? 
(KSS, 170–71) 
Tis series of questions, apparently not addressed to any outside entity, 
is further proof of a shaken psyche: the burrower is consumed by anxiety 
bred of doubts, misgivings, and a fear of the unknown. When hearing a 
hissing noise and suspecting the advance of an invader, another series of 
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Am I preoccupied with it? It is growing louder, it is coming closer, but
I wriggle my way through the labyrinth and camp up here under the
moss, it is almost as if I had already abandoned my house to the hisser,
content just to have a little peace up here. To the hisser? Do I have a
new, defnitive opinion about the source of the noise? Surely the noise
stems from the channels that the little creatures dig? Isn’t that my
defnitive opinion? . . . How did it happen that for so long everything
ran quietly and smoothly? Who guided the paths of my enemies so
that they engaged in wide detours around my property? Why was I
protected for so long, only to be terrorized now? What were all the
small dangers, which I spent my life brooding over, compared to this
single one! Do I, as the owner of the burrow, hope to be superior to
anyone who might come? (KSS, 184–85, 186) 
In addition to the interrogative sentences, the fact that the passage, 
like most of the story, is written in the present tense underlines the efect 
of distress and agitation. Te burrower reports the events—both external 
and internal—in real time. Due to this unusual narration mode, neither 
the burrower nor the reader knows how this assault will end and whether 
the burrower will survive. Had the story been narrated in the typical past 
tense, the reader would have understood that the burrower had managed 
to escape the danger (or supposed menace), or else he would not be able to 
recount it. But with this rare mode of narration, both the reader and the 
protagonist-narrator have no prescience of the outcome, a fact that intensi-
fes the fear and suspense. 
If in Kafka’s novel Te Castle the protagonist’s worry is a consequence 
of his journey to an unknown, unattainable destination, here it is due to 
the approach of an unknown enemy. Lack of knowledge and consequent 
anxiety and apprehension are central motifs in Kafka’s work, yet in “Te 
Burrow” this theme is taken to an extreme, and the entire story is a study 
in worry and fear, as Roman Sturc points out: 
Te story is at least in part a study in worry and dread (“Sorge,” 
“Angst”), Kafka easily qualifes as the Dante of “Sorge.” . . . Most 
of Kafka’s protagonists are loners and worriers. . . . In Te Burrow
Kafka goes one better. Tere is only one being in this longish story: 
a speaking, ratiocinating animal who, in a monologue lasting well 
over one hour, pours out his fears, anxieties, and guilt feelings. . . . 













Te Burrow is a study in monomania. What in Te Great Wall of 
China appears to be reasonable postulate of human existence—the 
longing for security—in this story becomes a rage, an idée fxe which 
dominates in all respects the life of the animal.6 
Te world of the burrower is a horrifying realm subsumed by a sense of 
impending doom. In fact, Kafka’s frst extended tale, “Description of a 
Struggle” (“Beschreibung eines Kampfes”), could be an apt title for this 
work as well, since more than telling a story, it describes a perpetual state 
of the struggle for survival. 
Te incessant disquiet of the protagonist has often been viewed as a 
testimony to an unstable mental state, and various diagnoses abound for 
his alleged pathology: acute paranoia, obsessive neurosis, hysteria, or com-
pulsive disorder.7 Seeing the burrower’s apprehensiveness as pathological 
excess is, however, indicative of an anthropocentric bias. While, as sug-
gested here, the experience of the burrowing narrator can be regarded as 
a nightmarish representation of modern experience, it is also uniquely 
animalistic. Despite the potential afnity between the experience of the 
burrow-dweller and the experience of modern man, the signifcant difer-
ences between them should not be undermined. By viewing the nonhu-
man animal in human terms, the burrower’s behavior is often regarded as 
abnormal. Yet such behavior (as well as feeling), which by human norms 
is considered abnormal, is, in fact, natural and reasonable for a ground-
dwelling, nonhuman animal.8 
Despite having specifc human cognitive abilities, the burrow-dweller 
is not a human being in disguise. Te life led by the protagonist of “Te 
Burrow” follows quite closely the life of a similar being in nature; the bor-
rower’s behavior, actions, and interests are those of a veritable animal. Te 
burrow-dweller is preoccupied with the real-life concerns of subterranean 
burrowing animals: digging a warren, storing food, hunting animals, haul-
ing prey to the burrow, sleeping, and warding of invaders. Moreover, the 
burrower’s sensory functions are those of a nonhuman animal—the ani-
mal’s explorations are based mostly on the senses of hearing, smell, and 
touch, and not on sight. In fact, “Te Burrow” delves into the nonhuman 
experience more than any other of Kafka’s animal tales. 
Since “Te Burrow” is not a sequence of events deriving causally one 
from the other, it has often been described as a story without a story.9 
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up—is described in the present tense, denoting routine and habitual ac-
tions. Te narrative progresses through the examination of various aspects 
of the structure and routines that make up the life of the burrow-dweller: 
Sometimes I stretch out and whirl around in the passage for sheer 
contentment. It is a beautiful thing to have such a burrow in ad-
vancing age, to have put a roof over your head at the approach of 
the fall. . . . Tat is where I sleep the sweet sleep of peace, of grati-
fed desire, of the achieved goal of home ownership. I don’t know 
whether it is habit from the old days or whether the dangers in even 
this house are serious enough to wake me, but from time to time at 
regular intervals I am startled out of deep sleep and listen, listen into 
the silence that reigns unchanged day and night, smile, comforted, 
and with relaxed limbs sink into still deeper sleep. (KSS, 164) 
“Te Burrow” thus deviates from the common defnition of a narrative 
as a telling of a “connected sequence of events,”10 or as laid down in Aristo-
tle’s Poetics, a “structure of events.”11 In her infuential study of narratology 
Mieke Bal requires a confict between two agents as a necessary component 
of any plot,12 a criterion that is not met here as well. 
Animal life, unlike human life—and modern human life in particular—
seems to be cyclical and not linear. Te relevant cycles are circadian and 
seasonal ones, whereas the only linear progression is maturing and growing 
old. Te protagonist of “Te Burrow” is well aware of this temporal pro-
gression. Tis can be inferred from the comment “I’m growing old” (KSS, 
163) in the frst paragraph. However, the main concept of time in the story 
is a cyclical one. In his 1984 novel, Te Unbearable Lightness of Being, the 
Czech author Milan Kundera captures this aspect of nonhuman animal 
experience when describing the life of his beloved dog Karenin: 
Dog time cannot be plotted along a straight line; it does not move 
on and on, from one thing to the next. It moves in a circle like 
the hands of a clock, which—they, too, unwilling to dash madly 
ahead—turn round and round the face, day in and day out follow-
ing the same path. . .  . If Karenin had been a person instead of a 
dog, he would surely have long since said to Tereza, “Look, I’m sick 
and tired of carrying that roll in my mouth every day. Can’t you 
come up with something diferent?” And therein lies the whole of 









man’s plight. Human time does not turn in a circle; it runs ahead in 
a straight line.13 
An animal narrative, then, is signifcantly diferent from a human nar-
rative, which progresses chronologically and linearly. Presenting the story 
in the present tense, depicting habitual, routine activities—in itself a de-
parture from the literary norm—is well suited to a nonhuman animal 
character, whose life consists of repetitive routines. Even the potential for 
confrontation, in the guise of noise, is not realized. While the protagonist 
of “Te Burrow” is anthropomorphized (i.e., presented as having human 
cognitive faculties), the story—through both its structure of narration and 
thematic content—conveying an experience that is essentially diferent 
from human experience, even though it is not entirely an animal experi-
ence either. 
Te cyclical character of the natural world, in contrast to the human 
perception of time, is expressed in the opening chapter of Ecclesiastes: 
“Vanity of vanities,” says the Preacher; “Vanity of vanities, all is van-
ity.” What proft has a man from all his labor in which he toils 
under the sun? One generation passes away, and another generation 
comes; But the earth abides forever. Te sun also rises, and the sun 
goes down, and hastens to the place where it arose. Te wind goes 
toward the south, and turns around to the north; Te wind whirls 
about continually, and comes again on its circuit. All the rivers run 
into the sea, yet the sea is not full; To the place from which the riv-
ers come, there they return again. All things are full of labor; Man 
cannot express it. Te eye is not satisfed with seeing, nor the ear 
flled with hearing. Tat which has been is what will be, that which 
is done is what will be done; And there is nothing new under the 
sun. (Ecclesiastes 1:2–9) 
Not only is there nothing new under the sun; there is nothing new under 
the ground as well. Although Kafka did not complete this story, its last 
sentence, “But everything remained unchanged” (KSS, 189), which osten-
sibly is an anticlosure, is actually a ftting fnale, since indeed nothing has 
changed in the life of the burrow-dweller throughout the story. 
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manner of perceiving the burrow. On one hand, the protagonist regards it 
as a beloved spouse,14 and its parts as members of the family: 
Tere is no way that it would be necessary for me to refect in order 
to understand what the burrow means to me, I and the burrow 
belong together.  .  .  . It is for your sake, you passages and cham-
bers, and you above all, castle court, that I have counted my life as 
nothing after having been stupid enough for such a long time as to 
tremble about it and delay my return to you. What do I care about 
danger now that I am with you? You belong to me, I to you, we are 
bound together; what can happen to us? (KSS, 175, 177) 
Te burrow can also be seen as an extension of the self, as from the stand-
point of the burrower, there is no separation between these two entities: 
Te vulnerability of the burrow has made me vulnerable, the in-
juries it sufers pain me as if they were my own. Tis is exactly 
what I should have foreseen; instead of thinking only about defend-
ing myself—and how lightly and fruitlessly did I do even that!—I 
should have been thinking about defending the burrow. (KSS, 186) 
Once again, it seems that there is a marked tendency among Kafka’s crit-
ics to impose a human model on a nonhuman animal character, criticizing 
this jealous possessiveness as an obsession blown out of proportion.15 Te 
function of the burrow as true protection against real dangers is, however, 
quite diferent from the function of a human abode. Te ability to dif-
ferentiate between the self and the rest of the world is in fact fundamental 
to all living beings, because it is necessary for survival, as Daniel Dennett 
explains in his account of how consciousness arises: “As soon as something 
gets into the business of self-preservation, boundaries become important, 
for if you are setting out to preserve yourself, you don’t want to squander 
efort trying to preserve the whole world; you draw the line.”16 Accord-
ing to this principle, if protecting immediate surroundings is essential for 
survival, there is an evolutionary advantage in identifying the self with 
that immediate surrounding. When self-preservation depends on preserv-
ing a certain environment, the identifcation of self with the surrounding 
is thus functional and in some cases even essential. Underground dwellers 





are very vulnerable when their burrows and tunnels are unprotected. Te 
protagonist’s attitude toward the burrow is therefore completely justifable 
in terms of self-preservation. 
In his account of the novel, E. M. Forster maintains, as mentioned in 
the introductory section, that the literary protagonists must be human 
and cannot be other animals, “for we know too little so far about their 
psychology.”17 Forster published his comments in 1927, three years after 
Kafka wrote “Te Burrow.” It seems that even before the scientifc devel-
opments envisaged by Forster, Kafka created a character that, although 
it is not a faithful representation of a nonhuman animal, is certainly not 
a camoufaged human, or as Forster put it, a four-legged table moving 
around. Apart from language skills, the burrower has salient nonhuman 
features, both as a protagonist and as a narrator. By presenting a concept of 
time and self that radically difers from human time concept, Kafka’s tale 
of the Everybeing challenges the notion of protagonist, as well as the very 
conception of narrative. 
The Burrower as an Aspecies Being 
Critical theory has increasingly underscored the tangled manners that hu-
mans imagine themselves in through a series of excluded terms and identi-
ties, foremost among them is animality; “human being has been expressed 
in contradistinction to the animal,” Horkheimer and Adorno state at the 
outset of “Man and Beast” in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Similarly, the 
sole function of the Agambenian “anthropological machine,” as presented 
in the frst chapter, is to produce the human through the human/animal 
opposition.18 Nonetheless, this contradistinction, this anthropological ma-
chine, produces not only the human but also the animal. Deriving from 
the binary logic of inclusion/exclusion, the very concept of animal is re-
stricted—in most contexts and discourses—to nonhuman animals, as if 
human beings are not animals. As Derrida famously states in Te Animal 
Tat Terefore I Am: “Te animal is a word, it is an appellation that men 
have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the au-
thority to give to the living other.”19 
Te conception of humans instituting animals through the power of 
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Out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the feld 
and every bird of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he 
would call them. And whatever Adam called each living creature, 
that was its name. So Adam gave names to all cattle, to the birds of 
the air, and to every beast of the feld. (Genesis 2:19–20) 
Genesis 2 retells the creation story, told in Genesis 1, with several varia-
tions; whereas in Genesis 1 God tells the humans to have dominion over 
other animals, in Genesis 2 human’s dominion over nonhuman animals is 
not expressed by God’s words, but by his act; God bestows humans with 
the right to name all other animals. Te human act of naming the animals 
in Genesis 2 echoes the divine act of creation in Genesis 1. Tere God cre-
ates the world by his words: “And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there 
was light” (Genesis 1:3). Here, man constructs other animals, created by 
God, through his own words, as “whatever Adam called each living crea-
ture, that was its name.” 
In his recent study of the creaturely, Tobias Menely compares Kafka’s 
reader to Adam, as “like Adam, the reader of Kafka’s parables encounters 
the animals still unnamed, so than when, in the course of the tale, the 
creatures are fnally identifed according to the accepted nomenclature, 
the reader’s experience is one of radical defamiliarization.”20 In some cases, 
however, including this particular case of “Te Burrow,” the state of the 
nonhuman animals as unnamed is not merely temporary, inasmuch as 
the information about the identity of the nonhuman animals is not sus-
pended, but is not revealed—and cannot be constructed—throughout the 
narrative. For example, in Kafka’s short piece “Te Animal in the Syna-
gogue” (“Das Tier in der Synagoge”), the nonhuman animal is indefnable 
and also untouchable, as described at the outset of the story: 
In our synagogue there lives an animal about the size of a marten.
One can often get a very good view of it, for it allows people to ap-
proach to a distance of about six feet from it. It is pale blue-green
in color. Nobody has ever yet touched its fur, and so nothing can
be said about that, and one might almost go so far as to assert that
the real color of its coat is unknown, perhaps the color one sees is
only caused by the dust and mortar with which its fur is matted.
(PP, 49) 





Another enigmatic creature appears in Kafka’s fragment “It Is the Ani-
mal with the Big Tail” (“Es ist das Tier mit dem großen Schweif ”): 
It is the animal with the big tail, a tail many yards long and like a 
fox’s brush. How I should like to get my hands on this tail some-
time, but it is impossible, the animal is constantly moving about, 
the tail is constantly being fung this way and that. Te animal re-
sembles a kangaroo, but not as to the face, which is fat almost like 
a human face, and small and oval; only its teeth have any power 
of expression, whether they are concealed or bared. Sometimes I 
have the feeling that the animal is trying to tame me. What other 
purpose could it have in withdrawing its tail when I snatch at it, 
and then again waiting calmly until I am tempted again, and then 
leaping away once more? (WPC, 327) 
Te narrator’s inability to get a hand on the tail of this animal parallels the 
inability to defne the species of the animal, as well as to describe her. In 
these narratives, as in “Te Burrow,” the reader, unlike Adam, fails to name 
the animals and to subjugate them through categorization. In other words, 
Kafka deprived his reader of “the right and the authority to give [identity] 
to the living other,” as Derrida puts it. 
In Kafka’s 1914 story “Te Village Schoolmaster” (“Der Dorfschulleh-
rer”), which is also known as “Te Giant Mole” (“Der Riesenmaulwurf”), 
the nonhuman animal is even less approachable and fundamentally inde-
fnable. In this story, the narrator describes his unsuccessful efort to sup-
port the failed attempt of a village schoolmaster to validate the existence 
of a giant mole. Tis story is typically read as a metatextual parable on the 
paradox of interpretation. Te narrator’s attempt is doomed to failure, as 
by doing so he is merely producing a new level of discursive displacement: 
What Kafka’s text demonstrates is the discursive character of “real-
ity,” the infnite displacement of empirical “facts” by the discursive 
energy that engages with these so-called facts. Te World of Kafka’s 
fction is always, it would seem, a world controlled by discourse.21 
Interestingly, the subject that Kafka chose to illustrate this idea is a 
nonhuman animal, and more precisely—a ground-dwelling animal. Te 
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of a ground-dwelling animal. While, as suggested in the introductory sec-
tion, through careful observation we can access—at least partly—the ex-
perience of nonhuman animals, a ground-dwelling animal is unobservable 
and therefore inherently unapproachable and unrepresentable. 
Given the failure to provide a scientifc account of the gigantic ground-
dwelling creature in “Te Village Schoolmaster,” in his next attempt to de-
pict a subterranean being, Kafka allows the ground-dwelling animal to tell 
her story by means of self-representation. Yet it should be noted that nei-
ther option is free of anthropomorphism. In the case of a frst-person ani-
mal narrative, the protagonist-narrator is inevitably anthropomorphized, 
since the nonhuman narrator uses human language. If, however, the narra-
tor is human, anthropomorphism is also inescapable, because the human 
narrator does not have access to the ground-dwelling experience. In this 
no-win situation, when dealing with a subterranean being, whose reality is 
essentially inaccessible to humans, anthropomorphism seems to be inevi-
table, as either the author or the narrator anthropomorphizes them. 
It seems that the biological indeterminacy of the burrower can be ex-
plained, at least to some extent, by the story’s mode of narration. Te two 
major modes of narration are frst person and third person, or—in Gérard 
Genette’s terms—homodiegetic and heterodiegetic respectively. Genette 
also defnes the autodiegetic narrative as a particular case of homodiegetic 
narrative, in which the narrator is the story’s protagonist.22 When nonhu-
man fgures are portrayed by a human narrator, either a homodiegetic or 
heterodiegetic one, they are typically introduced by their species. For ex-
ample, the homodiegetic narrator in Kafka’s “Te Vulture” (“Der Geier”) 
begins his story with “A vulture is hacking at my feet” (CS, 442), and the 
heterodiegetic narrator in Kafka’s “Leopards in the Temple” (“Leoparden 
in Tempel”) commences with “Leopards break into the temple and drink 
to the dregs what is in the sacrifcial pitchers” (PP, 93). If we change the 
perspective in such stories and make the nonhuman fgures their narrators, 
the species of the nonhuman animals will be omitted. Te frst sentence 
of “Te Vulture” would then be “I am hacking at a man’s feet,” and the 
revised opening of “Leopards in the Temple” would be “We break into the 
temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrifcial pitchers.” 
A human narrator would probably specify the burrower biologically, 
but as “Te Burrow” is an autodiegetic narrative (namely, the burrow-
dweller is both the narrator and the protagonist of the story) keeping the 
biological identity of burrower unspecifed is narratologically reasoned. 






















From the very outset, there is a self-referential use of “I,” which does not 
necessitate a biological determination. Indeed, omitting the species iden-
tifcation in nonhuman autodiegetic narratives does not always ensue in 
Kafka’s nonhuman autodiegetic narratives; in “A Report to an Academy” 
and “Researches of a Dog,” Kafka’s earlier nonhuman autodiegetic narra-
tives, the biological identity of the narrator is specifed. However, in both 
cases, the accounts of the narrators largely focus on species issues— the 
narrators’ species identity and their social interactions within and beyond 
their own species—hence biological identity is central and cannot be omit-
ted. Unlike Kafka’s simian and canine narrators, the protagonist of “Te 
Burrow” does not deal with social relations, within or outside the species; 
the burrower does not have such relations at all. Te story actually presents 
a radical autodiegetic narrative, in which the narrator is not only the main, 
but also the sole character of the story. 
Te solitary nature of the burrower is widely regarded by critics
as abnormal, and often even in a judgmental manner, as the burrow-
dweller has been broadly “blamed” for inappropriate asocial behavior.23 
However, criticizing the protagonist’s asocial behavior imposes a human
model on a nonhuman fgure. Humans are indeed social creatures, and
building social connections seems natural and necessary for them, but it
is not the case for some other animals. Like many other ground-dwelling
beings, who are solitary animals by nature, the burrower here is also a
solitary being, living without any social interactions, and the lack of
sociability does not indicate any problem with personality or behavior.
“Te Burrow” is, in fact, a study in solitary existence. Te narrator is the
only character in the story and does not interact with any other being.
Te noise the burrower hears could come from someone approaching the
burrow, but that being never makes an appearance and the reader never
fnds out the source of the noise. 
Tis ultimate solitude is also refected linguistically, by the frequent use 
of German refexive verbs throughout the story: sich rühmen, sich stricken,
sich drehen, sich zusammenrollen, sich wärmen, sich wälzen, sich schleppen, 
and so on. Te burrower is both the subject and the object of these ac-
tions, as there is no other being around. Tis extreme solitude amplifes the 
protagonist’s anxiety and helplessness. Indeed, other characters in Kafka’s 
oeuvre, like Josef K. and Gregor Samsa, also fnd themselves in situations 
beyond their control and are beset by anxiety vis-à-vis the unknown, but 




















Te Burrow of the Indeterminable 133 
burrow-dweller has no acquaintances who, at least to some extent and for 
a specifed period, can assist. 
Tis burrower’s radical solitude is translated to a speciesless or aspecies 
existence. Following the well-established distinction between sex and gen-
der, Carmen Dell’Aversano suggests, as discussed in the frst chapter, an 
analogous diference between “biological species” and “species identity.”24 
Te Butlerian notion, that gender is not an essence but a performance, 
which “has no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute 
its reality,”25 might lead to the equivalent notion, that species identity does 
not exist without a species discourse. In the lack of any species discourse, 
the burrower is aspecies. 
Te aspecies burrow-dweller is equivalent to a nameless narrator-
protagonist, who is also common among many autodiegetic narratives.
However, alongside the narratological justifcation that persons do not tend
to refer to themselves by their name, in many cases the absence of a personal
name also serves a thematic purpose, indicating their asocial status. For ex-
ample, Dostoyevsky’s novella Notes from the Underground (1864) and Ralph
Ellison’s novel Invisible Man (1952) are known for their nameless outcast
narrators. Interestingly, these two nameless narrators—like Kafka’s aspecies
narrator—live below ground, where the social order is neutralized. In the
underground of both Dostoyevsky and Ellison, the social identity is sus-
pended, but their unnamed lonely narrators still keep their human identity.
In “Te Burrow,” on the other hand, the underground being includes also
suspension of species identity; its unnamed lonely narrator is also an aspecies
being. Unlike the underground human narrators, who used to live above
ground, the underground existence of the aspecies narrator in “Te Burrow”
is not only temporary. It is rather a total asocial existence, as Kafka’s burrower
neither recalls a past life nor foresees any future existence aboveground. 
Te underground in modern literature is, in fact, an extreme and darker 
version of the forest, which has a long literary tradition of marking, both 
physically and symbolically, the edge of the domain of human civilization: 
Te forests were foris, “outside.” In them lived the outcasts, the mad, 
the lovers, brigands, hermits, saints, lepers, the maquis, fugitives, 
misfts, the persecuted, the wild men. Where else could they go? 
Outside of the law of human society one was in the forest. But the 
forest asylum was unspeakable; one could only rise above or sink 
below the human level.26 






Te Forest of Arden, wherein Shakespeare’s pastoral comedy As You Like It
is set, is prototypical for such a literary woodland, where social dynamics 
radically changes. 
In Lewis Carroll’s Trough the Looking Glass (1886), the transgression 
of power relations, which was sparked in a sylvan setting (in this case, the 
wood “where things have no name”), also involved a fundamental shift in 
interspecies dynamics: 
Just then a Fawn came wandering by: it looked at Alice with its 
large gentle eyes, but didn’t seem at all frightened. “Here then! Here 
then!” Alice said, as she held out her hand and tried to stroke it; but 
it only started back a little, and then stood looking at her again. 
“What do you call yourself?” the Fawn said at last. Such a soft 
sweet voice it had! 
“I wish I knew!” thought poor Alice. She answered, rather sadly, 
“Nothing, just now.” 
“Tink again,” it said: “that won’t do.” 
Alice thought, but nothing came of it. “Please, would you tell me
what you call yourself?” she said timidly. “I think that might help a little.” 
“I’ll tell you if you’ll move a little further on,” the Fawn said. “I 
can’t remember here.” 
So they walked on together through the wood, Alice with her 
arms clasped lovingly round the soft neck of the Fawn, till they 
came out into another open feld, and here the Fawn gave a sudden 
bound into the air, and shook itself free from Alice’s arms. “I’m a 
Fawn!” it cried out in a voice of delight, “and, dear me! you’re a hu-
man child!” A sudden look of alarm came into its beautiful brown 
eyes, and in another moment it had darted away at full speed.27 
When entering this magical woods, the characters lose their personal 
names, but also their species identity, allowing interspecies interactions 
that would not occur in the ordinary world of social order and hierarchies. 
As Carmen Dell’Aversano notes: 
Carroll’s feeting but haunting portrayal of life and love in the 
“wood where things have no name” leads us to investigate what 
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More specifcally, it leads us to an analysis of the words “human” 
and “animal,” of the way they work and of the harm they do.28 
Likewise, Kafka’s underground world suspends not only the social identi-
ties within humanity but also the species identity. While the forest ofers a
radical shift in social dynamics, the underground ofers an asocial, or even
antisocial, zone, with nil social dynamics. As the term “human” gains sense
only through its opposition, the animal, so do other species terms. Tis no-
tion also explains why the burrower cannot self-defne species-wise. Te
analogy between the emblematic forest and the underground calls for para-
phrasing the famous philosophical thought experiment, asking, “If someone
is in a burrow and no one is around to observe them, do they have a species?” 
Humanimal Indeterminability 
The Burrower as a Humanimal Hybrid 
Apart from the fact that the species of the protagonist in “Te Burrow” can-
not be defned, the burrower cannot even be generically labeled as a nonhu-
man animal, as it is even unclear if we are dealing here with a nonhuman
animal. Preoccupied with the authentic concerns of subterranean burrowing
animals (such as digging a warren, storing food, hunting, hauling prey to
the burrow, sleeping, and warding of invaders) the burrower, more than any
other nonhuman fgure in Kafka’s fction, is characterized animalistically.
Correspondingly, the explorations of the burrower are based mostly on the 
senses of hearing, smell, and touch, and not on sight. Te burrow-dweller, 
however, also has distinctive human traits, foremost among them human 
cognitive abilities. 
As discussed in the introductory section, it is unclear if anthropomor-
phism can be entirely circumvented in the literary representation of non-
human animals. 
Nonetheless, when the nonhuman animal fgure is also the narrator of 
the story, the animal is inevitably anthropomorphized, as the act of nar-
ration requires, of course, the use of human language. While autodiegetic 
narratives are not common in Kafka’s poetics (i.e., in most of Kafka’s nar-
ratives the narrators are not the protagonists), autodiegetic narratives are 
prevalent among Kafka’s animal stories, such as “Report to an Academy,” 








“Researches of a Dog,” and “Te Burrow.” It is then reasonable to assume, 
that Kafka’s choice of autodiegetic narration for his animal stories is aimed 
at creating a humanimal efect, achieved by eliminating the mediating 
character of a human narrator. 
As several commentators have shown, the burrow is a mathematical 
design, for it requires theoretical and methodological calculations that ex-
ercise the intellect, not only in terms of architecture, but also regarding 
logistics.29 Furthermore, in one case, the burrower makes a direct reference 
to the act of writing: 
What is it, then? A slight hissing, audible only after long pauses, 
a nothing, though I don’t mean to say that you could get used to 
it, no, you could not get used to it, but you could notice it for a 
while without for the present taking any steps against it, e.g., every 
few hours listen for it occasionally and patiently register the results. 
(KSS, 181–82) 
Te act of “patiently register[ing] the results” (das Ergebnis geduldig regis-
trieren, E, 494) is, of course, a distinctly human activity with no parallel 
in other species. 
Moreover, the burrower also seems to have hands, saying, “Tis short-
coming was created by my own hands” (KSS, 168).30 Referring to the 
forelegs of the burrower with the word “hands” (Hände), a human physi-
cal attribute, instead of paws (Pfoten), as expected when dealing with a 
mole-like animal, is uncommon, and hence draws the reader’s attention. 
In “Jackals and Arabs,” as shown in the third chapter, the animality of 
the jackals is crucially embodied through their lack of hands, whereas hu-
mans are described as the animals with hands (though, as underscored, in 
a diferent way than Heidegger conceptualizes it). Kafka’s counter-human-
normative reference in “Te Burrow,” ascribing hands to the burrower, has 
been described by a few commentators as a “slip of the pen”—that is, not 
intentional.31 When Kafka describes the Statue of Liberty at the opening 
of his novel America, Lady Liberty is holding a sword, not a torch, in her 
hand (A, 3). Tis is of course neither a mistake nor a slip of the pen, but 
an intentional deviation from the convention of realism in order to pro-
duce a certain rhetorical efect. By the same token, such deviation in “Te 
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be read as a slip of the pen, but rather as a deliberate literary choice, aim-
ing at undercutting the all-embracing idea that humans are fundamentally 
diferent from other animals in more than one way. 
One way to reason the narrator’s hands and other human features is 
seeing the burrower as a humaninal hybrid, as also suggested by Hermann 
Weigand: 
What kind of creature is the builder of this borrow? Generically 
speaking, he is a hybrid of man and animal, a large, furry, tailless 
carnivore with a powerful dome of a forehead that constitutes his 
chief tool. His wants and needs are strictly those of an animal. 
However, his powers of abstract reasoning and introspection and 
the sensitive diferentiation of his emotional life are on a high hu-
man level.32 
Te burrower is portrayed as an interspecies being, a humanimal hybrid, 
by virtue of intertwining of human and nonhuman features (both physical 
and mental). Humanimal hybridity has a long history in Western litera-
ture, dating back to various mythological beings, such as centaurs, Mino-
taurs, and sirens. Sirens, the woman-bird hybrid in Greek mythology, are 
also found in Kafka’s “Te Silence of the Sirens” (“Das Schweigen der Si-
renen”), wherein they are described as follows: “Tey, more beautiful than 
ever, stretched and twisted their limbs, let their ghastly hair blow freely in 
the wind, spread their claws on the rocks” (KSS, 128). Another winged 
human being appears in Kafka’s second Octavo Notebook: 
An old man came towards us out of a long empty passage. A strange 
old man—he had wings. Wide, outspread wings, the tips taller than 
himself. “He has wings,” I called out to my brothers-in-arms, and 
those of us in front fell back somewhat, as far as we could for those 
behind, who were pushing on. “You are amazed,” the old man said. 
“We all have wings, but they have not been of any avail to us, and if 
we could tear them of, we would do so.” (BON, 12) 
Leni, Herr Huld’s nurse in Te Trial, is another human fgure, who 
has a distinctly animalistic feature; she has a webbed hand, which Josef K. 
fnds very attractive: 








“I’ve got a little defect like that. Look.” She held the middle and 
ring fngers of her right hand apart; the skin between them went 
up almost to the top joint of her little fngers. “What a trick of 
nature,” said K., adding, after he had examined the whole of her 
hand, “What a pretty claw!” It was with a kind of pride that Leni 
watched as K., in wonderment, kept pulling her two fngers apart 
and putting them together again, until fnally he gave them a brief 
kiss and let go. (T, 78) 
And, of course, Kafka’s transformed fgures—Gregor Samsa in “Te Meta-
morphosis” and Red Peter in “A Report to an Academy” —are humanimal 
beings, as elaborated in the frst two chapters. Another humanimal fgure 
is Dr. Bucephalus, the protagonist of Kafka’s short tale “Te New Lawyer” 
(“Der neue Advokat”), who previously was the war horse of Alexander of 
Macedonia (KSS, 59–60). Te narrator in “Te Wish to Be a Red Indian” 
(“Wunsch, Indianer zu warden”) merges with the horse he is riding (CS, 
390), becoming a horse-man.33 Te protagonist of “Te Burrow” should 
thus be read in the light of all these aforementioned humanimal hybrids in 
Kafka’s fction. Not only is the burrower unaligned with any specifc spe-
cies, but this fctitious humanimal can also be viewed as a hermeneutical 
category, ultimately undermining and subverting the discursive human/ 
animal binary. 
The Burrower as a Performative Humanimal 
Te reading of the burrower as a humanimal hybrid, as shown above, is 
based on both human and nonhuman features that Kafka ascribes to the 
protagonist of “Te Burrow,” like other humanimal hybrids in his writing. 
Nonetheless, unlike Kafka’s other humanimal hybrids, the burrower is not 
explicitly described as such, and the humanimal thesis is merely a hypoth-
esis, suggested by the reader as an explanation for the inconsistency in the 
depiction of the burrower. According to an alternative explanation, the hu-
manimal transgression in “Te Burrow” does not transpire ontologically, 
but rather linguistically—that is, through the subversive use of language. 
As examined at more length in the third chapter, Kafka often uses animal-
istic terminology to describe humans and vice versa, drawing attention to 
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tional choice to classify the burrower’s forelegs as “hands” can be taken as 
equivalent to describing the killing of nonhuman animal as murder in “A 
Crossbreed” and human eating activity as fressen in “Jackals and Arabs.” In 
this context, the word “hands,” instead of “paws,” does not refer to human 
organs, but stands for Kafka’s deliberate disruption of language conven-
tions (and not biological categories), seeking to rethink human and other 
animals in a nonbinary manner. 
Te burrow-dweller might then be an anthropomorphized nonhuman, 
analogous to the canine protagonist of “Researches of a Dog,” but might 
also be an animalized human. Like humanized animals, animalized hu-
mans (namely, human fgures whose behaviors include some distinguished 
animalistic features) are also omnipresent in Kafka’s fction. Together, the 
humanization of nonhuman animals and the animalization of humans bi-
directionally disrupt the human-animal boundary. 
Leni’s amphibian trait in Te Trial is intensifed by her animalistic be-
havior, as she soon bites Josef K.’s hair. As discussed in the third chapter, 
the nomads in “A Page from an Old Document” are also depicted animal-
istically: 
True to their nature they camp under the open sky, for they detest
houses, . . . You cannot talk to the nomads. Tey do not know our
language; indeed, they hardly have one of their own. Tey com-
municate with each other like jackdaws. Again and again we hear
this screech of jackdaws. Tey are indiferent to our way of life,
our institutions, and fnd them incomprehensible. As a result they
are also ill-disposed to any sort of sign language. You can dislocate
your jaw and twist your hands out of joint, but they have not
understood you, and they will never understand you. Tey often
grimace: then their eyes roll up in their heads and foam fows out
of their mouths, but these are not meant either to convey anything
or to frighten people; they do it because that is how they are.
What they need, they take. You cannot say that they use force.
When they make a grab at something, you step aside and let them
have it. (KSS, 66–67) 
Not having language, the nomads here lack the one critical feature, which 
makes one human, traced as far back as the ancient Greek determination 
of zoon echon logon. If not human (not even animalistic humans), what 






are they? Neither animals nor humans, the nomads are liminal beings, 
overturning the human/animal binary, upon which Western culture rests. 
In Kafka’s short story “A Country Doctor” (“Ein Landarzt”) the groom 
also behaves in a beastly manner, “crawling out on his all fours,” and then 
forcefully biting the poor maid, leaving red marks imprinted on her cheek 
(KSS, 61). Likewise, in “Building the Great Wall of China” (“Beim Bau 
der Chinesischen Mauer”) the people of the northern lands, from whom 
the wall is meant to protect, are rendered animalistically: “In artists’ paint-
ings, faithful to the truth, we see these faces of damnation, the gaping 
maws, the jaws equipped with long, pointed teeth, the scrunched-up eyes 
that seen to squint at the victim whom their maws will crush and rend” 
(KSS, 118). Among other human characters who are distinctly animalized 
are the sailors in “A Report to Academy,” as well as the condemned man in 
“Te Penal Colony” and the attorney in Te Trial, as demonstrated in the 
second and third chapters respectively. 
Te reader of “Te Burrow” cannot be sure what kind of animal the 
burrow-dweller is, or if this creature is human, nonhuman, or a humani-
mal hybrid. It is important to note that some of this ambiguity in the text 
is inevitably lost in translation. Te German title of this story, “Der Bau,” 
is equivocal, an ambiguity that does not exist in the English title “Te Bur-
row.” Whereas the word Bau can indeed refer to a hole or tunnel dug in 
the ground by a small animal for dwelling, and is indeed equivalent to the 
word “burrow,” it also has a broader meaning of “construction” or “build-
ing.” Discussing this translation issue, Stanley Corngold observes: 
Once we have committed ourselves to this “burrow,” however, we 
have sacrifced an element of tension that is a constitutive part of 
the story: the doubleness of a structure that is built horizontally 
underground but is represented in the mind of the badger-narrator 
in “higher” terms, terms more suitable to a structure built vertically 
above ground.34 
Not only is the ambiguity of the Bau lost in translation, but also the ob-
scurity of the protagonist, as the word “burrow” indicates that its builder 
is a nonhuman animal, an indication that does not exist in the original 
German text. As most stories are written from a human perspective and 
their characters are human, the reader tends to assume that the narrator/ 
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there is no reason to assume otherwise. Accepting the protagonist as hu-
man, then, is the cultural default position. Due to this default assumption, 
the reader frst presumes that the burrower is human; only later on, with 
accumulating references indicating that the narrator is a nonhuman ani-
mal (or rather a humanimal hybrid), does the human context change into 
a nonhuman one. 
Tis change unfolds gradually, throughout the process of reading. Te 
further the reader progresses into the text, the more bizarre the framework 
becomes, as it turns out the protagonist resides in a subterranean structure, 
is fearful of predators, and does a lot of snifng. About fve pages into 
the “Te Burrow,” the narrator mentions that “on awakening [I] fnd still 
hanging from my teeth a rat, perhaps, as incontrovertible proof of night 
work that already seems almost dreamlike” (KSS, 166). Later, the narrator 
says: “Sometimes it seems to me as if my coat were growing thin” (KSS, 
168). Whereas the word “coat” in English can refer to both nonhuman 
natural hair and an item of clothing, in the original German text Kafka 
uses the word Fell,35 which typically refers to an animal pelt or to fur. Tis 
word further reinforces (perhaps even confrming) the hypothesis that we 
are dealing with a nonhuman animal, and not with a human protagonist. 
Te inability to determine conclusively—at least at the outset—
whether the protagonist is human or nonhuman derives from the fact that 
each of the two hypotheses is an exception to the conventional realistic 
model. If we are dealing with a human fgure, then it is a very animalistic 
one who has animal characteristics and behavior, such as dwelling under 
the earth, relying chiefy on its sense of smell, feeding on rats, and refer-
ring to its coat as a pelt. Conversely, the nonhuman animal hypothesis is 
equally outside the conventional scheme of realism, for the protagonist, as 
mentioned before, possesses distinct human attributes: frst and foremost, 
language skills, which is a corollary of the animal’s function as both pro-
tagonist and narrator. 
Both options—the humanized animal and the animalized human— 
blur the human-animal divide, creating “performative humanimality.” Un-
like “ontological humanimality,” which derives from the duality of animal 
and human elements in the diegetic world, “performative humanimality” 
derives from the inability of the reader to decide whether the protagonist is 
a human being or another animal. During that period of indecision, until 
the human framework is exchanged for the nonhuman one, the reader si-
multaneously envisions two contradictory views, inducing an efect of hy-






bridity: the fgure is part animal, part human. Walter Benjamin famously 
rendered this idea: 
It is possible to read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without 
realizing that they are not about human beings at all. When one 
encounters the name of the creature—monkey, dog, mole—one 
looks up in fright and realizes that one is already far away from the 
continent of man.36 
Just as the narrator of “Te Burrow” feels their way through the dark, 
listens attentively, and gleans crumbs of information about a possible in-
vader, the reader also fumbles in the dark through the story, picking up 
morsels of hints strewn throughout the text, trying to fgure out who the 
narrator is and what the burrower is all about. But just as the identity of the 
invader remains unknown to the protagonist, so the protagonist’s identity 
remains unknown to the reader. Te failure of the narrator in “Te Village 
Schoolmaster” to unveil the mole enigma is analogical to the inability of 
the reader in “Te Burrow” to elucidate the conundrum of the burrower. 
Te attempt to trace the identity of the burrow-dweller is a hopeless 
pursuit in both texts. In the opening of “Te Village Schoolmaster” the 
narrator discusses the obscurity of the giant mole, “which has remained 
quite inexplicable” (CS, 168). Te burrower also remains mostly inexpli-
cable, either a humanized animal, an animalized human, or a humanimal 
hybrid. In the “Te Burrow” Kafka does not aim at consolidating or stabi-
lizing any species identity. Trough his refusal to portray species identity as 
a fxed, coherent, and natural category, Kafka displaces the normative du-
alism of human/animal. Te “species-bender” burrower presents a “species 







Josefne the Singer, or  
Performing Humanimality 
“Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” (“Josefne, die Sängerin oder 
Das Volk der Mäuse”) is Kafka’s last story, which he wrote in 1924, just 
a few months before his death. Te story centers on the relationship be-
tween the singer Josefne and the community where she lives, a relation-
ship fraught with admiration and contempt, anxiety and abandonment. 
Te fact that Kafka, on his deathbed, wrote a story about an artist who 
disappears from the public arena corroborates the autobiographical inter-
pretations of Josefne as a stand-in for Kafka himself.1 Kafka published 
this story in a collection entitled Te Hunger Artist (Ein Hungerkünstler) 
with three other stories, two of which deal with art: “Te Hunger Art-
ist” and “First Sorrow” (“Erstes Leid”). Tis led to reading “Josefne, the 
Singer or the Mouse People” allegorically, as a story about art,2 or—more 
specifcally—about Jewish art.3 In addition, it has been widely held that 
Kafka here subversively uses antisemitic stereotypes, as the mouse people 
represent the Jewish people.4 In his biography of Kafka, Max Brod regards 
the identifcation of the mice with the Jews as a foregone conclusion, argu-
ing “to what particular people this picture of the baited, helpless host of 
mice most nearly refers need not be expressly stated.”5 
Brod’s statement can be broken down into four diferent arguments: (1) 
the literal level of the story deals with mice, (2) the function of these mice 
is allegorical; they stand for something else, (3) these mice stand for the 
Jewish people, and (4) arguments 1–3 do not need to be expressly stated, 
as they are obvious. Te interpretative dispute, if at all, is over Brod’s third 
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argument.6 However, I would like to question Brod’s very frst point— 
which is typically taken for granted—that the literal level of the story deals 
with mice. Te examination of the nature of the story’s characters on the 
literal level is preceded by the discussion of mice in Kafka’s writings. 
Kafka’s Mice between Allegorical and Mimetic Poles 
Mice appear in two short texts by Kafka that were not published in his life-
time. One was written in 1920 and published posthumously by Max Brod, 
who gave it the title “A Little Fable” (“Kleine Fabel”). Te second text was 
probably written in 1918 and is included in Te Blue Octavo Notebooks
(Die Acht Oktavhefte). 
Kafka’s Allegorical Mouse 
“Alas,” said the mouse, “the whole world is growing smaller every 
day. At the beginning it was so big that I was afraid, I kept running 
and running, and I was glad when I saw walls far away to the right 
and left, but these long walls have narrowed so quickly that I am in 
the last chamber already, and there in the corner stands the trap that 
I must run into.” “You only need to change your direction,” said the 
cat, and ate it up. (CS, 445) 
It is important to note that the title for this piece, “A Little Fable,” alleg-
edly indicating the genre it belongs to, was given by Max Brod, and not by 
Kafka, hence it does not indicate that Kafka indeed considered it a fable. 
Roy Pascal argues that Brod’s title is “appropriate enough,” as speaking 
animals, as appear in this text, invoke the association of fables, linking it 
directly to the fable tradition and leading the reader to interpret the text 
allegorically. Te mouse and the cat symbolize human qualities, stand for 
weakness and power, the hunted and the hunter, victim and victimizer, 
and so on. Nonetheless, Pascal also points out that the story does not yield 
a moral, as unlike traditional fables that purport to teach us how to behave, 
Kafka’s fable ofers no illumination; it only confounds us more.7 
Interestingly, this short piece by Kafka not only deliberately mimics 
the style of Aesop’s animal fables, but is, in fact, remarkably similar to a 
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A stag, oppressed by thirst, came to a spring to drink. After having a 
drink, he saw the shadowy fgure of himself in the water. He much 
admired his fne antlers, their grandeur and extent. But he was dis-
contented with his legs, which he thought looked thin and feeble. 
He remained there deep in reverie when suddenly a lion sprang out 
at him and chased him. Te stag fed rapidly and ran a great dis-
tance, for the stag’s advantage is his legs, whereas a lion’s is his heart. 
As long as they were in open ground, the stag easily outdistanced 
the lion. But they entered a wooded area and the stag’s antlers be-
came entangled in the branches, bringing him to a halt so that he 
was caught by the lion. As he was on the point of death, the stag 
said: “How unfortunate I am! My feet, which I had denigrated, 
could have saved me, whereas my antlers, on which I prided myself, 
have caused my death!” 
And thus, in dangerous situations it is often the friends who we sus-
pect who save us, while those on whom we rely betray us.8 
Te two texts certainly share a similar structure; at the center of both is 
a nonhuman animal feeing from the danger of open spaces into a worse 
peril in a closed area; out of the frying pan into the fre. But whereas the 
Aesopian text implies that the stag has made a tactical error that could be 
avoided, Kafka’s version suggests an inevitable, existential predicament. 
Scholars difer on the rhetorical efect of the fable. It is unanimously 
agreed that fables teach us something, but opinions are divided regard-
ing the nature of their lesson.9 Many defne fable as a didactic story, de-
signed to instruct the reader how to behave and how to avoid mistakes and 
pitfalls,10 while others are less rigorous, suggesting it embodies an ethical 
truth, which is open to interpretations and not necessarily limited to a 
concrete didactic moral.11 As presented in the introductory section, Kafka’s 
work, which is never didactic, is regarded as an “open parable” or “slid-
ing paradox.” Nevertheless, although “A Little Fable” does not have an 
explicit moral, the text does seem to convey a certain message or an ethical 
truth. Depicting a tiny, feeble, powerless creature trapped in a hopeless 
situation—whichever route is chosen, she is bound to get hurt—this text 
refects an ethical truth, a very Kafkaesque Weltanschauung. In a letter to 
Milena on July 18, 1920, Kafka makes similar use of a mouse, describing 
himself as one: “I really am just the mouse in the ‘big house’ which is al-
lowed to run freely across the carpet once a year” (LM, 92). In both “A 






Little Fable” and the letter to Milena mice stand for the ultimate weak and 
vulnerable creature. 
Te description of the mouse in “A Little Fable” as a weak, helpless, 
constantly threatened creature is, at least in part, a realistic depiction that 
fts mice in general. In this respect, the text does not deviate from the 
fable norm. Te stereotypical role of mice in fables, then, is rooted in 
some basic characteristics of mice in the real world—being small, weak 
animals, always fearing for their lives. Tus, for example, in Aesop’s “Te 
Lion and the Mouse Who Returned a Kindness,” a lion captures a mouse, 
who pleads to be released, and later gnaws the rope snare where the lion is 
caught. Fables use the animals’ typical characteristics, not in reference to 
real mice, but to highlight the weakness of humans. Te small, frail crea-
ture in the fable symbolizes the weaker members in human society, as the 
moral tagged to the fable makes clear: “Trough the changes of fortune, 
the strong can come to depend on the weak.”12 
Characterization of nonhuman animals in fables does not necessarily 
confict with their real nature. Nonhuman animals in fables, as well as in 
other allegorical texts, are considerably anthropomorphized, yet minimal 
adherence to realistic models is still required; their size, anatomy, and func-
tion in the ecological system are maintained, even in fables. Tus, the lion 
in fables is always a predator, the hare is a fast runner, the turtle is slow, 
the stork has a long beak, and so on. In “A Little Fable,” Kafka uses the 
conventions of fables, in which the anthropomorphized speaking animals 
still possess some of the authentic characteristics of their species. 
Moreover, “A Little Fable” conforms with the defnition of fable—“a 
brief tale that conveys a moral lesson, usually by giving human speech 
and manners to animals and inanimate things”13—not only in content 
(bestowing human speech and manners on nonhuman animals) and ef-
fect (conveying a kind of moral lesson), but also in extent (a brief tale). 
Te terseness and brevity of Kafka’s “A Little Fable” does not evoke much 
empathy for the mouse; the laconic description of the mouse’s death, for 
example, is very concise: “said the cat and devoured it.” Nor is the mouse 
characterized as an individual or as representative of a distinct group. Te 
description does not encourage the reader to see the mouse as signifcant, 
but only as a means of conveying a message. All this facilitates the conver-
sion into a human object on the correlative level. Being “a brief tale that 
conveys a moral lesson, usually by according human speech and manners 
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of talking animals, “A Little Fable”—regardless of its title—is a fable par 
excellence. 
Kafka’s Mimetic Mouse 
When the little mouse, which was loved as none other was in the 
mouse-world, got into a trap one night and with a shrill scream 
forfeited its life for the sight of the bacon, all the mice in the district, 
in their holes, were overcome by trembling and shaking; with eyes 
blinking uncontrollably they gazed at each other one by one, while 
their tails scraped the ground busily and senselessly. Ten they came 
out, hesitantly, pushing one another, all drawn towards the scene of 
death. Tere it lay, the dear little mouse, its neck caught in the deadly 
iron, the little pink legs drawn up, and now stif the feeble body that 
would so well have deserved a scrap of bacon. Te parents stood 
beside it and eyed their child’s remains. (BON, 69–70) 
Tis untitled text describes a realistic event: a mouse caught in a mouse-
trap while other mice stand around looking at the corpse. Unlike most 
of the nonhuman animals in Kafka’s stories, this mouse does not possess 
human characteristics. And yet he evokes empathy, unlike Kafka’s other 
non-anthropomorphized animals, such as the protagonists of “Te Tiger” 
(“Der Tiger”), “Te Vulture,” “Leopards in the Temple,” and “A Cross-
breed.” Compared to the matter-of-fact report of the demise of the mouse 
in “A Little Fable,” the mouse here dies with great agony and drama. Tis 
is an unusual passage in Kafka’s oeuvre—one of the few cases of animal 
representation that is both realistic and empathetic. 
An empathetic, yet realistic, representation of mice is rare not only in 
Kafka’s work, but in literature overall. Fictional mice seem to be, for the 
most part, anthropomorphized and allegorized. Tus, the most famous 
mouse in Western culture, Walt Disney’s Mickey Mouse, walks on his hind 
legs, wears clothes, speaks human language, and even owns a dog. Unlike 
pets, with whom humans are familiar, but also unlike wildlife animals, who 
intrigue us and evoke reverence, mice are considered vermin. In fact, Kafka 
himself had a musophobia, as he described in a letter to Felix Weltsch in 
November 1917: “My health is quite good, assuming that mouse phobia 
does not carry me of before tuberculosis does” (LFFE, 169). In December 
1917 he similarly wrote to Max Brod: 














My reaction towards the mice is one of sheer terror. To analyze its 
source would be the task of the psychoanalyst, which I am not. Cer-
tainly, this fear, like an insect phobia, is connected with the unex-
pected, uninvited, inescapable, more or less silent, persistent, secret 
aims of these creatures, with the sense that they have riddled the 
surrounding walls through and through with their tunnels and are 
lurking within, that the night is theirs, that because of their noctur-
nal existence and their tininess they are so remote from us and thus 
outside our power. (LFFE, 174) 
In the wide spectrum between texts representing nonhuman animals re-
alistically and texts in which they serve as a mere metaphor for human con-
tent, Kafka’s untitled mouse tale and “A Little Fable” are at opposite poles.
Although the content of “A Little Fable” is reminiscent of the text about the
mouse in Te Blue Octavo Notebooks—in both cases the mouse is a feeble
creature, who gets killed—the narrative in Te Blue Octavo Notebooks refers
to the subjectivity of mice and fosters empathy for them, while “A Little
Fable” is allegorical, reducing mice and their experience to intrahuman con-
tent. It is against the background of these two polarized representations of
mice, which span the range between the mimetic and the allegorical, that I
propose to examine “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People.” 
The Mouse People between Mice and People 
Various studies have described “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” 
as a fable,14 although this story certainly does not match the common def-
nition of a fable, as it is neither a brief tale nor ended with a moral. In fact, 
this text is substantially diferent not only from classical fables, such as Ae-
sop’s, but also from Kafka’s own fable, “A Little Fable.” Unlike the laconic 
“A Little Fable,” which presents a distinct, easily decipherable theme, “Jo-
sefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” cannot be reduced to one theme. 
Furthermore, the relatively large scope of the text—albeit marked by pau-
city of detail—is a result of the attempt to create a complex world, with 
a purpose and focus of its own, which is not to be found in fables. On 
the other hand, this is certainly not a story about real mice—like the one 
in Kafka’s Octavo Notebooks—since the mice (or putative mice) here are 
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mice. Although it has been widely taken for granted, I examine the story 
closely, asking whether the fgures in “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse 
People,” on the very literal level, are indeed mice. 
Masking Species Identity 
As some interpreters have recognized, there is no direct statement in the 
story to clearly indicate that the characters are, in fact, mice.15 Tis is in 
contrast to the specifc indication of the characters’ biological species in 
“Report to an Academy,” “Jackals and Arabs,” “Researches of a Dog,” and 
“A Crossbreed,” as well as many other shorter works, such as “A Little 
Fable,” “Te Vulture,” “Te Tiger,” and “Leopards in the Temple.” Indeed, 
the biological species of the nonhuman animal protagonists are not always 
mentioned in Kafka’s oeuvre; in “Te Metamorphosis,” as I noted in the 
frst chapter, there is no specifc biological reference to describe Gregor 
Samsa’s incarnation, only the generic defnition of “vermin” (Ungeziefer). 
Similarly, the species of nonhuman animal at the center of “In Our Syn-
agogue” is also unspecifed, but—as discussed in the ffth chapter—the 
creature is “about the size of a marten” (PP, 49). In both cases it is expressly 
indicated that the fgures are not human. “Te Burrow” casts doubt on 
whether or not the protagonist is a human, as shown in the previous chap-
ter, but the ambiguity exists only in the frst part of the story. Te reader, 
without being explicitly told, soon fgures out that the burrower is indeed 
a nonhuman creature, as the cumulative details clear the fog of this un-
certainty. 
“Josefne, the Singer,” on the other hand, contains indications that the 
creatures might be mice, yet they are all inconclusive. In fact, apart from 
the title, the word “mouse” appears only once, and it is used metaphori-
cally. It appears in conjunction with describing the silence of her audience: 
“But her audience does not squeak, we are as quiet as mice” (KSS, 96). 
Te mice in “quiet as mice,” or mäuschenstill (E, 521) which Kafka uses 
in the original German, function only as a fgure of speech, without being 
present, just as saying “dog tired” does not involve any concrete dog. Te 
reference to mice here, then, is neutral—it does not support nor does it 
undermine the hypothesis that the protagonists of the story are mice. 
Besides this one fgurative reference, the only place mice appear is, as 
aforesaid, in the title “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People,” where it is 







qualifed by “or.” Te word “or” that separates the two parts, “Josefne, the 
Singer” and “the Mouse People,” can be understood as inclusive, suggest-
ing that the two parts are alternative depictions of the story, but also as an 
exclusive “or,” suggesting that only one of the two alternatives is relevant, 
as if the title ended with a question mark. It is important to recognize 
that unlike Kafka’s stories that were published posthumously, this title was 
given by Kafka himself, for the story was published during his lifetime. 
However, interestingly, Kafka added the second part of the title, “or the 
Mouse People,” only when preparing the story for publication in his story 
collection.16 Max Brod reports fnding a note in which Kafka states that 
“sub-titles like this are not very pretty, it is true, but in this case, it has 
perhaps a special meaning. It has a kind of balance.”17 
Te signifcance of this unusual title has been widely contemplated. Is 
there negative tension in the phrase (namely, an exclusive “or”), as Debo-
rah Harter maintains, or does it suggest not contrast but rather coexistence 
(in other words, an inclusive “or”), as Heinz Politzer claims? Clayton Koelb 
argues that the nature of the “or” is indeterminable, and Jay Geller stresses 
that the force of the title is directed at maintaining both form and content 
as undecidable.18 In any event, it would seem that the use of “or” lessens 
the concrete reference of the phrase “mouse people,” as it is only one op-
tion, and not even the frst (the story is not called “Te Mouse People or 
Josefne, the Singer”). Moreover, a title is fundamentally extraneous to the 
story and can also be perceived as a metaphor, as in John Steinbeck’s Of
Mice and Men, a novella that does not portray mice. 
It seems that the only evident nonhuman element in “Josefne, the 
Singer or the Mouse People” is the fur (Pelz) that the characters have: 
“many who are present do not bother to look up, instead of pressing their 
faces into the fur of their neighbors” (KSS, 100). Nevertheless, the mean-
ing of the word “fur” here is ambiguous. It can be used literally, referring 
to the natural body hair coverage of various mammals, but it can also serve 
as a synecdoche for a coat, or other pieces of clothing, made of the natural 
skin and body hair of dead mammals. Te reference to the neighbors’ fur 
may indicate that these neighbors are nonhuman, as they have natural fur, 
but it may also refer to a fur coat that these neighbors wear, and in this case 
it means that they are human. 
Kafka often uses the word “fur” as a synecdoche for a fur coat. Tis is a 
common linguistic usage, in both German and English, as in Leopold von 
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is often lost in Kafka’s translations to English. For example, at the begin-
ning of “A Country Doctor,” the narrator describes himself as bundled up 
in fur, “in den Pelz gepackt” (E, 253). Likewise, in the story “Te Married 
Couple” (“Das Ehepaar”) we are told that a man was standing in his fur: 
“Der alte N. . . . stand noch, so wie er eben gekommen war, in seinem Pelz 
da” (E, 452). And in “A Fratricide” a woman in an open fur collapses on 
top of her dead husband, and the fur spreads over the two of them: “Der 
Pelz öfnet sich, sie stürzt über Wese” (E, 263).19 In other words, the use of 
“fur” in itself, as well as the context in which it appears in the story, can-
not determine whether the fgures who wear fur are their original owners. 
Te descriptions of the community are equally ambiguous. Te word 
Volk, which appears in the original German title and throughout the 
story, appears in the English translation as “people.” Yet, the word Volk, 
unlike the word “people,” may actually refer to various nonhuman spe-
cies, whose social structures is reminiscent of human societies, such as ants 
(Ameisenvolk), termites (Termitenvolk), and bees (Bienenvolk). However, 
the term Mäusevolk is not used in German; when Kafka refers to the com-
munity of mice in his Octavo Notebooks, he uses the phrase “mouse-world” 
(Mäusewelt), and not “mouse-folk” (Mäusevolk). 
While referring to the community in the story as “people” is common 
in the English translations, Kafka circumvents using exclusively human 
terms (Menschen or Leute) and typically uses the ambiguous word Volk. In 
few cases throughout “Josefne, the Singer” Kafka uses other polysemous 
terms to refer to the community, such as Geschlecht (E, 518), translated as 
gender, race, or lineage, and Stamm (E, 528), a word meaning tribe that 
can also be used in a zoological context, referring to phylum. In fact, the 
word Leute (people) appears only once throughout the story, as part of the 
idiomatic construct gewöhnliche Leute (E, 531), which means common or 
ordinary people: “But it is a far cry from this to Josefne’s claim that she 
gives us new strength, etc., etc. Ordinary people think so, at least, not Jose-
fne’s fatterers” (E, 103). Te usage of the word Leute within this idiomatic 
construct and particular context, wherein the term does not actually refer 
to the community but is used to stand in opposition to Josefne, allows 
Kafka to retain the biological ambiguity. 
Additionally, we are told that when Josefne faces a small audience, “she 
grows angry, then she stamps her feet, curses in the most unmaidenly man-
ner; indeed, she even bites” (KSS, 98). Describing Josefne’s behavior as 
unmaidenly (unmädchenhaft) bolsters the hypothesis that she is a human 








being, since one does not expect a mouse to behave maidenly. However, 
the word “unmaidenly” can be construed as a reference to Josefne’s gender, 
and not to her biological afliation. In other words, Josefne’s behavior is 
unbecoming for a female. Following the description of her behavior as un-
maidenly, we are told that she even bites, which is typical of a nonhuman, 
but on the other hand, her biting is described as inappropriate, so it does 
not clearly indicate whether Josefne is human or nonhuman. As presented 
in the previous chapter, biting human beings appear in Kafka’s novel Te 
Trial as well as in his short story “A Country Doctor.” 
In another instance the narrator indicates that “if one individual stood 
in the place of the people here, you could imagine that all this time he had 
given in to Josefne with a continually burning desire to stop once and for 
all being so indulgent” (KSS, 105). In the original German, this individual 
is defned as a man (Mann). 20 Again, the use of “man” and “human” seems 
to reinforce the hypothesis that this is a story about a human community, 
not a mouse community, even concerning the literal level of the story. And 
yet it should be noted that the sentence does not refer to any concrete 
person—the grammatical mode of the phrase is an unreal condition (if 
one individual stood . . .), which is merely hypothetical, and the use of the 
conjunctive weakens the efect of the statement. 
Te narrator also characterizes the efort made by this individual as 
“superhuman” (übermenschlich). Yet this equivocal description still leaves 
the reader guessing. In “Researches of a Dog,” as discussed in the fourth 
chapter, human terms and expressions are converted to nonhuman terms 
and images, due to the canine perspective of the narrator. For example, the 
expression ein Mensch unter Menschen—“a man among men”—becomes 
“ein Hund unter Hunden”—“a dog among dogs.” In contrast, as shown 
above, it might be the case that in “Josefne, the Singer,” the narrator dis-
cussing nonhuman animals (mice, in this case) leaves human expressions 
as they are, without converting them into parallel animal terms. 
In addition to descriptions of Josefne’s community and audience, vari-
ous references to her body, which Jay Geller rightly characterizes as “an-
thropomorphic anomalies,”21 also raise questions regarding her biological 
nature. Human body parts, which mice do not have —such as arms (Ar-
men), a neck (Hals), and lips (Lippen) —are ascribed to Josefne. Moreover, 
her arms are described as “not extended as usual, but hanging lifelessly at 
the sides” (KSS, 107). Tus, even if we consider arms, a neck, and lips as 
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body, the description of these arms hanging lifelessly prevent us from re-
garding the arms as forelegs, as it indicates standing on two legs. 
Elias Canetti quotes a letter from Kafka to Felice where he uses the
phrase “the terror of standing upright.”22 For Kafka, as for the characters
in Orwell’s Animal Farm, standing upright signals the power of humans
over other animals. In Kafka’s poetics, the identifcation of human beings
with standing upright and of other animals on all fours is more essential
than any other trait, including the ability/inability to speak. In view of
this, the description of Josefne as standing upright reinforces the hypoth-
esis the Josefne is wholly human—not a humanized mouse, but simply
a human being. 
Te voice that the mice in the story produce is described as pfeifen, 
which means “piping” or “whistling” and not piepsen (squeaking), as the 
voice of mice is commonly portrayed. Yet piping is not singing or chanting 
either—it is not an applicable term for human singing. Like other terms 
in the story, the term pfeifen maintains the ambiguity about the identity 
of Josefne and the rest of the characters in the story. Unlike Kafka’s other 
animal stories, where there is a certain confusion of human and animal 
characteristics (such as using the word “hands” to describe the paws of the 
animal in “Te Burrow”), in “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” 
the human content is not the exception that proves the rule, but the rule 
itself. Apart from the fur, which could also be a reference to a fur coat, the 
characters are not endowed with a mousy anatomy, rather with a human 
one. And yet none of these indications is specifc and convincing enough 
to entirely cancel out the framework of the original reading (namely, the 
mice story), which has been formed at the outset of the reading, based on 
the title, as well as preliminary acquaintance with Kafka’s writings, where 
nonhuman animals abound. 
Te fact that the fgures in “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse Peo-
ple” are not endowed with even basic characteristics of real mice, seems 
to mark this story as allegory. But although nonhuman animals in fables 
and allegories are signifcantly anthropomorphized, there must be at least 
some correlation between the animals and their literary representation. 
As shown earlier in the discussion of “A Little Fable,” the prevailing con-
vention in allegorical animal stories, including animal fables, is that al-
though the nonhuman animals are anthropomorphized (in terms of their 
cognitive abilities, behavior, volitions, etc.), their basic biological features 
remain those of their species. Tis is despite the fact that the literal level 








in animal allegories might be not important per se, since on the thematic 
level of the story the nonhuman animals are exchanged for humans. Tis 
conventional structure does not exist in “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse 
People,” since already on the very literal level the species identity of the 
characters is nebulous. Tis obfuscation is a result of employing human 
body parts and pronouns on the one hand, and a lack of explicit indica-
tions as to the animal nature of the characters on the other. Tus, the literal 
level of the story is unresolved; consequently, it calls for closer examination 
of its details. 
If the context of the story is human society on the literal level as well, 
then the title is metaphoric, and the phrase “mouse people” refers to a 
human community. As mentioned before, literary mice—including Kaf-
ka’s representation of mice—are emblematic of weak beings, perennially 
threatened by danger. Terefore, the title should be metaphorically inter-
preted to indicate that the story is about a frail community in constant 
peril. Te narrator’s comment underlines this aspect: “Our enemies too 
numerous, the dangers that confront us on all sides are incalculable—we 
cannot shelter our children from the struggle for existence, and if we did 
so, it would mean their premature end” (KSS, 101). 
Nevertheless, “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” difers from 
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men, in which the fact that the title is metaphoric 
and the text does not deal with mice at all is evident to the reader from 
the very start and is never questioned. In Kafka’s story the premise sug-
gested by the title, that the story revolves around a community of mice, is 
not placed in doubt in the initial stages and never unequivocally denied 
throughout the story. Te uncertainty arises, if at all, later in the story 
and—as I argued earlier—most commentators have not raised doubts 
about that premise at all. 
Performing Species Fluidity 
Te ambiguous nature of the story’s characters can be illustrated by the 
well-known duck/rabbit illusion, in which an ambiguous image can be 
seen as a head of either a duck or a rabbit. Tis image was frst utilized by 
the psychologist Joseph Jastrow as a perceptual experience, indicating that 
perception is not merely a product of the stimulus, but fundamentally 
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interpretative component; we become aware that we are not simply see-
ing something, but rather seeing as something, as Wittgenstein notes in 
his Philosophical Investigations.24 Ernst Gombrich applies the image of the 
duck-rabbit to the interpretation of artworks: 
We can see the picture as either a rabbit or a duck. It is easy to
discover both readings. It is less easy to describe what happens
when we switch from one interpretation to the other. Clearly we
do not have the illusion that we are confronted with a “real” duck
or rabbit. Te shape on the paper resembles neither animal very
closely. And yet there is no doubt that the shape transforms itself
in some subtle way when the duck’s beak becomes the rabbit’s ears
and brings an otherwise neglected spot into prominence as the
rabbit’s mouth. I say “neglected,” but does it enter our experience
at all when we switch back to reading “duck”? To answer this ques-
tion, we are compelled to look for what is “really there,” to see the
shape apart from its interpretation, and this, we soon discover, is
not really possible.25 
Kafka’s Josefne can be regarded as a woman/mouse, the textual equiv-
alent of the visually ambiguous image of the duck/rabbit. We can read 
her and the other characters in the story as either human beings or mice, 
or—more precisely—either as humanlike mice or mice-like humans. In 
the previous chapter I presented the ambiguity in the protagonist of “Te 
Burrow,” whose species cannot be identifed by the reader. Yet gradually, 







throughout the story, it turns out that the burrower is a humanized animal 
and not an animalized human. 
In “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” such ambiguity is not 
merely temporary, as a constant tension persists until the very end of the 
narrative, and the human/mouse enigma is not resolved. Juxtaposing the 
details that support seeing the characters are nonhuman animals with ele-
ments in support of perceiving them as humans, does not allow a conclu-
sive decision between the two hypotheses: does the diegesis deal with a 
community of mice or rather of humans? Te ambiguity demands focus-
ing on the literal level of the story with a meticulous examination of all 
details, which is not required in typical allegorical texts. 
Te story does not provide the answer to the question “Who is Josefne 
and who is her audience?” which is prior to the question “What do they 
stand for?” It only ofers constant vacillation between the two readings. In 
light of this reading, one can understand the title diferently—the title, 
with its qualifying “or,” creates tension, not between the mouse singer and 
the mouse people within the diegesis, but between the two rival hypoth-
eses in the act of reading; whether the characters are humanized animals 
or animalized humans. 
In How to Do Tings with Words (1962) John Austin distinguishes be-
tween constative utterances, which are descriptive and either true or false, 
and performative utterances that are not descriptive but rather perform 
a certain kind of action.26 Te act performed when a “performative ut-
terance” is issued belongs to what Austin calls “speech acts.” John Searle 
has extended Austin’s notion of speech acts, introducing a taxonomy of 
fve diferent speech act categories: assertive, directive, commissive, expres-
sive, and declarative.27 To the long list of declarative speech acts, which 
constitute—and not merely refect—reality (such as naming, appointing, 
and fring) Judith Butler adds gendering, arguing that the doctor’s state-
ment “It’s a boy” or “It’s a girl” when a baby is born is an act that con-
structs, through the declaration, the sex gender of the child.28 
Unlike the doctor’s act of gendering by declaring, “It’s a boy” or “It’s a 
girl,” by not declaring, “Tese are mice” or “Tese are people,” Kafka in 
“Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” refrains from the speech act 
of “speciesing.” Moreover, Kafka refrains not only from telling whether 
the characters are mice or humans, but also from showing it to the reader, 
as the consistently ambiguous description does not allow the reader to 
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utterances reject singularity and a static fxity of meaning in general, and 
of species identity in particular. 
Tis device, which organizes “Josefne, the Singer or the Mouse People” 
entirely, is defned in the literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin as hybridiza-
tion. Bakhtin sees hybridization, the intentional fusing of two utterances 
that are socially distinguished from one another into a single utterance, as 
the peculiar mark of artistic texts, and stresses that their double-voicedness 
is not meant to be settled.29 Te hybridization governed in Kafka’s ambigu-
ous text takes place also in the literal sense, as the two conficted meanings 
brought together here belong to diferent biological species—mice and 
humans. 
In Kafka’s poetics, boundaries that are seemingly absolute and rigid are 
quite often shaken and undermined. Tus, for example, in “Te Married 
Couple” the borderline between life and death is obliterated when a corpse 
comes to life, and in the story “A Guest of the Dead” (“Bei den Toten zu 
Gast”) the narrator pays a visit to the realm of the deceased. Similarly, in 
“Te Hunter Gracchus” (“Der Jäger Gracchus”) the hunter is caught in the 
limbo between life and death, after the mythic death ship that was to take 
him to the realm of the dead went of course, and as a result he is destined 
to sail eternally between the living and the dead. Te boundary between a 
living creature and an inanimate object is also problematized in Kafka’s fc-
tion, where inanimate objects behave like animate creatures. For example, 
“Te Cares of a Family Man” (“Die Sorge des Hausvaters”) tells the story 
of Odradek, a spool of thread capable of walking and talking.30 In the same 
vein, “Te Bridge” (“Die Brücke”) is narrated by a conscious bridge, who 
aches when people walk on it, and also has organs, such as feet, hands, 
and teeth. Similarly, in “Te Bucket Rider” (“Der Kübelreiter”) a bucket 
“behaves” like a riding animal, and in “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor” two 
celluloid balls act as if they are little animals. 
Te human-animal divide is often presented as fuid in Kafka’s sto-
ries, an efect that has been extensively discussed throughout this book.
Kafka’s oeuvre is replete with characters that are partly nonhuman, partly
human. Some of them have undergone metamorphoses, such as Gregor
Samsa in “Te Metamorphosis” and Dr. Bucephalus in “Te New Law-
yer,” or changed their species identity, like Red Peter in “Report to an
Academy.” Other protagonists that have a dubious status between non-
human and human are humanimal hybrids, like the sirens in “Te Si-
lence of the Sirens.” 





Like all these fgures, the characters of “Josefne, the Singer or the 
Mouse People,” Kafka’s swan song, challenge boundaries by being of un-
certain status: human or animal. Yet the uniqueness of these characters is 
in the fact that the doubt concerning their biological nature derives from 
the inability of the reader to decide, based on the text details, whether 
they are human or mice. Comparable to the duck/rabbit, Josefne and the 
other characters in the story are human/mice, for as much as some details 
in their representation support the contention that they are mice, others 
indicate they are humans. 
Unlike the ontological humanimality commonly found in Kafka’s lit-
erary corpus, another kind of humanimality, a performative one, is pre-
sented in his last story. Tis distinctive form of humanimality does not 
emanate from the dual nature of the protagonist in the diegetic universe, 
but is instead the result of ambiguous representation, which does not al-
low the reader to fx the biological nature of the creature. However, both 
ontological and performative humanimality have a similar efect; both blur 





Te Kafkaesque Humanimal Machine 
An ancient Indian parable tells of six blind men who set out to determine 
what an elephant is like, each feeling a diferent part of the animal. Te 
frst man, who held the trunk, stated: “An elephant is like a snake.” Te 
second grabbed the tusk and thought an elephant is like a spear. “It’s like 
a fan,” announced the third, who felt the elephant’s ear. Te man who 
hugged a leg said: “An elephant is like a pillar.” Touching the side uttered, 
the ffth man believed an elephant is like a wall, and the sixth, who grasped 
the tail, declared, “An elephant is like a rope.” 
Tis tale, which has provided insights into a wide range of topics, came 
to mind when refecting on Kafka’s poetics, and his zoopoetics in par-
ticular. Whereas this image can be applied to any intricate work of art, 
it essentially illustrates the writing of Kafka, due to its open and elusive 
nature. Like the blind men, each critic typically focuses on one aspect 
of Kafka’s oeuvre, and hence is inherently limited by the failure to ac-
count for other aspects and develop a coherent idea of the whole. Te 
psychoanalytic critic maintains that Kafka’s writing embodies the Oedipal 
complex; for the Marxist it faithfully mirrors the socio-historical condi-
tion, whereas through a Jewish prism it revolves around Jewish identity or 
theology. Tis book does not undertake to provide an exhaustive account 
of Kafka’s canon, not even of his animal stories, recognizing that any in-
terpretive description thereof is a priori fragmentary. My humble attempt 
is thus to join the other blind observers, groping an area in the elephant’s 
body that has not been comprehensively explored. Te zoopoetic analysis 
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does not contradict the allegorical interpretations, inasmuch as they do 
not rule each other out, but instead complements them. Te zoopoetic 
reading of Kafka’s animal stories is, however, diferent from allegorical in-
terpretations. Indeed, like the psychoanalytic, Marxist, and Jewish inter-
pretations, it also examines the nonhuman animals on the literal level of 
the texts through the lens of, and in dialogue with, theoretical and critical 
frameworks. Yet, unlike other extradiegetic frameworks, the zoopoetic one 
does not reduce the nonhuman animals to intrahuman issues by virtue of 
allegorization. Alternatively, it transgresses the human/animal binary and 
undermines anthroparchy. 
Kafka’s frst two animal stories, “Te Metamorphosis” (1915) and “A 
Report to an Academy” (1917), deal with species transition. In the frst 
one, a man turns into a nonhuman animal, and in the second, a nonhu-
man animal turns into a man. Unlike traditional metamorphosis narra-
tives, the rift at the center of Kafka’s cross-species transformation tales is 
not between the animal body and the human psyche, but is rather within 
the psyche itself, having animal and human elements alike, which engage 
in a constant dynamic. Kafka’s humanimal trans-species protagonists, the 
human-vermin Gregor Samsa and the ape-human Red Peter, are both lim-
inal beings, situated on the threshold between humanity and animality, 
and thereby transgress the human/animal binary. By portraying the human 
fgures in these stories as inhumane, Kafka’s narratives of species transi-
tion dismiss both the perception of human existence as superior to animal 
existence and the correlation between being human and being humane. 
Both stories also reject the essentialist dimension of the contradistinction 
between human and other animals by depicting human and animal iden-
tity as a social construct rather than a pure biological actuality. Whereas 
in “Te Metamorphosis” species identity is largely socially constructed, as 
it appears alongside the corporal component, in “A Report on an Acad-
emy” the physical aspect of the species transition is eliminated, and species 
identity is radically redefned as a mere social construction. In both cases, 
species identity is generated through biopolitical practices of segregation, 
exclusion, confnement, and violence. 
Te canine protagonists of Kafka’s next two animal stories, “Jackals 
and Arabs” (1917) and “Researches of a Dog” (1922), unlike his earlier 
nonhuman protagonists, were born and raised and lived all their lives as 






foremost by their verbal ability to tell their stories (to the narrator, in the 
case of the jackals, or directly to the reader in Kafka’s dog tale), an ability 
that nonhuman animals in the real universe essentially lack. Both the jack-
als and the dog refect on interspecies power relations, and the perspectival 
shift subverts anthropocentric presumptions. Te jackals in “Jackals and 
Arabs” challenge anthroparchy—human dominion over other animals—
aspiring to end the slaughter of animals for food, as well as to reverse the 
humanimal power relations, aspirations that are doomed to fail. Such a 
reversal in the humanimal power dynamics has allegedly taken place in the 
diegetic universe of “Researches of a Dog,” wherein dogs seem to be the 
dominant species, due to their technological and intellectual superiority. 
Yet the reader quickly becomes aware that these power relations mirror 
the real world, while only the canine narrator does not recognize (or does 
not wish to acknowledge) this. While it turns out that the power relations 
between humans and dogs are not inverted, the dog’s caninocentrism criti-
cally refects anthropocentrism and thereby undermines it. 
Kafka’s last two animal stories, “Te Burrow” (1923–4) and “Josefne, 
the Singer or the Mouse People” (1924), difer from their predecessors, 
since they do not posit a confict between humans and animals. “Te Bur-
row” features one sole character, who is also the narrator, and in “Josefne, 
the Singer or the Mouse People,” the entire cast of characters is of the same 
species. Nevertheless, both stories cast doubt on the nature of this species. 
Unlike Kafka’s frst two animal stories, where the protagonist’s humanimal 
hybridity is ontological (i.e., exists in the fctional world), his last two 
animal tales produce a performative humanimal hybridity, resulting from 
the reader’s inherent inability to discern whether the characters are human 
or nonhuman animals. In “Te Burrow” this performative humanimal hy-
bridity occurs only in the frst stages of reading, whereas in “Josefne, the 
Singer or the Mouse People” this unique case of hybridity sustains until 
the fnal word. 
Against the humanization of the nonhuman characters, Kafka also 
presents a complementary efect of animalizing his human fgures. In the 
frst three animal stories I have examined in depth, “Te Metamorphosis,” 
“A Report to an Academy,” and “Jackals and Arabs,” Kafka posits the non-
human characters (the vermin, the ape, and the jackals, respectively) as 
victims that arouse empathy, whereas the human fgures are portrayed in a 
negative light. Morally speaking, the nonhuman animals are humane crea-
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tures, whereas the humans, in their immoral behavior, are bestial. Kafka’s 
bestial humans are not merely metaphorical but are expressed physically as 
well. For example, in “A Country Doctor” the groom behaves in a beastly 
way, biting the servant girl; in “A Page from an Old Document” the bar-
baric nomads feed on a live ox, and in “Building the Great Wall of China” 
people are described as wild creatures. 
Te animalization of humans and the humanization of other animals 
also ensues in Kafka’s poetics through the subversive use of language. Ger-
man, more than English, introduces a terminological diferentiation be-
tween the human world and the terrain of other animals. Kafka, however, 
consistently dismisses this separation by choosing words whose German 
denotation is strictly animalistic (such as fressen, which refers to nonhu-
man eating activity) when dealing with humans, and German words that 
are restricted to human context (such as Mord, which means “murder,” the 
killing of a human by a human), when referring to nonhuman animals. 
By transgressing the conventional use of language Kafka destabilizes the 
oversimplifed polarity between the human and the nonhuman world. 
Despite the rich diversity of thematic and formative elements in his 
various stories, one central motif runs throughout Kafka’s entire corpus: 
species boundaries are mutable and obscure, as Kafka radically disregards 
the barrier between humans and other animals. Kafka’s overarching zoopo-
etics, therefore, stands in opposition to the Agambenian conception of the 
anthropological machine. Whereas the anthropological machine repeat-
edly draws a line between humans and other animals, Kafka abolishes this 
line altogether. Fusing together human and nonhuman features, Kafka’s 
humanimal beings undermine the hegemonic contradistinction between 
humans and other animals. Using rhetorical, narratological, linguistic, and 
thematic means, Kafka complicates the nonhuman experience, the human 
experience, and the diferences between them. Tese diferences in experi-
ence, which are paradigmatically perceived as biologically unequivocal and 
sweeping value judgments, presented throughout his writings as subject to 
cultural construction. 
Constituting a model of species fuidity between the human and the 
nonhuman, Kafka’s zoopoetics undermines the stark barrier, installed 
by the anthropocentric hegemony, between human and other animals. 
Trough denying the animalistic elements in humans and disavowing 





ing compassion for them, the human-animal barrier has been designed to 
regularize both humanity and animality. Kafka’s zoopoetics is thus the an-
ticipated fctional manifestation of the critical zoopolitical theories evolved 
at the turn of the third millennium. Reading Kafka’s zoopoetics in dialogue 
with contemporary zoopolitical theories engenders a poetic-political post-
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mystifcation over Gulliver’s determination to hide his body from sight. See Arm-
strong 2008: 203. 
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22. Köhler 1957: 226. 
23. Hobbes 1996: 89. 
24. Derrida’s Te Beast and the Sovereign is particularly focused on this theme. 
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not thought necessary. When a pig with a rope round its middle is hoisted squealing 
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Kilcher and Detlef 2004: 61; Lippit 2010: 149; Lorenz 2007: 166; Norris 1985: 67; 
Sokel 1964: 383; Tiher 1990: 82. 
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Geller 2018: 135. 
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2010: 129; Lorenz 2007: 162. 
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56. Critchley 2002: 33. Critchley also remarks that unlike this pleasingly benign 
efect when nonhuman animals are humanized, “when the human becomes animal 
the efect is disgusting and if we laugh at all then it is what Beckett calls ‘the mirthless 
laugh,’ which laughs at that which is unhappy.” 
57. Aristotle 1996: 13. 
58. Aristotle 1997: 22. 
59. Bernhardt-House 2008: 159; Dell’Aversano 2010: 74; Gaard 1997: 115. 
60. Jagose 1996: 99. 
61. Lippit 2010: 150. Te nonverbal sailors can be compared to Kafka’s other ani-
malized human fgures, such as the nomads in “A Page from an Old Document” and 
in “Building the Great Wall of China,” which will be presented in the next chapter, as 
well as the groom in “A Country Doctor,” introduced in the ffth chapter. 
62. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 14. 
63. In “Te Metamorphosis” Gregor’s transformation to vermin is also not the only 
metamorphic event in the story; it is accompanied, as suggested in the previous chap-
ter, with Grete’s metamorphosis. However, Grete’s metamorphosis is not an cross-
species one, and hence species transition there is not bidirectional. 
64. Beicken 2011–12: 6; Lorenz 2007: 160; Snoek 2012: 11; Sokel 1964: 335. 
65. Fanon 2004: 5. 
66. Fanon 2008: 25. 
67. Fanon 2008: 75. 
68. Sokolowsky 1908: 17–21. 
69. Fanon 2008: 106. 
70. Lacan 1998: 99. 
71. Bhabha 1994: 122. 
72. Bhabha 1994: 172. 
73. Weil 2012: 6. 
74. Wittgenstein 2009: 235. 
75. Speaking animals are, in fact, not merely a thought experiment; experiments 
attempting to teach sign language to nonhuman primates were conducted in the 
1960s and 1970s, drawing increasing scholarly attention. See Radick 2007. 
76. Spivak 1988: 308. 
77. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 205. 
78. Lyotard 1988: 28. 
Chapter 3 
1. Fingerhut 1969: 103; Geller 2018: 170–78; Gilman 1995: 150–53; Geller 
2015; Hanssen 2012; Kilcher and Detlef 2004: 54–56; Kriesberg 2010: 42–48; Pas-
cal 1982: 194–96; Robertson 1985: 164; Rubinstein 1967: 14–17; Shumsky 2009; 
Spector 2000: 191–93; Tiher 1990: 81; Tismar 1975: 311–13. Like Kafka’s other 
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cal construction of human existence, the struggle of human beings against the laws of 
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3. Judd 2003: 117–29. 
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6. Dunayer 2001: 2. 
7. “Doch hat es noch niemals eine Mordgelegenheit ausgenutzt” (E, 320). 
8. Canetti 1988: 88. 
9. Nekula 2015: 54. 
10. Te original title of this story was actually “A Page from an Old Document 
from China” (“Ein altes Blatt aus China”), but in the fnal draft Kafka omitted this 
geographical reference, alluding to the invaders as nomads from the North. See Gray 
et al. 2005: 11. Te original title points to the close relationship between “A Page from 
an Old Document” and “Building the Great Wall of China” (“Beim Bau der Chine-
sischen Mauer”), where the people of the northern lands, from whom the inhabitants 
wish to be protected by the wall, are also portrayed animalistically. 
11. Canetti 1988: 89. 
12. In a letter to Milena, Kafka mentions that he weighs 55 kilograms, which is 
about 120 pounds, while he was six feet tall (LM, 126). Deleuze and Guattari describe 
Kafka as anorectic. See Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 30. Kafka wrote in his diary that 
his body “hasn’t the least bit of fat to engender a blessed warmth, to preserve an inner 
fre, no fat on which the spirit could occasionally nourish itself beyond its daily need 
without damage to the whole” (D, 124–25), and in a letter to his father he portrays 
himself as “skinny, weakly, slight . . . a little skeleton, unsteady” (LFBV, 19). 
13. Norris 1985: 116. 
14. Gilman 2006: 94. 
15. Hayman 1981: 31. 
16. Citati 1990: 8. 
17. Brod 1975: 74. 
18. Brod 1975: 109. 
19. See n. 26 on p. 93. 
20. Lemon 2011: 91. 
21. Bridgewater 1987: 115; Gray et al. 2005: 244; Hanssen 2012: 184; Strong 
1979: 474. 
22. Sokel 2002: 136–37. 
23. Koelb 1989: 26–27. 
24. Te term “anthroparchy” was coined by Erika Cudworth in analogy to patriar-
chy. See Cudworth 2005: 14. 
25. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 205. 
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27. Derrida 1987: 173. 
28. Searle 1985: 12–20. Te theory of speech acts is further discussed in the sixth 
chapter. 
29. Apes’ anatomical capacity to hold weapons is famously realized in Planet of the 
Apes, Pierre Boulle’s 1963 novel, and its numerous flm and television adaptations. 
30. Löwy 2016: 9–11. 
31. Marx and Engels 2008: 53. 
32. Robert Lemon suggests that the sewing scissors, which are called Nähschere in 
German, highlight the ambivalence between proximity and separation, since the prefx 
Näh (sewing) is semantically, etymologically, and homonymically related to the word 
Nähe (closeness). See Lemon 2011: 94. 
33. Te semiotics of dogs, in Western culture in general and in Kafka’s poetics in 
particular, is examined in the next chapter, which focuses on Kafka’s “Researches of a 
Dog.” 
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Shepard 1996: 244; Zeder 2006: 171. 
6. Darwin 2007: 136. 
7. Homer 1991: 240. 
8. Cervantes 2007: 137. 
9. Laura Brown, in her study of animal representation in modern literature, states 
that in the frst two decades of the nineteenth century dog-protagonist narratives were 
particularly common and become a popular subgenre, which contributed to the rapid 
development of the animal protection movement in this period. See Brown 2010: 
129–30. 
10. Derrida 1992: 143. 
11. Serpell 2008: 159. Examining the role of dogs in Jewish society and culture, 
Sophia Menache argues that the negative biblical approach to dogs derives from both 
rejections of canine rituals in ancient Near Eastern societies and the ubiquity of rabies 
in the area. See Menache 2013: 40–42. 
12. Bruce 2007: 44; Isenberg 1999: 37; Powell 2008: 137. 
13. Serpell 2008: 200–201. 
14. Freud 2005: 88. 
15. Armbruster 2002: 353; Fudge 2004: 27–28; Haraway 2005: 11–12; Shepard 
1996: 248. 
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17. Many Aesopian fables allow deallegorization and a focus on nonhuman animals, 
their condition, and their relationship with humans. See Harel 2009. 
18. Budiansky 1992: 19–42. 
19. Weil 2012: 56. Tis negative perception of dogs led Deleuze and Guattari to 
provocatively contend that “anyone who likes cats and dogs is a fool.” See Deleuze and 
Guattari 2000: 240. 
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Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. 
Not with nothing but. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.” Her 
father’s reaction to this statement is “Like a dog,” and Lucy agrees: “Yes, like a dog.” 
See Coetzee 2000: 205. Similarly, in Remnants of Auschwitz (1999) Agamben quotes 
Josef K.’s famous last words, which are later echoed in Holocaust survivors’ testimo-
nies, where the Muselmann is “like a stray dog.” See Agamben 1999: 104, 167. 
22. In the original German text, there is no reference to people; Kafka uses here 
the German word man, which is equivalent to “one” or “someone.” “Man rühmt oft 
den allgemeinen Fortschritt der Hundeschaft durch die Zeiten und meint damit wohl 
hauptsächlich den Fortschritt der Wissenschaft” (E, 435). 
23. Pascal 1982: 23; Politzer 1962: 283; Robertson 1985: 279. 
24. Shklovsky 1965: 14–15. 
25. Roy Pascal mentions that Kafka read Gulliver’s Travels shortly before writing 
“Researches of a Dog.” See Pascal 1982: 189. 
26. Swift 2003: 249. 
27. Booth 2002: 158–59. 
28. Anderson 1992: 72; Fickert 1993: 190; Koelb 2010: 140; Kuzniar 2006: 22; 
Lawson 1987: 128; Pascal 1982: 23; Robertson 1985: 276; Williams 2007: 104. 
29. Kuzniar 2006: 24; Pascal 1982: 210. 
30. Bruce 1992: 6; Pascal 1982: 209; Robertson 1985: 275. 
31. Nägele 2013: 22. 
32. Robertson 1985: 276–77. 
33. Asker 2001: 29; DeKoven 2016: 38 n. 17; Höfe 1998: 247; Norris 2010: 24; 
Ziolkowski 1983: 87. 
34. Riggan 1981. 
35. Bergson 2007: 87. 
36. Uhall 2016: 2. 
37. Orwell 1996: 34. 
38. Berger 1980: 2–3, 14. Te animal gaze is central in Adorno’s criticism, who 
claims that “philosophy exists in order to redeem what you see in the gaze of an ani-
mal” (cited in Claussen 2008: 255); see also n. 26 on p. 93. Te animal gaze, as 
discussed in the second chapter, is also what has triggered Derrida to delve into the 
animal question. See n. 18 on p. 90. 
2RPP
  
   





   
















Notes to 119–28 177 
Chapter 5 
1. Boulby 1982; Corngold 1988: 283; Driscoll 2011–12: 23; Freer 2015: 89; 
Koelb 2002: 350–51; Maché 1982: 526–27; Menke 2000: 32; Politzer 1962: 318–22; 
Spurr 2011: 187; Torlby 1972: 47; Türk 2007: 153; Wegmann 2011:361; Weigand 
1972: 152. Other readings see the story as allegory of the human condition in modern 
society. See Emrich 1984: 224; Kurz 1980: 193; Nagel 1974: 370; Sokel 1964: 372; 
Stahman 2004: 19. 
2. In the frst book written on nonhuman animals in Kafka’s work, Die Funktion 
der Tierfguren im Werke Franz Kafkas: Ofene Erzählgerüste und Figurenspiele (1969) 
Karl Heinz Fingerhut compares the enigmatic biological status of the protagonist of 
“Te Burrow” to that of Gregor Samsa in “Te Metamorphosis.” See Fingerhut 1969: 
190. 
3. Ingarden 1980: 53. 
4. Interestingly, not only the species, but also the gender, of the burrower is unde-
fned. 
5. McDonnell 2004: 24. 
6. Sturc 1982: 84–85. 
7. Ewing 2007–8: 29; Freer 2015: 89; Geier 2016: 39; Politzer 1962: 330; Snyder 
1981: 11; Spurr 2011: 187; Sussman 1977: 130–31; Weigand 1972: 162. 
8. A study of nonhuman narrators, which focuses largely on Kafka’s “Te Burrow,” 
quotes ethological accounts of wasps’ apparently mindless movements, which actually 
follow an instinctual logic closely reminiscent of the narrator’s single-minded obses-
sion with the burrow in Kafka’s story. Tis wasp’s behavioral account is widely used by 
philosophers of mind to demonstrate that innate mechanisms can result in behavior 
that looks, from a human vantage point, irrational or even absurd. See Bernaerts et al. 
20014: 80. 
9. Bangerter 1974: 12–13; Cohn 1978: 195–97; Pascal 1982: 190; Stahman 2004: 
30. 
10. Baldick 2009: 219. 
11. Aristotle 1997: 24. 
12. Bal 2009: 182. 
13. Kundera 2004: 74, 298. 
14. Clayton Koelb asserts that the original title of the story, “Der Bau,” refers to 
Kafka’s fancée, Felice Bauer. See Koelb 2002: 350–51. Dora Diamant, with whom 
Kafka spent the last year of his life, claimed that the burrow is the apartment they 
shared in Berlin and that the castle court (Burgplatz) is her. See Fingerhut 1969: 169. 
Philip Roth associatively links the burrow to Dora Diamant’s genitalia. See Roth 1975: 
257. 
15. Stahman 2004: 22; Sussman 1977: 107. 
16. Dennett 1991: 174. 
17. Forster 1985: 4318. 
18. Agamben 2004: 37, Gross and Vallely 2012: 1, Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 
203. 


















   
  
  
    
   
 
   




178 Notes to 129–43 
20. Menely 2015: 127. 
21. Gray et al. 2005: 73. 
22. Genette 1983: 245. 
23. Bangerter 1974: 15; Henel 1986: 126; Nagel 1983: 370; Sokel 1964: 371; Stah-
man 2004: 20, 30; Sturc 1982: 84; Weigand 1972: 152–53. 
24. Dell’Aversano 2010: 80. 
25. Butler 1990: 185. 
26. Harrison 1993: 61. 
27. Carroll 2001: 59–60. 
28. Dell’Aversano 2010: 86. 
29. Meljac 2008: 70; Stahman 2004: 21. 
30. “Von meinen Händen” (E, 474). 
31. Boulby 1982: 175. In some English versions of the story, the abnormal element, 
which ascribes to the nonhuman animal human traits, is lost in translation, as “von 
meinen Händen” is translated as “for which I am responsible” (CS, 332). 
32. Weigand 1972: 152. 
33. Interestingly, Karl Rossmann, the protagonist of Kafka’s novel America, is also a 
horseman, as his last name literally means horseman in German. 
34. Corngold 2011: xi–xii. 
35. “Mir ist manchmal als verdünne sich mein Fell” (E, 474). 
36. Benjamin 1969: 122. 
Chapter 6 
1. Gray et al. 2005: 145–46; Gross 2002: 90; Robertson 1985: 283–84. Chris 
Danta states that Kafka identifes here with a nonhuman animal, because losing the 
ability to speak due to his illness reduced him to the level of a nonhuman animal; both 
share the burden of speechlessness. Additionally, Danta suggests that Kafka felt that he 
would die like an animal, reiterating the antihumanist sentiment of Ecclesiastes 3:19: 
“Man’s fate is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits both: As one dies, so dies 
the other. All have the same breath; man has no advantage over the animal.” See Danta 
2008: 153. 
2. Baer 2010; Ellison 1998: 205; Emrich 1984: 200–206; Fickert 1993: 60; Harter 
1987; Koelb 2002: 354; Norris 1983: 378; Pascal 1982: 231–32. 
3. Beck 1971: 205–7; Boa 1996: 176; Bridgwater 1974: 143; Olshan 1999: 178; 
Woodring 1964: 72. 
4. Anderson 1992: 204–5; Geller 2018: 68–78; Gilman 2006: 94; Grözinger 1999: 
141–64; Harter 1987: 159; Olshan 1999: 175; Robertson 1985: 282; Tauber 1941: 
185–86; Tiher 1990: 130; Weinberg 1963: 440; Woodring 1964: 72. Te identifca-
tion of the mouse people with the Jewish people is also based on a pun in German, as 
there is phonetic similarity between the words Mäuse (mice in German) and Moses, 
so “the mice people” sounds like “the people of Moses.” See Gray et al. 2005: 146. 















   















Notes to 143–57 179 
modern Jewish literature, this antisemitic metaphor is most famously depicted in Art 
Spiegelman’s graphic novel Maus, serialized from 1980 to 1991. 
5. Brod 1975: 192. 
6. For example, Heinz Politzer argues that while there is indeed a similarity between 
the mice and the Jewish people (both are threatened by the hostile world around them, 
both are waiting for a savior to deliver them, etc.), the fact that the mice are specifcally 
described as lacking historical consciousness casts doubt on their identifcation with 
the Jewish people. See Politzer 1962: 315. 
7. Pascal 1982: 146–47. 
8. Aesop 1998: 80. 
9. Carlson 1993: 11. 
10. Ziolkowski 1990: 10. 
11. Blackham 2013: xiii; Cranes 1992: 7; Perry 1959: 19. 
12. Aesop 1998: 206. 
13. Baldick 2009: 123. 
14. Fickert 1993: 57; Kwon 1996: 109; Politzer 1962: 308; Richter 1962: 355; 
Zhou 1996: 157. 
15. Ford 2010: 132; Minden 2009: 304; Politzer 1962: 309; Vizthum 1993: 274. 
16. Geller 2018: 75. 
17. Brod 1975: 205–6. 
18. Geller 2018: 75–76; Harter 1987: 155; Koelb 2002: 356, Politzer 1962: 309. 
19. In all these cases, the word “coat,” which does not appear in the original text, is 
added in the English translation: “bundled up in my fur coat” (KSS, 60), “Old N. . . . 
was still wearing the fur coat in which he had entered” (CS, 452), and “Her fur coat 
falls open, she topples onto Wese” (KSS, 74–75). 
20. “Stünde hier an Stelle des Volkes ein Einzelner: man könnte glauben, dieser 
Mann habe die ganze Zeit über Josefne nachgegeben unter dem fortwährenden bren-
nenden Verlangen endlich der Nachgiebigkeit ein Ende zu Machen” (E, 534). 
21. Geller 2018: 74. 
22. Canetti 1988: 88. 
23. Jastrow 2010: 291–95. 
24. Wittgenstein 2009: 204. 
25. Gombrich 2000: 5. 
26. Austin 1975: 5. 
27. Searle 1985: 12–20. 
28. Butler 1993: 232. 
29. Bakhtin 1981: 125. 
30. In this context it is worth citing Adorno’s remark, who brings into the dialogue 
the living/thing character of Odradek with the living/dead character of Gracchus: 
“Te zone in which it is impossible to die is also the no-man’s land between man and 
thing: within it meets Odradek . . . and Gracchus, the humble descendant of Nimrod. 
Te understanding of these most advanced, incommensurable productions, and of 
several others that similarly evade current conceptions of Kafka, may one day provide 










Adams, Carol J. 2011. Te Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Te-
ory. New York: Continuum. 
Adams, Carol J., and Josephine Donovan, eds. 1995. Animals and Women: Feminist 
Teoretical Explorations. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Adams, Carol J., and Lori Guren, eds. 2014. Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with 
Other Animals and the Earth. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Adorno, Teodor W. 1974. Minima Moralia: Refections from Damaged Life. Trans. E. 
F. N. Jephcott. London: Verso. 
Adorno, Teodor W. 1981. “Notes on Kafka.” In Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and 
Shierry Weber. Cambridge: MIT Press, 245–71. 
Adorno, Teodor W. 1997. Aesthetic Teory. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Aesop. 1998. Te Complete Fables. Trans. Robert Temple and Olivia Temple. New 
York: Penguin. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1995. Idea of Prose. Trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1999. Remnants of Auschwitz: Te Witness and the Archive. Trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone Books. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 2004. Te Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Allen, Mary. 1983. Animals in American Literature. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Anders, Günther. 1965. Franz Kafka. Trans. A. Steer and A. K. Torlby. London: 
Bowes & Bowes. 
Anderson, Mark. 1992. Kafka’s Clothes: Ornament and Aestheticism in the Habsburg Fin 
de Siècle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Apuleius. 1994. Te Golden Ass. Trans. P. G. Walsh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
















Aristotle. 1996. Te Politics and the Constitution of Athens. Trans. Stephen Everson. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Aristotle. 1997. Poetics. Trans. Malcolm Heath. New York: Penguin. 
Armbruster, Karla. 2002. “‘Good Dog’: Te Stories We Tell about Our Canine Com-
panions and What Tey Mean for Humans and Other Animals.” Papers on Lan-
guage and Literature 38(4): 351–76. 
Armstrong, Philip. 2008. What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity. New York: 
Routledge. 
Asker, David Barry Desmond. 2001. Aspect of Metamorphosis: Fictional Representations 
of the Becoming Human. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Asker, David Barry Desmond. 2011. “Metaphor to Metamorphosis: From Homer to 
Kafka, Bulgakov, Malamud, and Darrieussecq.” Symbolism 11: 11–36. 
Austin, J. L.. 1975. How to Do Tings with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Baer, Andrea. 2010. “Performative Emotion in Kafka’s ‘Josefne, the Singer; or, the 
Mouse Folk’ and Freud’s ‘Te Creative Writer and Daydreaming.” In Marc Lucht 
and Donna Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids, and Other Fantastic 
Beings. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefeld, 137–56. 
Bakhtin, M. M. 1981. Te Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Trans. Caryl Emerson 
and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bal, Mieke. 2009. Narratology: Introduction to the Teory of Narrative. Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press. 
Balazs, Zoltan. 2015. “Power and Animality in Kafka’s Te Castle.” Journal of Political 
Power 8(1): 85–107. 
Baldick, Chris. 2009. Te Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Bangerter, Lowell A. 1974. “‘Der Bau’: Franz Kafka’s Final Punishment Tragedy.” 
Research Studies 42: 11–19. 
Barney, Richard A. 2004. “Between Swift and Kafka: Animals and the Politics of Coe-
tzee’s Elusive Fiction.” World Literature Today 78(1): 17–23. 
Barthes, Roland. 1972. Critical Essays. Trans. Richard Howard. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press. 
Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Beauvoir, Simone de. 2011. Te Second Sex. Trans. Constance Borde. New York: Vin-
tage. 
Beck, Evelyn Torton. 1971. Kafka and the Yiddish Teater. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Beer, Gillian. 2000. Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Beer, Gillian. 2005. “Animal Presences: Tussles with Anthropomorphism.” Compara-
tive Critical Studies 2(3): 311–22. 
Beicken, Peter. 1987. “Transformation of Criticism: Te Impact of Kafka’s Metamor-
phosis.” In Ronald Gottesman and Moshe Lazar, eds., Te Dove and the Mole: 























Beicken, Peter. 2011–12. “Conforming Ape and Revolting Insect: Gender Compli-
ance versus Transgendering in Two Kafka Animals Stories, ‘Te Metamorphosis’ 
and ‘A Report to an Academy.’” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 35–36: 5–9. 
Ben-Ephraim, Gavriel. 1994. “Making and Breaking Meaning: Deconstruction, Four-
Level Allegory and Te Metamorphosis.” Midwest Quarterly 35(4): 450–67. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1969. Illuminations: Essays and Refections. Trans. Harry Zohn. New 
York: Schocken. 
Berger, John. 1980. About Looking. New York: Pantheon. 
Bergson, Henri. 2007. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Trans. Cloud-
esley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. Champaign, IL: Book Jungle. 
Bermejo-Rubio, Fernando. 2013. “Does Gregor Samsa Crawl over the Ceiling and 
Walls? Intra-narrative Fiction in Kafka’s Die Verwandlung.” Monatshefte 105(2): 
278–314. 
Bernaerts, Lars, Marco Caracciolo, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck. 2014. “Te Sto-
ried Lives of Non-human Narrators.” Narrative 22(1): 68–93. 
Bernhardt-House, Phillip A. 2008. “Te Werewolf as Queer, the Queer as Werewolf, 
and Queer Werewolves.” In Noreen Gifney and Myra J. Hird, eds., Queering the 
Non/Human. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 159–83. 
Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. Te Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. 
Birke, Lynda. 2002. “Intimate Familiarities? Feminism and Human-Animal Studies.” 
Society & Animals 4: 429–36. 
Blackham, H. J. 2013. Te Fable as Literature. London: Bloomsbury. 
Bloom, Harold. 1989. Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the 
Present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bloomfeld, Morton. 1972. “Allegory as Interpretation.” New Literary History 3: 301–
17. 
Blyn, Robin. 2000. “From Stage to Page: Franz Kafka, Djuna Barnes, and Modern-
ism’s Freak Fictions.” Narrative 8(2): 134–60. 
Boa, Elizabeth. 1996. Kafka: Gender, Class, and Race in the Letters and Fictions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Boggs, Colleen Glenney. 2013. Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Bio-
political Subjectivity. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Booth, Wayne, C. 2002. Te Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. 1964. Other Inquisitions, 1937–1952. Trans. Ruth L. C. Simms. 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bostock, Stephen. 1993. Zoos and Animal Rights: Te Ethics of Keeping Animals. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Boulby, Mark. 1982. “Kafka’s End: A Reassessment of Te Burrow.” German Quarterly
55(2): 175–85. 
Bouson, Brooks. 1990. “Te Narcissistic Drama and Reader/Text Transaction in Kaf-
ka’s Metamorphosis.” In Ruth V. Gross, ed., Critical Essays on Franz Kafka. Boston: 
G. K. & Co., 191–205. 
Braverman, Irus, ed. 2016. Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively Legalities. New York: 
Routledge. 










Brod, Max. 1975. Franz Kafka: A Biography. Trans. G. Humphreys Roberts and Rich-
ard Winston. New York: Schocken Books. 
Brown, Laura. 2010. Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in 
the Modern Literary Imagination. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Bruce, Iris. 1992. “‘Aggadah Raises Its Paw against Halakha’: Kafka’s Zionist Critique 
in ‘Forschungen eines Hundes.’” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 16(1): 
4–18. 
Bruce, Iris. 2007. Kafka and Cultural Zionism: Dates in Palestine. Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press. 
Budiansky, Stephen. 1992. Te Covenant of the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestica-
tion. W. Morrow: New York. 
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies Tat Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York: 
Routledge. 
Cadman, Sam. 2016. “Refections on Anthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism and 
Impossible Fiction: Towards a Typological Spectrum of Fictional Animals.” Ani-
mal Studies Journal 5(2): 161–82. 
Caldwell, Richard. 1987. “Kafka and Orpheus: Te Metamorphosis.” In Ronald Got-
tesman and Moshe Lazar, eds., Te Dove and the Mole: Kafka’s Journey into Darkness 
and Creativity. Malibu: Undena, 47–59. 
Campbell, Elisa K. 1983. “Beyond Anthropocentrism.” Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences 19: 54–67. 
Camus, Albert. 1991. Te Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. Trans. Justin O’Brien. 
New York: Vintage Books. 
Camus, Albert. 1992. Te Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. Trans. Anthony Bower. 
New York: Vintage. 
Canetti, Elias. 1979. Te Conscience of Words. Trans. Joachim Neugroschel. New York: 
Seabury Press. 
Canetti, Elias. 1988. Kafka’s Other Trial: Te Letters to Felice. Trans. Christopher Mid-
dleton. New York: Schocken Books. 
Caras, Roger A. 1996. A Perfect Harmony: Te Intertwining Lives of Animals and 
Humans throughout History. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Carlson, Gregory. 1993, “Fables Invite Perception.” Bestia 5: 7–25. 
Carroll, Lewis. 2001. Trough the Looking Glass and What Alice Found Tere. New 
York: Bloomsbury. 
Cavalieri, Paola. 2001. Te Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human 
Rights. Trans. Catherine Woollard. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cervantes, Saavedra Miguel de. 2007. “Dialogue between Scipio and Berganza, Dogs 
of the Hospital of the Resurrection in the City of Valladolid, Commonly Called 
the Dogs of Mahudes.” In Te Exemplary Novels of Cervantes, trans. Walter K. 
Kelly. Charleston: BiblioBazaar, 137–87. 
Chabris, Christopher F., and Daniel J. Simons. 2010. Te Invisible Gorilla: And Other 
Ways Our Intuitions Deceive Us. New York: Crown. 

















Ralph Acampora, ed., Metamorphoses of the Zoo: Animal Encounter after Noah. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 193–220. 
Citati, Pietro. 1990. Kafka. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Knopf. 
Clark, Gregory. 1991. “Labour Productivity in English Agriculture, 1300–1860.” 
In Bruce M. S. Campbell and Mark Overton, eds., Land Labour and Livestock: 
Historical Studies in European Agricultural Productivity. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 211–35. 
Claussen, Detlev. 2008. Teodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius. Trans. Rodney Living-
stone. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Clutton-Brock, Juliet. 2008. “Origins of the Dog: Domestication and Early History.” 
In James Serpell, ed., Te Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour and Interactions 
with People. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7–20. 
Coetzee, J. M. 1981. “Time, Tense and Aspect in Kafka’s ‘Te Burrow.’” MLN 96(3): 
556–79. 
Coetzee, J. M. 2000. Disgrace. London: Penguin. 
Coetzee, J. M. 2001. Te Lives of Animals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Cohn, Dorrit. 1978. Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness 
in Fiction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Cole, Matthew, and Kate Stewart. 2014. Our Children and Other Animals: Te Cultural 
Construction of Human-Animal Relations in Childhood. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Corbey, Raymond. 2005. Te Metaphysics of Apes: Negotiating the Animal-Human 
Boundary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Corngold, Stanley. 1988. Franz Kafka: Te Necessity of Form. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 
Corngold, Stanley. 2004. Lambent Traces: Franz Kafka. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
Corngold, Stanley, and Benno Wagner. 2011. Franz Kafka: Te Ghosts in the Machine. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Cranes, Pack. 1992. “Te Fable and the Anti-fable: Te Modern Face of Aesop.” Bestia
4: 5–34. 
Critchley, Simon. 2002. On Humour. New York: Routledge. 
Cudworth, Erika. 2005. Developing Ecofeminist Teory: Te Complexity of Diference. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Danchev, Alex. 2011. On Art and War and Terror. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Danta, Chris. 2008. “Kafka’s Mousetrap: Te Fable of the Dying Voice.” SubStance
37(3): 152–68. 
Darwin, Charles. 2004. Te Descent of Man. London: Penguin. 
Darwin, Charles. 2007. On the Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection or the 
Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. New York: Cosimo. 
Dawkins, Marian Stamp. 1998. Trough Our Eyes Only? Te Search for Animal Con-
science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
DeGrazia, David. 1996. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 














Narrative.” In David Herman, ed., Creatural Fiction: Human-Animal Relationships 
in Twentieth and Twenty First Century Literature. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
19–40. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1986. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. 
Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 2000. A Tousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Dell’Aversano, Carmen. 2010. “Te Love Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken: Queering 
the Human-Animal Bond.” Journal for Critical Animal Studies 8(1): 73–125. 
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1987. “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand.” In John Sallis, ed., Decon-
struction and Philosophy: Te Texts of Jacques Derrida. Trans. John P. Leavey. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 161–96. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1992. Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2008. Te Animal Tat Terefore I Am. Trans. David Wills. New 
York: Fordham University Press. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2009. Te Beast & the Sovereign. Trans. Geofrey Bennington. Vol. 1. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Descartes, René. 1969. A Discourse on Method. Trans. John Veitch. London: J.M. 
Dent. 
Diamond, Jared. 1994. “Te Tird Chimpanzee.” In Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, 
eds., Te Great Ape Project: Equality beyond Humanity. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 88–101. 
Dodd, Bill. 2002. “Te Case for a Political Reading.” In Julian Preece, ed., Te Cam-
bridge Companion to Kafka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131–49. 
Donelson, Kenneth, and Alleen Pace Nilsen. 1997. Literature for Today’s Young Adults. 
New York: Longman. 
Donovan, Josephine. 2016. Te Aesthetics of Care: On the Literary Treatment of Ani-
mals. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Douglass, Frederick. 1995. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American 
Slave. New York: Dover. 
Dowden, Stephen D. 1995. Kafka’s Castle and the Critical Imagination. Columbia, SC: 
Camden House. 
Driscoll, Kári. 2011–12. “Te Enemy Within: Zoopoetics in ‘Erinnerungen an die 
Kaldabahn.’” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 35–36: 23–35. 
Dunayer, Joan. 2001. Animal Equality: Language and Liberation. Derwood: Ryce Publishing. 
Dungey, Nicholas. 2014. Franz Kafka and Michel Foucault: Power, Resistance, and the 
Art of Self-Creation. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Eggenschwiler, David. 1986. “‘Te Metamorphosis,’ Freud, and the Chains of Odys-
seus.” In Harold Bloom, ed., Franz Kafka. New York: Chelsea House, 199–219. 
Eilittä, Leena. 1999. Approaches to Personal Identity in Kafka’s Short Fiction: Freud, 
Darwin, Kierkegaard. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica. 
Eisner, Pavel. 1950. Franz Kafka and Prague. Trans. Lowry Nelson and René Wellek. 




















Elias, Norbert. 1994. Te Civilizing Process: Te History of Manners. Trans. Edmund 
Jephcott. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ellison, David R. 1998. “Narrative and Music in Kafka and Blanchot: Te ‘Singing’ of 
Josefne.” Yale French Studies 93: 196–218. 
Empson, William. 1961. Seven Types of Ambiguity. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Emrich, Wilhelm. 1984. Franz Kafka: A Critical Study of His Writing. Trans. Sheema 
Zeben Buehne. New York: Frederick Ungar. 
Ewing, Megan. 2007–8. “From Burrow to Bureau: Ego Defense in Kafka’s Der Bau.”
Journal of the Kafka Society of America 31–32: 27–36. 
Fanon, Frantz. 2004. Te Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: 
Grove Press. 
Fanon, Frantz. 2008. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: 
Grove Press. 
Fast, Howard. 1981. “Te Metamorphosis.” In Kenneth Hughes, ed., Franz Kafka: An 
Anthology of Marxist Criticism. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 
12–14. 
Ferk, Janko. 2011–12. “Academy and Ape: Kafka’s World of Animals—a Contradic-
tion in Itself?” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 35–36: 36–37. 
Fickert, Kurt. 1992. “Kafka’s Search for Truth in ‘Forschungen eines Hundes.’” 
Monatshefte 85(2): 189–97. 
Fickert, Kurt. 1993. End of Mission: Kafka’s Search for Truth in His Last Stories. Colum-
bia, SC: Camden House. 
Fingerhut, Karl-Heinz. 1969. Die Funktion der Tierfguren im Werke Franz Kafkas: 
Ofene Erzählgerüste und Figurenspiele. Bonn: H. Bouvier. 
Fitzgerald, Emily A. 2015. “[Ape]rsonhood.” Review of Litigation 34(2): 337–78. 
Fletcher, Angus. 1993. Allegory: Te Teory of a Symbolic Mode. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Ford, Tomas H. 2010. “Crowds, Animality, and Aesthetic Language in Kafka’s
‘Josefne.’” In Marc Lucht and Donna Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals,
Hybrids, and Other Fantastic Beings. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefeld,
119–35. 
Forster, E. M. 1985. Aspects of the Novel. San Diego: Harvest-Harcourt. 
Foucault, Michel. 1990. Te History of Sexuality. Vol. 1, An introduction. Trans. Robert 
Hurley. New York: Vintage. 
Foucault, Michel. 2002. Te Order of Tings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Routledge. 
Foucault, Michel. 2003. Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975. Trans. 
Graham Burchell. London: Verso. 
Francione, Gary L. 2009. Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploita-
tion. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Freer, Scott. 2015. Modernist Mythopoeia: Te Twilight of the Gods. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Freud, Sigmund. 2001. Totem and Taboo. Trans. James Strachey. London: Routledge. 















Frye, Northrop. 1957. Anatomy of Criticism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Fudge, Erica. 2002. “A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals.” In Nigel 
Rothfels, ed., Representing Animals. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 
3–18. 
Fudge, Erica. 2004. Animal. London: Reaktion Books. 
Gaard, Greta. 1997. “Toward a Queer Ecofeminism.” Hypatia 12(1): 114–37. 
Garlof, Katja. 2011. “Kafka’s Racial Melancholy.” In Stanley Corngold and Ruth V. 
Gross, eds., Kafka for the Twenty-First Century. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
89–104. 
Geddes, Jennifer L. 2016. Kafka’s Ethics of Interpretation: Between Tyranny and Despair. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Geier, Ted. 2016. Kafka’s Nonhuman Form: Troubling the Boundaries of the Kafkaesque. 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Geller, Jay. 2015. “Kafka’s ‘Schakale und Araber’ and the Question of Genre: ‘Gleich-
nis,’ ‘Tiergeschichte,’ or ‘dialektisches Bild’?” In Ulrike Brunotte, Anna Dorothea 
Ludewig, and Axel Stähler, eds., Orientalism, Gender, and the Jews: Literary and 
Artistic Transformations of European National Discourses. Berlin: de Gruyter, 124–
36. 
Geller, Jay. 2018. Bestiarium Judaicum: Unnatural Histories of the Jews. New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
Genette, Gérard. 1983. Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Trans. Jane E. Lewin. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Giaccherini, Enrico. 2005. “Metamorphosis, Science Fiction and the Dissolution of 
the Self.” In Carla Dente, ed., Proteus: Te Language of Metamorphosis. Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 62–70. 
Gildenhard, Ingo, and Andrew Zissos, eds. 2013. Transformative Change in Western 
Tought: A History of Metamorphosis from Homer to Hollywood. London: Legenda. 
Gilman, Sander L. 1995. Franz Kafka: Te Jewish Patient. New York: Routledge. 
Gilman, Sander L. 2006. Multiculturalism and the Jews. New York: Routledge. 
Goodbody, Axel. 2016. “Animal Studies: Kafka’s Animal Stories.” In Hubert Zapf, 
ed., Handbook of Ecocriticism and Cultural Ecology. Boston: de Gruyter, 249–72. 
Gombrich, Ernst Hans. 2000. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Grant, Judith. 2016. “Darwin and Freud’s Posthumanist Political theory.” In Judith 
Grant and Vincent G. Jungkunz, eds., Political Teory and the Animal/Human 
Relationship. Albany: State University of New York Press, 49–71. 
Gray, Richard T., Ruth V. Gross, Rolf J. Goebel, and Clayton Koelb, eds. 2005. A 
Franz Kafka Encyclopedia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Gray, Ronald. 1973. Franz Kafka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Greve, Anniken. 2011. “Te Human Body and the Human Being in ‘Die Verwand-
lung.’” In Jakob Lothe, Beatrice Sandberg, and Ronald Speirs, eds., Franz Kafka: 
Narration, Rhetoric, and Reading. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 40–57. 
Gross, Aaron, and Anne Vallely, eds. 2012. Animals and the Human Imagination: A 












Gross, Ruth V. 2002. “Kafka’s Short Fiction.” In Julian Preece, ed., Te Cambridge 
Companion to Kafka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 80–94. 
Grözinger, Karl Erich. 1999. Kafka and Kabbalah. Trans. Susan Hecker Ray. New 
York: Continuum. 
Guren, Lori. 2013. “Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Approach to Animal Ethics.” 
In Raymond Corbey and Annette Lanjouw, eds., Te Politics of Species: Reshaping 
our Relationships with Other Animals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
223–31. 
Haacke, Paul. 2013. “Kafka’s Political Animals.” In Brendan Moran and Carlo Salzani, 
eds. Philosophy and Kafka. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 141–57. 
Hagenbeck, Carl. 1950. Von Tieren und Menschen: Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen. Düs-
seldorf: Vier Falken Verlag. 
Hanssen, Jens. 2012. “Kafka and Arabs.” Critical Inquiry 39(1): 167–97. 
Haraway, Donna. 1989. Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of 
Modern Science. New York: Routledge. 
Haraway, Donna. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: Te Reinvention of Nature. New 
York: Routledge. 
Haraway, Donna. 2005. Te Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Signif-
cant Otherness. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press. 
Harel, Naama. 2009. “Te Animal Voice behind the Animal Fable.” Journal for Criti-
cal Animal Studies 7(2): 9–21. 
Harrison, Robert Pogue. 1993. Forests: Te Shadow of Civilization. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 
Harter, Deborah. 1987. “Te Artist on Trial: Kafka and Josefne, ‘die Sängerin.’” 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 61(1): 
151–62. 
Harzer, Friedmann. 2000. Erzählte Verwandlung: Eine Poetik epischer Metamorphosen. 
Ovid, Kafka, Ransmayr. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
Hayman, Ronald. 1981. K: A Biography of Kafka. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1968. What Is Called Tinking? Trans. J. Glenn Gray. New York: 
Harper and Row. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1995. Te Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Heidegger, Martin. 2009. Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Trans. Robert D. 
Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Heidsieck, Arnold. 2005. Te Intellectual Contexts of Kafka’s Fiction: Philosophy, Law, 
Religion. Columbia, SC: Camden House. 
Heller, Erich. 1980. “Investigations of a Dog and Other Matters.” In J. P. Stern, ed., 
Te World of Franz Kafka. New York: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 103–11. 
Henel, Heinrich. 1986. “‘Te Burrow’ or How to Escape from a Maze.” In Harold 
Bloom, ed., Franz Kafka. New York: Chelsea House, 119–32. 
Hobbes, Tomas. 1996. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Höfe, Peter. 1998. Von den Unfähigkeit, historisch zu Werden: Die Form der Erzählung 










Hogan, Walter. 2009. Animals in Young Adult Fiction. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. 
Homer. 1991. Te Odyssey of Homer. Trans. T. E. Lawrence. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Horkheimer, Max, and Teodor W. Adorno. 2002. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philo-
sophical Fragments. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Iacomella, Lucia. 2015. “Auswege eines Durchschnittsafen: Franz Kafka und der Fall 
Rotpeters.” In Harald Neumeyer und Wilko Stefens, eds., Kafkas narrative Ver-
fahren: Kafkas Tiere. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 73–90. 
Ingarden, Roman. 1980. Te Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Trans. Ruth Ann 
Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Isenberg, Noah William. 1999. Between Redemption and Doom: Te Strains of German-
Jewish Modernism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Jackson, Frank. 1997. Faithful Friends: Dogs in Life and Literature. New York: Carroll 
& Graf. 
Jagose, Annamarie. 1996. Queer Teory: An Introduction. New York: New York Uni-
versity Press. 
Janouch, Gustav. 2012. Conversations with Kafka: Notes and Reminiscences. Trans. 
Goronwy Rees. New York: New Directions. 
Jastrow, Joseph. 2010. Fact and Fable in Psychology. Whitefsh, MT: Kessinger. 
Johnson, Keith Leslie. 2011–12. “Close Encounters of the Nth Kind, or ‘Te Bur-
row.’” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 35–36: 50–58. 
Judd, Robin. 2003. “Te Politics of Beef: Animal Advocacy and the Kosher Butcher-
ing Debates in Germany.” Jewish Social Studies 10(1): 117–50. 
Kafka, Franz. 1954. Wedding Preparations in the Country, and Other Posthumous Prose 
Writings. Trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. London: Secker and Warburg. 
Kafka, Franz. 1975. Parables and Paradoxes: In German and English. Trans. Clement 
Greenberg, Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, Willa and Edwin Muir, and Tania 
and James Stern. New York: Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1976. Te Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–23. Trans. Joseph Kresh and 
Martin Greenberg. New York: Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1977. Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors. Trans. Richard and Clara 
Winston. New York: Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1983. Te Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir and Tania and 
James Stern. New York: Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1988. Letters to Felice. Trans. James Stern and Elizabeth Duckworth. 
New York: Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1990. Letters to Milena. Trans. Philip Boehm. New York: Schocken 
Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 1991. Te Blue Octavo Notebooks. Trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne 
Wilkins. Cambridge: Exact Change. 
Kafka, Franz. 1996. Te Metamorphosis: Translation, Backgrounds and Contexts, Criti-
cism. Trans. Stanley Corngold. New York: Norton. 













Kafka, Franz. 2007. Kafka’s Selected Stories: New Translations, Background and Context, 
Criticism. Trans. Stanley Corngold. New York: Norton. 
Kafka, Franz. 2009. Te Trial. Trans. Mike Mitchell. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kafka, Franz. 2011. America: Te Missing Person. Trans. Mark Harman. New York: 
Schocken Books. 
Kafka, Franz. 2015. Letter to the Father / Brief an den Vater: Bilingual Edition. Trans. 
Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. New York: Schocken Books. 
Kaiser, Hellmuth. 1972. “Kafka’s Fantasy of Punishment.” In Stanley Corngold, ed., 
“Te Metamorphosis” by Franz Kafka. New York: Bantam, 147–56. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1987. Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: 
Hackett. 
Kelly, Alfred. 1981. Te Descent of Darwin: Te Popularization of Darwinism in Ger-
many, 1860–1914. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Kessler, Susanne. 1983. Kafka: Poetik der sinnlichen Welt. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
Kilcher, Andreas, and Detlef Kremer. 2004. “Die Genealogie der Schrift: Eine Trans-
textuelle Lektüre von Kafka’s Bericht für eine Akademie.” In Claudia Liebrand und 
Franziska Schößler, eds., Textverkehr: Kafka und die Tradition. Würzburg: König-
shausen & Neumann, 63–70. 
Kluback, William. 1993. Franz Kafka: Challenges and Confrontations. New York: Peter 
Lang. 
Kluge, Friedrich, and Elmar Seebold. 1999. Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen 
Sprache. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Koelb, Clayton. 1989. Kafka’s Rhetoric: Te Passion of Reading. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Koelb, Clayton. 2002. “Kafka Imagines His Readers: Te Rhetoric of ‘Josefne die 
Sängerin’ and ‘Der Bau.’” In James Rolleston, ed., A Companion to the Works of 
Franz Kafka. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 347–59. 
Koelb, Clayton. 2010. Kafka: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Continuum. 
Köhler, Wolfgang. 1957. Te Mentality of Apes. Trans. Ella Winter. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Kriesberg, Hadea Nell. 2010. “‘Czechs, Jews and Dogs Not Allowed’: Identity, Bound-
ary, and Moral Stance in Kafka’s “A Crossbreed’ and ‘Jackals and Arabs.’” In Marc 
Lucht and Donna Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids, and Other Fan-
tastic Beings. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 33–52. 
Kundera, Milan. 2004. Te Unbearable Lightness of Being. Trans. Michael Henry 
Heim. New York: HarperCollins. 
Kurz, Gerhard. 1980. Traum-Schrecken: Kafkas literarische Existenzanalyse. Stuttgart: 
Metzler. 
Kuzniar, Alice A. 2006. Melancholia’s Dog: Refections on Our Animal Kinship. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Kwon, Se-Hoon. 1996. Die moderne Schreibweise in den Werken von Franz Kafka und 
Günter Kunert oder der Übergang von der Moderne zur Postmoderne. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang. 
Lacan, Jacques. 1998. Te Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XI, Te Four Fundamental 

















La Fontaine, Jean de. 1952. La Fontaine’s Fables. Trans. Edward Marsh. London: Dent. 
Lawson, Richard H. Franz Kafka. New York: Ungar, 1987. 
Leadbeater, Lewis. 1986. “Aristophanes and Kafka: Te Dung Beetle Connection.” 
Studies in Short Fiction 23(1): 169–78. 
Leadbeater, Lewis. 1993. “Te Sophistic Nature of Kafka’s Forschungen eines Hun-
des.” German Life and Letters 46(2): 145–55. 
Leavitt, June O. 2012. Te Mystical Life of Franz Kafka: Teosophy, Cabala, and the 
Modern Spiritual Revival. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lemon, Robert. 2011. Imperial Messages: Orientalism as Self-Critique in the Habsburg 
Fin de Siècle. Rochester, NY: Camden House. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1998. Collected Philosophical Papers. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1963. Totemism. Trans. Rodney Needham. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Lippit, Akira Mizuta. 2010. Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Loba, Miroslaw. 2014. “On Animality and Humanity in Literature after the ‘Darwin-
ian Turn.’” In Szymon Wróbel, ed., Te Animals in Us: We in Animals. New York: 
Peter Lang, 259–68. 
Lorenz, Dagmar C. G. 2007. “Transatlantic Perspectives on Men, Women, and Other 
Primates: Te Ape Motif in Kafka, Canetti, and Cooper’s and Jackson’s King Kong 
Films.” Women in German Yearbook 23: 156–78. 
Lorenz, Konrad. 1952. King Solomon’s Ring: New Light on Animal Ways. Trans. Marjo-
rie Kerr Wilson. New York: Crowell. 
Löwy, Michael. 2016. Franz Kafka: Subversive Dreamer. Trans. Inez Hedges. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Lukács, Georg. 1963. Te Meaning of Contemporary Realism. Trans. John and Necke 
Mander. London: Merlin Press. 
Luke, F. D. 1964. “Te Metamorphosis.” In Angel Flores and Homer Swander, eds., 
Franz Kafka Today. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 25–44. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1988. Te Diferend: Phrases in Dispute. Trans. Georges Van 
Den Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Maché, Britta. 1982. “Te Noise in the Burrow: Kafka’s Final Dilemma.” German 
Quarterly 55(4): 526–40. 
Malamud, Randy. 2017. “Te Problem with Zoos.” In Linda Kalof, ed., Te Oxford 
Handbook of Animal Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 397–410. 
Marx, Karl. 1971. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Trans. S. W. 
Ryazanskaya. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 2008. Te Communist Manifesto. Trans. Samuel 
Moore in cooperation with Friedrich Engels. London: Pluto Press. 
Massumi, Brian. 2014. What Animals Teach Us about Politics. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
McAndrew, Elizabeth M. 1969. “A Splacknuck and a Dung-Beetle: Realism and Prob-
ability in Swift and Kafka.” College English 31: 376–91. 
















McHugh, Susan. 2004. Dog. London: Reaktion Books. 
McHugh, Susan. 2011. Animal Stories: Narrating across Species Lines. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
McShane, Clay, and Joel A. Tarr. 2007. Te Horse and the City: Living Machines in the 
Nineteenth Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Meljac, Eric Paul. 2008. “Te Poetics of Dwelling: A Consideration of Heidegger, 
Kafka, and Michael K.” Journal of Modern Literature 32(1): 69–76. 
Menache, Sophia. 2013. “From Unclean Species to Man’s Best Friend: Dogs in the 
Biblical, Mishnaic, and Talmud Periods.” In Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman and 
Rakefet Zalashik, eds., A Jew’s Best Friend? Te Image of the Dog throughout Jewish 
History. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 36–51. 
Menely, Tobias. 2015. Te Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
Menke, Bettine. 2000. Prosopopoiia: Stimme und Text bei Brentano, Hofmann, Kleist 
und Kafka. Munich: Fink. 
Mill, John Stuart. 2002. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Minden, Michael. 2009. “Kafka’s ‘Josefne die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse.’” 
German Life and Letters 62(3): 297–310. 
Moe, Aaron. 2012. “Zoopoetics: Cummings, Merwin, and the Expanding Field of Eco-
criticism.” Humanimalia: A Journal of Human/Animal Interface Studies 3(2): 28–56. 
More, Tomas. 2016. Utopia. Trans. Robert M. Adams. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Morris, Desmond. 1984. Te Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal.
New York: Dell. 
Mullan, Bob, and Garry Marvin. 1998. Zoo Culture: Te Book about Watching People 
Watch Animals. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Nabokov, Vladimir. 1982. Lectures on Literature. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanov-
ich. 
Nagel, Bert. 1974. Franz Kafka: Aspekte zur Interpretation und Wertung. Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag. 
Nagel, Bert. 1983. Kafka und die Weltliteratur. Munich: Winkler. 
Nägele, Rainer. 2013. “I Don’t Want to Know Tat I Know: Te Inversion of Socratic 
Ignorance in the Knowledge of the Dogs.” In Brendan Moran and Carlo Salzani, 
eds., Philosophy and Kafka. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 19–31. 
Nash, Kate. 2015. Te Political Sociology of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Natarajan, Nalini. 1993. “Man into Beast: Representations of Metamorphosis.” Bestia
5: 117–22. 
Nekula, Marek. 2015. Franz Kafka and His Prague Contexts: Studies on Language and 
Literature. Praha: Karolinum Books. 
Nelles, William. 2001. “Beyond the Bird’s Eye: Animal Focalization.” Narrative 9(2): 
188–94. 
Neumann, Gerhard. 1968. “Umkehrung und Ablenkung: Franz Kafka ‘Gleitendes 
















Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2008. Te Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix 
of Songs. Trans. Josefne Nauckhof. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, Margot. 1983. “Kafka’s Josefne: Te Animal as the Negative Site of Narra-
tion.” MLN 98(3): 366–83. 
Norris, Margot. 1985. Beast of the Modern Imagination: Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, 
Ernst and Lawrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Norris, Margot. 2010. “Kafka’s Hybrids: Tinking Animals and Mirrored Humans.” 
In Marc Lucht and Donna Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids, and 
Other Fantastic Beings. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 17–32. 
Ohrem, Dominik, and Roman Bartosch, eds. 2017. Beyond the Human-Animal 
Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Oldridge, Darren. 2005. Strange Histories: Te Trial of the Pig, the Walking Dead, and 
Other Matters of Fact from the Medieval and Renaissance Worlds. New York: Rout-
ledge. 
Olshan, Matthew. 1999. “Franz Kafka: Te Unsinging Singer.” In Glenda Abramson,
ed., Modern Jewish Mythologies. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 174–
90. 
O’Neill, Patrick. 2014. Transforming Kafka: Translation Efects. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Ortiz-Robles, Mario. 2016. Literature and Animal Studies. New York: Routledge. 
Ortlieb, Cornelia. 2007. “Kafkas Tiere.” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 126: 339–
66. 
Orwell, George. 1996. Animal Farm: A Fairy Story. New York: Signet Classic. 
Orwell, George. 2005. Why I Write. New York: Penguin. 
Ovid. 2000. Metamorphoses XIII–XV. Trans. D. E. Hill. Warminster: Aris & Phillips. 
Pachirat, Timothy. 2011. Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics 
of Sight. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Pascal, Roy. 1982. Kafka’s Narrators: A Study of His Stories and Sketches. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pedot, Richard. 2005. “Metamorphosis in Ian McEwan’s Short Stories.” Comparative 
Critical Studies 2(3): 411–25. 
Perkins, David. 2003. Romanticism and Animal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Perry, Ben Edwin. 1959. “Fable.” Studium Generale 12: 17–37. 
Peters, Richard Stanley. 1966. Ethics and Education. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Pfeifer, Johannes. 1962. “Te Metamorphosis.” In Ronald Gray, ed., Kafka: A Collec-
tion of Critical Essays. Englewood Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 53–59. 
Pick, Anat. 2011. Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Plutarch. 1927. Plutarch’s Moralia, Vol. XII. Trans. Harold Cherniss and William C. 
Helmbold. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Politzer, Heinz. 1962. Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press. 
Powell, Matthew T. 2008. “Bestial Representations of Otherness: Kafka’s Animal Sto-















Rachels, James. 1991. Created from Animals: Te Moral Implications of Darwinism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Radick, Gregory. 2007. Te Simian Tongue: Te Long Debate about Animal Language. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Regan, Tom, and Andrew Linzey. 2010. Other Nations: Animals in Modern Literature. 
Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. 
Reitter, Paul. 2015. Bambi’s Jewish Roots and Other Essays on German-Jewish Culture.
New York: Bloomsbury. 
Rettinger, Michael. 2003. Kafkas Berichterstatter: Anthropologische Refexionen zwischen 
Irritation und Reaktion, Wirklichkeit und Perspektive. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang. 
Richards, I. A. 1976. Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul. 
Richter, Helmut. 1962. Franz Kafka: Werk und Entwurf. Berlin: Rütten & Loening. 
Richter, Virginia. 2011. Literature after Darwin: Human Beasts in Western Fiction, 
1859–1939. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Riggan, William. 1981. Pícaros, Madmen, Naīfs, and Clowns: Te Unreliable First-
Person Narrator. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Ritvo, Harriet. 1987. Te Animal Estate: Te English and Other Creatures in the Victo-
rian Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Robertson, Ritchie. 1985. Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rohman, Carrie. 2009. Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Rolleston, James. 1974. Kafka’s Narrative Teater. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Rolleston, James. 2002. “Introduction: Kafka Begins.” In James Rolleston, ed., A 
Companion to the Works of Franz Kafka. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 1–19. 
Roth, Philip. 1975. Reading Myself and Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Rothfels, Nigel. 2002. Savages and Beasts: Te Birth of the Modern Zoo. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Rowe, Michael. 2002. “Metamorphosis: Defending the Human.” Literature and Medi-
cine 21(2): 264–80. 
Rubinstein, William C. 1964. “A Report to an Academy.” In Angel Flores and Homer 
Swander, eds., Franz Kafka Today. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 55–60. 
Rubinstein, William C. 1967. “Kafka’s ‘Jackals and Arabs.’” Monatshefte für deutschen 
Unterricht 59(1): 13–18. 
Russell, Bertrand. 1997. Te Problem of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Russell, Bertrand. 2004. Power: A New Social Analysis. New York: Routledge. 
Ryan, Michael P. 2001. “Kafka’s Die Söhne: Te Range and Scope of Metaphor.” 
Monatshefte 93(1): 73–86. 
Santner, Eric L. 2006. On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2004. “Preface.” In Te Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox. 


















Saur, Pamela. 1992. “Civilization versus Animal Nature of Human Beings in Franz 
Kafka and Ernst Weiß.” Journal of the Kafka Society of America 16(2): 51–59. 
Schiller, Friedrich. 1972. Wilhelm Tell. Trans. William F. Mainland. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 
Schilling, Britta. 2014. Postcolonial Germany: Memories of Empire in a Decolonized 
Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scholtmeijer, Marian. 1993. Animal Victims in Modern Fiction: From Sanctity to Sacri-
fce. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Scholtmeijer, Marian. 1997. “What Is ‘Human’? Metaphysics and Zoontology in 
Flaubert and Kafka.” In Jennifer Ham and Matthew Senior, eds., Animal Acts: 
Confguring the Human in Western History. New York: Routledge, 127–43. 
Scholz, Eleanor. 2011. “Justifying the Esthetic in Kafka’s ‘Josefne the Singer.’” Anthro-
poetics: Journal of Generative Anthropology 16(2): 1–6. 
Schubiger, Jürg. 1969. Franz Kafka Die Verwandlung: Eine Interpretation. Zurich: 
Atlantis. 
Schumacher, Eckhard. 2008. “Die Kunst der Trunkenheit: Franz Kafkas Ein Bericht 
für eine Akademie.” In Tomas Strässle und Simon Zumsteg, eds., Trunkenheit: 
Kulturen des Rausches. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 175–92. 
Schwarz, Egon, 1986. “Kafka’s Animal Tales and the Tradition of the European Fable.” 
In Roman Sturc and J. C. Yardley, eds., Franz Kafka, 1883 –1983: His Craft and 
Tought. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 75–88. 
Searle, John R. 1985. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Teory of Speech Acts.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Serpell, James. 2008. In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human-Animal Relation-
ship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Seyppel, Joachim H. 1956. “Te Animal Teme and Totemism in Franz Kafka.” Amer-
ican Imago 13: 69–93. 
Shapiro, Kenneth, and Marion W. Copeland. 2005. “Toward a Critical Teory of 
Animal Issues in Fiction.” Society and Animals 13(4): 343–46. 
Shepard, Paul. 1996. Te Others: How Animals Made Us Human. Washington, DC: 
Island Press, Shearwater Books. 
Shklovsky, Boris. “Art as Technique.” In Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, eds., Rus-
sian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 3–24. 
Shumsky, Dimitry. 2009. “Czechs, Germans, Arabs, Jews: Franz Kafka’s ‘Jackals and 
Arabs’ between Bohemia and Palestine.” AJS Review 33(1): 71–100. 
Simons, John. 2002. Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation. Wiltshire: 
Palgrave. 
Snoek, Anke. 2012. Agamben’s Joyful Kafka: Finding Freedom beyond Subordination. 
New York: Bloomsbury. 
Snyder, Verne P. 1981. “Kafka’s ‘Burrow’: A Speculative Analysis.” Twentieth Century 
Literature 27(2): 113–26. 
Sokel, Walter. 1964. Franz Kafka—Tragik und Ironie: Zur Struktur seiner Kunst. 
Munich: Albert Langen. 
Sokel, Walter. 2002. Te Myth of Power and the Self: Essays on Franz Kafka. Detroit: 





















Sokel, Walter. 2007. “Identity and the Individual, or Past and Present: Franz Kafka’s 
‘A Report to an Academy’ in a Psychoanalytic and a Sociohistorical Context.” In 
Stanley Corngold, ed., Kafka’s Selected Stories: New Translations, Background and 
Context, Criticism. New York: Norton, 252–75. 
Sokolowsky, Alexander. 1908. Beobachtungen über die Psyche der Menschenafen. Frank-
furt am Main: Neuer Frankfurter Verlag. 
Sontag, Susan. 2001. Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Picador U.S.A. 
Spector, Scott. 2000. Prague Territories: National Confict and Cultural Innovation in 
Franz Kafka’s Fin de Siècle. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Cary Nelson and 
Lawrence Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 271–313. 
Spurr, David. 2011. “Paranoid Modernism in Joyce and Kafka.” Journal of Modern 
Literature 34(2): 178–91. 
Stahman, Laura. 2004. “Franz Kafka’s ‘Te Burrow’ as Model of Ipseity in Levinasian 
Teory.” Mosaic 37(3): 19–32. 
Stine, Peter. 1981. “Franz Kafka and Animals.” Contemporary Literature 22: 58–80. 
Straus, Nina Pelikan. 2007–8. “An Investigation into Kafka’s Animal Sites.” Journal of 
the Kafka Society of America 31–32: 99–104. 
Stuart, Dabney. 1969. “Kafka’s ‘A Report to an Academy’: An Exercise in Method.” 
Studies in Short Fiction 6: 413–20. 
Sturc, Roman S. 1982. “Existence as Construct: Kafka’s ‘Te Great Wall of China’ and 
‘Te Burrow.’” Research Studies 50(2): 79–89. 
Sussman, Henry. 1977. “Te All-Embracing Metaphor: Refections on Kafka’s ‘Te 
Burrow.’” Glyph 1: 100–131. 
Sweeney, Kevin W. 2013. “‘You’re Nobody ’Till Somebody Love You’: Communica-
tion and the Social Destruction of Subjectivity in Kafka Metamorphosis.” In Bren-
dan Moran and Carlo Salzani, eds., Philosophy and Kafka. Lanham, MD: Lexing-
ton Books, 95–108. 
Swift, Jonathan. 2003. Gulliver’s Travels. London: Penguin. 
Swinford, Dean. 2010. “Te Portrait of an Armor-Plated Sign: Reimagining Samsa’s 
Exoskeleton.” In Marc Lucht and Donna Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, 
Hybrids, and Other Fantastic Beings. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 211–36. 
Tauber, Herbert. 1948. Franz Kafka: An Interpretation of His Works. Trans. G. Hum-
phreys Roberts and Roger Senhouse. London: Secker and Warburg. 
Taylor, Alexander. 1965. “Te Waking: Te Teme of Kafka’s Metamorphosis.” Studies 
in Short Fiction 2: 337–42. 
Tester, Keith. 1991. Animals and Society: Te Humanity of Animal Rights. London: 
Routledge. 
Tiher, Allen. 1990. Franz Kafka: A Study of the Short Fiction. Boston: Twayne. 
Tomas, Keith. Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500–
1800. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Torlby, Anthony. 1972. Kafka: A Study. London: Heinemann. 
Tiefenbrun, Ruth. 1973. Moment of Torment: An Interpretation of Franz Kafka’s Short 





















Tismar, Jens. 1975. “Kafkas ‘Schakale und Araber’ im zionistischen Kontext 
betrachtet.” Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft 19: 306–23. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. 1975. Te Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Trans. 
Richard Howard. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. 1982. Symbolism and Interpretation. Trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Troscianko, Emily. 2014. Kafka’s Cognitive Realism. New York: Routledge. 
Tsovel, Ariel. 2004. “Alienated Contact: Transformations in the Relation of Humans 
to Other Species from Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries” [in Hebrew]. 
In Sophia Menache, Benjamin Arbel, and Joseph Terkel, eds., Bene-adam ṿe-ḥayot 
aḥerot be-aspaḳlaryah hisṭorit. Jerusalem: Carmel, 333–87. 
Türk, Johannes. 2007. “Rituals of Dying, Burrows of Anxiety in Freud, Proust, and 
Kafka: Prolegomena to a Critical Immunology.” Germanic Review 82(2): 141–56. 
Turner, James. 1980. Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Humanity and Pain in the 
Victorian Mind. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Tyler, Tom. 2010. “Four Hands Good, Two Hands Bad.” In Marc Lucht and Donna 
Yarri, eds., Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids, and Other Fantastic Beings. Lan-
ham, MD: Lexington Books, 175–90. 
Uhall, Michael. 2016. “Creaturely Conditions: Acknowledgment and Animality in 
Kafka, Cavell, and Uexküll.” Confgurations 24(1): 1–24. 
Vizthum, Tomas. 1993. “A Revolution in Writing: Te Overthrow of Epic Story-
telling by Written Narrative in Kafka’s Josefne, die Sängerin.” Symposium 46(4): 
269–78. 
Wagenbach, Klaus. 1958. Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie seiner Jugend, 1883–1912. 
Bern: Francke. 
Wegmann, Tomas. 2011. “Te Human as Resident Animal: Kafka’s Der Bau in the 
Context of His Later Notebooks and Letters.” Monatshefte 103(3): 360–71. 
Weigand, Hermann J. 1972. “Franz Kafka’s ‘Te Burrow’ (“Der Bau”): An Analytical 
Essay.” PMLA 87(2): 152–66. 
Weil, Kari. 2012. Tinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now? New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Weinberg, Kurt. 1963. Kafkas Dichtungen: Die Travestien des Mythos. Bern: Francke. 
Weinstein, Leo. 1962. “Kafka’s Ape: Heel or Hero.” Modern Fiction Studies 81: 75–79. 
Weitzenfeld, Adam, and Melanie Joy. 2014. “An Overview of Anthropocentrism, 
Humanism, and Speciesism in Critical Animal Teory.” In Anthony J. Nocella et 
al., eds., Defning Critical Animal Studies: An Intersectional Social Justice Approach 
for Liberation. New York: Peter Lang, 3–27. 
Weninger, Robert. 1993. “Sounding Out the Silence of Gregor Samsa: Kafka’s Rheto-
ric of Dys-Communication.” Studies in Twentieth Century Literature 17(2): 263–
86. 
Williams, Eric. 2007. “Of Cinema, Food, and Desire: Franz Kafka’s ‘Investigations of 
a Dog.’” College Literature 34(4): 92–124. 
Wiseman, Susan. 1999. “Monstrous Perfectibility: Ape-Human Transformations in 
Hobbes, Bulwer, Tyson.” In Erica Fudge, Ruth Gilbert, and Susan Wiseman, eds., 
At the Border of the Human: Beasts, Bodies and Natural Philosophy in the Early Mod-













Witt, Ann-Marie. 1971. “Confnement in Die Verwandlung and Les Séquestrés 
d’Altona.” Comparative Literature 23: 32–44. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Wolfe, Cary. 2009. “Human, All Too Human: ‘Animal Studies’ and the Humanities.” 
PMLA 124(2): 564–75. 
Wolfe, Cary. 2010. What Is Posthumanism? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Wolfe, Cary. 2013. Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Woodring, Carl R. 1964. “Josefne the Singer, or the Mouse Folk.” In Angel Flores 
and Homer Swander, eds., Franz Kafka Today. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 71–75. 
Youngs, Tim. 2013. Beastly Journeys: Travel and Transformation at the Fin de Siècle. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
Zeder, Melinda A. 2006. “Archaeological Approaches to Documenting Animal 
Domestication.” In Melinda A. Zeder, Daniel G. Bradley, Eve Emshwiller, and 
Bruce D. Smith, eds., Documenting Domestication: New Genetic and Archaeological 
Paradigms. Berkeley: University of California Press, 171–80. 
Zhou, Jianming. 1996. “Literary Rendition of Animal Figures: A Compression 
between Kafka’s Tales and Pu Songling Strange Stories.” In Adrian Hsia, ed., Kafka 
and China. Bern: Peter Lang, 113–76. 
Ziolkowski, Jan. 1990. “Te Form and Spirit of Beast Fable.” Bestia 2: 4–40. 


































absent referent (Carol Adams), 11, 166n49 
Adorno, Teodor: 176n38, Aesthetic 
Teory, 56; and Max Horkheimer (Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment) 38–39, 77, 96, 
128; Minima Moralia, 58; “Notes on 
Kafka,” 2, 6, 16, 
Aesop: “Te Lion and the Mouse Who 
Returned a Kindness,” 146; “Te Man 
and the Lion Traveling Together,” 12–
13, 77; “Te Stag at the Spring and the 
Lion,” 144–45; “Te Wolf, the Dog, 
and the Collar,” 106–7 
Agamben, Giorgio: Homo Sacer, 22–23; 
Idea of Prose, 7; Te Open, 23, 58–59, 
62, 128, 162; Remnants of Auschwitz, 
176n21 
alienation: 3, 15, 21, 84, 90; from animals 
in modernity, 26–27; from animals 
through adolescence, 29–33 
allegory, 3–9, 21–22, 49, 102, 104, 121, 
143–8, 153, 156, 160, 166n28 
animal: agency, 5, 55, 77, 162; fable (see
fable); gaze, 38–39, 54–55, 58, 65, 
92, 115–16, 176n38; killing, 28, 31, 
58, 82, 87, 94–95, 139; narratives 
126, 131; studies, 2–5, 9, 13, 17, 105, 
166n44; turn, 5, 165n20 
animality, 2–3, 15–17, 24–25, 33, 47, 55, 
62, 77, 87, 97, 128, 136, 163 
animalization, 13, 17, 22, 48, 69–70, 
139–40, 142, 156, 162, 173n61 
anthroparchy, 95, 98–100, 109, 160, 161, 
168n10, 174n24 
anthropocentrism, 4, 12–13, 34, 38–93, 
41, 63, 114–15, 158, 161 
anthropomorphism, 2, 12, 102, 119, 131, 
135, 139, 146–48, 152–53, 166n51 
Arendt, Hannah, 13, 24 
Aristotle, 44, 68, 125 
Barthes, Roland, 6–7 
Baudrillard, Jean, 23 
Bauer, Felice, 1, 15, 91, 107, 153, 177n14 
beast fable. See fable 
de Beauvoir, Simone, 47 
Benjamin, Walter, 2, 6, 142 
Bergson, Henri, 67, 109, 113–14 
Bhabha, Homi K., 74 
binary: human/animal, 13, 22, 33–34, 70–
71, 98, 128, 138, 140, 160, 165n1 
biopolitics, 16, 25–26, 48, 160 
Booth, Wayne C., 41, 109 
Borges, Jorge Luis, 43–44 
Brod, Max, 1,5, 6, 82, 91–92, 119, 143–
44, 150, 166n28 
Butler, Judith, 65–68, 133, 156 
Camus, Albert, 6, 171n19 
Canetti, Elias, 15, 46, 86, 89, 153 
Coetzee, J. M., 55, 171n20, 176n21 
Corngold, Stanley, 46, 140, 170n57 










































circus, 51–52, 70, 89, 111 
creaturely, 2, 16, 54, 55, 129, 167n72 
Darwin, Charles, 13, 103, 172n33; evolu-
tionary theory, 4, 14, 61–63 
deallegorization, 106–7, 176n17 
defamiliarization, 110, 129 
dehumanization, 58, 70 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, 2, 8–9, 
15, 38, 40, 70, 107, 174n12, 176n19 
Derrida, Jacques, 2, 44–45, 54, 97, 104, 
128, 130, 167n5, 176n38, 
Descartes, René, 10, 55, 62 
dog: the paradigm of the faithful, 103–4; 
the paradigm of the despicable, 104–6; 
the paradigm of the submissive, 106–7 
drag, 66–67, 172n54 
duck/rabbit illusion, 154–55, 158 
Elias, Norbert (Te Civilizing Process), 
27–28, 52 
everyman, 121 
evolutionary theory. See Darwin, Charles 
fable, 3, 9, 12, 77, 102, 106–7, 144–48, 
153, 169n50, 176n17 
Fanon, Frantz, 47, 71–72, 74 
Fingerhut, Karl-Heinz, 3, 177n2 
Forster, E. M., 10–11, 128 
Foucault, Michel, 24–25, 44–45 
Freud, Sigmund, 13, 30; Civilization and 
Its Discontents, 104–5, Totem and Taboo, 
22 
Frye, Northrop, 9 
Genette, Gérard, 131 
Te Golden Ass (Apuleius), 33, 34–35 
Gombrich, Ernst, 155 
Gulliver’s Travels (Jonathan Swift), 109, 
171n17, 176n25 
Haraway, Donna, 4, 62 
Hagenbeck, Carl, 50–53, 56, 58, 171n6 
Hobbes, Tomas, 56–59 
Heidegger, Martin, 23, 24, 97–98, 136 
humanimality, 10, 13, 16–17; ontological 
and performative, 141, 158, 161 
humanism, 23–25, 97–98 
humanization, 17, 63–69, 73, 75, 95, 139, 
161–62 
humanormativity, 33, 168n29 
hybridity, 74, 142, 161; hybridization 
(Bakhtin) 157; humanimal, 38, 135–38, 
140–42, 157, 161; performative (see
humanimality, ontological and perfor-
mative) 
indeterminability: nonhuman, 121–28; 
humanimal, 135–42 149, 151–56 
interspecies: being, 137; dynamics, 103, 
134; ethics, 16; power relations (see
power relations, human-animal); transi-
tion (see transspecies) 
invisible gorilla, 3–4 
Janouch, Gustav, 13–14, 66 
Jesenská, Milena, 1, 83, 101, 145–46, 
174n12 
Jewish ritual slaughter (shechita). See
slaughter 
Kafka, Franz: America, also known as Te 
Man Who Disappeared (Der Verschol-
lene) 136, 178n33; “Te Animal in 
the Synagogue” (“Das Tier in der 
Synagogue”), a.k.a “In Our Synagogue” 
(“In unserer Synagoge”), 129, 167n10; 
“Advocates” (“Fürsprecher”), 8; Te Blue 
Octavo Notebooks (Die Acht Oktavhefte), 
82, 101, 105–6, 137, 144, 148, 151; 
“Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor” 
(“Blumfeld ein älterer Junggeselle”), 
105, 157; “Te Bridge” (“Die Brücke”), 
157; “Te Burrow” (“Der Bau”), 119–
42; “Te Bucket Rider” (“Der Kübel-
reiter”), 157; “Building Te Great Wall 
of China” (“Beim Bau der Chinesischen 
Mauer”), 140, 162, 173n61, 174n10; 
Te Castle (Das Schloss), 8, 123; “Te 
Cares of a Family Man” (“Die Sorge 
des Hausvaters”), 157; “A Comment” 
(“Ein Kommentar”) a.k.a “Give it Up!” 
(“Gibs auf!”), 8; “A Country Doc-


































162, 173n61; “A Crossbreed” (“Eine 
Kreuzung”), 85–86, 120, 139, 149; 
“Description of a Struggle” (“Besch-
reibung eines Kampfes”), 124, 170n3; 
“First Sorrow” (“Erstes Leid”), 143; “A 
Fratricide” (“Ein Brudermord”), 83, 
151; “A Guest of the Dead” (“Bei den 
Toten zu Gast”), 157; “Te Hunter 
Gracchus” (“Der Jäger Gracchus”), 157; 
“It is the Animal with the Big Tail” (“Es 
ist das Tier mit dem großen Schweif ”), 
130; “Jackals and Arabs” (“Schakale 
und Araber”), 81–101; “Josefne, the 
Singer or the Mouse People” (“Jose-
fne, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der 
Mäuse”), 143–58; “Te Judgment” 
(“Das Urteil”), 39–40, 56; “Te Knock 
at the Courtyard Gate” (“Der Schlag 
ans Hoftor”), 40; “Leopards in the 
Temple” (“Leoparden in Tempel”), 
131, 147, 149; “A Little Fable” (“Kleine 
Fabel”), 144–8, “Te Married Couple” 
(“Das Ehepaar”), 151, 157; “Te 
Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”), 
21–48; “Te New Lawyer” (“Der neue 
Advokat”), 138, 157; “It is the Animal 
with the Big Tail” (“Es ist das Tier mit 
dem großen Schweif ”), 130; “A Page 
from an Old Document” (“Ein altes 
Blatt”), 86–89, 94; “On Parables” (“Von 
den Gleichnissen”), 7; “In the Penal 
Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”), 40, 56, 
93–94, 107; “Prometheus,” 7; “On the 
Question of the Laws” (“Zur Frage der 
Gesetze”), 56–57; “Report to an Acad-
emy” (“Ein Bericht für eine Akademie”), 
49–77;”Researches of a Dog” (“Forsc-
hungen eines Hundes”), 102–16; “Te 
Silence of the Sirens” (“Das Schweigen 
der Sirenen”), 137, 157; “A Hunger 
Artist” (“Ein Hungerkünstler”), 89–90; 
“Temptation in the Village” (“Verlock-
ung im Dorf”), 106; “Te Test” (“Die 
Prüfung”), 7; “Te Tiger” (“Der Tiger”), 
147, 149; Te Trial (Der Prozess), 5, 7, 
35, 39, 56, 58, 93, 107, 137–40, 152; 
“Te Village Schoolmaster” (“Der Dorf-
schullehrer”) a.k.a “Te Giant Mole” 
(“Der Riesenmaulwurf”), 130–31, 142; 
“Te Vulture” (“Der Geier”), 131, 147, 
149; “Te Wish to Be a Red Indian” 
(“Wunsch, Indianer zu werden”), 138 
Koelb, Clayton, 32–33, 65, 94, 150, 
177n14 
Köhler, Wolfgang, 55–56 
Lacan, Jacques, 74 
Lady into Fox (David Garnett), 13–14 
La Fontaine, Jean de, 169n50 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 4 
Levinas, Emmanuel, 9 
Lorenz, Konrad, 11 
Lukács, Georg, 13 
Lyotard, Jean-François, 77 
Marx, Karl, 21, 36, 98–99, 159 
meat, 23, 29, 81, 86–87, 89–92 
metamorphosis narratives, 8–9, 13–14, 
32–39, 47, 60–61; etiological and non-
etiological narratives, 33–35, 38; in Te 
Odyssey (see Te Odyssey); Ovidian, 33, 
34, 41, 62, 169n31–32; psychophysi-
cal split in, 34–35, 37; vs evolutionary 
narratives, 61–63 
Mill, John Stuart, 41 
mimesis, 11, 49 
Moby Dick (Herman Melville), 4 
monster, 33, 42, 45 
narratology, 33, 47, 125, 131, 133, 162 
Nabokov, Vladimir, 42 
“News of an Educated Young Man” (E. T. 
A. Hofmann), 66 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 13, 54, 107 
Norris, Margot, 3, 89–90 
Te Odyssey (Homer), 34, 41, 103, 169n50 
Open parable (Heinz Politzer), 6, 145 
Orwell, George: Animal Farm, 115, 153; 
“Politics and the English Language,” 
85–86 
Ovid. See metamorphosis tales, Ovidian 
performativity: gender, 66, 68; human, 68; 







































posthumanism, 4–5, 16–17, 26, 56, 71, 
109 
postspeciesist critique, 85 
power relations: human-animal, 12, 15, 
100–101, 161; inverted, 108–10, trans-
gression of, 134 
Richard, I. A., 12, 166n51 
Rothfels, Nigel, 50–51 
Russell, Bertrand, 59, 171–2n28 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 47 
simian orientalism. See Haraway, Donna 
slaughter, 27, 59, 84–90, 168n18; Kafka’s 
approach to, 82–83, 91–92; Jewish 
ritual, 81–82, 91 
sliding paradox (Gerhard Neumann), 6, 
145 
Sokel, Walter, 41–42, 62, 93 
Sontag, Susan, 5 
speech acts, 98, 156, 175n28 
species: barrier, 13, 38, 40, 70, 162–63; 
cis-species, 70–71; fuidity 13, 34, 154, 
162; hierarchies, 65, 69, 86, 110, 134–
35; identity 47–48, 61–71, 132–35, 
142, 154, 157, 160; performance, 66, 
69; queer, 69; social construction of, 48, 
61, 65, 160; transition, 34, 61, 65, 68, 
70–73, 160, 173n63 
speciesing, 156 
speciesism, 85–86, 114, 168n29 
Spivak, Gayatri, 76–77 
Todorov, Tzvetan, 21–22, 49 
transgression: humanimal, 138; of 
language, 84–86, 136, 138–39, 162; 
of power relations (see power relations, 
transgression of ); of species boundaries, 
34–38; of species essentialism, 42–48; 
of species hierarchies, 38–42 
transformation; Grete’s, 32–33, 173n63. 
See also metamorphosis tales 
transspecies, 68–69, 160. See also species, 
transition 
Trough the Looking Glass (Lewis Carroll), 
134–35 
vegetarianism, 82, 90–94 
vulnerability, 127 
Underground: narratives 133–25 
Ungeziefer, 22–24, 32, 42–43, 45–6, 149, 
170n56 
Utopia (Tomas More), 168n18 
werewolf, 69, 172n39 
William Tell (Friedrich Schiller), 25–26 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 76, 155 
Woolf, Virginia: Flash, 104; Orlando,  
11 
Yahoos. See Gulliver’s Travels (Jonathan 
Swift) 
Te Yearling (Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings), 
31–32 
“Te Young Englishman or the Ape as 
Human” (Wilhelm Hauf), 66 
zoo, 50–52 
zoon echon logon, 24, 68, 139 
zoopoetics, 2, 5, 10, 16–17, 26, 159–60, 
162–63 
